

PHRENOLOGY,

OR THE

DOCTRINE OF THE MENTAL PHENOMENA.

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P R E F A C E.

Whoever wishes for truth is a philosopher; and of philosophers there are as many varieties as there are departments of knowledge as well physical as metaphysical. The title, however, is more particularly given to him who looks for exact notions and positive knowledge founded on principles dependent on the relations between cause and effect.

It is unfortunate for humanity that those who assume distinctive titles; do not act up to them. From this cause it is that the most noble appellations fall into discredit. Pretended patriots have sometimes been more dangerous than declared enemies; pretended Christians worse than heathens. Who would not be styled philosopher, or friend, or lover of wisdom? Yet is this name often applied to decry individuals and their manner of thinking. Let us only observe that all who call themselves philosophers deserve not the title any more than do all their's who are called noble.

The ancient philosophers were, in general, metaphysicians, that is, they examined objects, without the reach of observation; for instance, the primitive cause of the universe, the origin of beings, the cause of life, the nature of the soul, its immortality, &c. I incessantly repeat, that the aim of Phrenology is never to attempt pointing out what the mind is in itself or its manner of acting,

or its final destination. Phrenologists are observers of nature, and as such they examine only the manifestations of the mind and the circumstances under which these take place in this life. To prove Phrenology, a great mass of incontestable facts has been collected. This volume contains philosophical reflections, and inferences drawn from phrenological observations. It will be divided into eight sections. In the first I shall make remarks on various systems of mental philosophy;—In the second I shall enumerate the fundamental powers of the mind which are ascertained by observation and admitted in phrenology, state their aim, the disorders which may result from them, and the consequences of their inactivity; in the third, I shall discuss their origin; in the fourth, the conditions of their manifestations; in the fifth, the religious constitution of man; in the sixth, the moral constitution man; in the seventh, I shall make some practical reflections; and, in the eighth, explain several philosophical expressions according to the fundamental powers of the mind.

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PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES
OF
PHRENOLOGY.

SECTION I.

OBSERVATIONS ON VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL VIEW OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

It may be indifferent to phrenologists whether the first wise men were among the Egyptians, Chaldeans, Indians or Chinese. As the fundamental powers of the mind are innate and essentially the same in mankind, it is probable that in every nation some individuals excelled and took the lead of their countrymen. My object is here to take a very summary view of the most important schools of philosophy.

It is known that before the Greek philosophers learning was hereditary in peculiar tribes or castes, and wisdom the monopoly of certain families, of the priests in Egypt, of the Levites among the Jews, of the Magi in Chaldaea, Assyria, and Persia, of the Brahmins among the Indians, of the Druids among the Celtic nations, &c. All knowledge was confined to priesthood, and the vulgar relied on their sayings and interpretations of nature and heaven. The whole tendency of the barbaric philosophy, though employed upon important subjects, both divine and human, was mystical. Instead of investigating truth from clear principles,

there was every where a public or vulgar and a concealed or more philosophical doctrine. The sacerdotaly directed the religious and civil concerns, the administration of justice and the education of youth, clothed their dogmas in an allegorical dress, and transmitted them principally by the way of tradition, to which the vulgar gave their simple and easy assent. Ignorance, superstition and impostors prevailed. It is, however, an important fact that the doctrines of a Supreme Deity and the immortality of the soul were universally received.

The founders of the Grecian states introduced the mode of instruction used in their native countries in a poetical dress, and under the disguise of fables, mystery, prodigies, and mythological enigmas. The management of the civil and religious affairs were in the same hands during the first period of Greece as well as elsewhere. By degrees, however, practical wisdom appeared under the exertions of the seven wise men, and Thales from Miletus, the first of them, introduced the scientific method of philosophising.

Theogony and Cosmogony, (God and nature,) were the principal objects of philosophical inquiries in the remotest ages. The chaos, as eternal, was generally admitted, and the creation from nothing was unknown. The sum of the ancient Theogonies and Cosmogonies seems to be: the first matter, containing the seeds of all future beings, existed from eternity with God. At length the Divine Energy upon matter produced a motion among its parts by which those of the same kind were brought together, and those of a different kind were separated, and by which, according to certain wise laws, the various forms of the material world were produced. The same energy of emanation gave existence to animals, to men, and to gods, who inhabit the heavenly bodies and various places of nature. Among men those who possess a larger portion of the Divine nature than others are hereby impelled to great and beneficent actions, and afford illustrious proofs of their Divine Original, on account of which they are after death raised to a place

among the gods and become objects of religious worship.— Upon the basis of such notions the whole mythological system and all the religious rites and mysteries of the Greeks may be founded. Blind necessity in the motion of the particles of matter seems to have been admitted as the first principle of nature.

Anaxagoras of Clazomena first affirmed that a pure mind, perfectly free from all material connections, acted upon matter with intelligence and design in the formation of the universe. Instead of mixing mind with the rest, he conceived it to be a separate, simple, pure, and intelligent being, capable of forming the eternal mass of matter. Like Thales, he believed the sun and stars to be inanimate fiery bodies, and no proper objects of worship. Of course such doctrines offended the Athenians and their priests; Anaxagoras was banished and went to Lampsacus, saying to his friends that he had not lost the Athenians, but the Athenians had lost him.

The Ionic school investigated particularly the origin and nature of things, considered the external objects much more than the nature of man, and in men paid little attention to those subjects in which the happiness of human life is immediately concerned. They admired virtue and extolled virtuous actions without taking the pains of establishing the principles and inculcating the precepts of sound morality. No distinction was made between thoughts and objects thought of.

Socrates gave a new direction to philosophical investigation. He united with a penetrating judgment, a liberal mind and exalted views, exemplary integrity and purity of manners. Observing with regret that the opinions of the Athenians were misled and their moral principles corrupted, by philosophers who spent all their time in refined speculations upon the origin and nature of things, and by sophists who taught the art of false eloquence and deceitful reasoning, Socrates endeavored to institute a new and more useful method of instruction. He conceived that the true end of philosophy is not an ostentatious display of superior learning, neither ingenious conjectures, nor subtle disputations, but the

love of truth and virtue. He estimated the value of knowledge by its utility and recommended the study of astronomy, geometry and other sciences only as far as they admit of a practical application to the purposes of human life. His great object was to lead men into an acquaintance with themselves, to convince them of their follies and vices, to inspire them with the love of virtue and to furnish them with useful moral instruction. He thought it more reasonable to examine things in relation to man and the principles of his moral conduct, than such as lie beyond the sphere and reach of human intellect, and consequently do not relate to man. His favorite maxim was: whatever is above us, does not concern us.

Socrates had many disciples who formed schools or philosophical sects, such as the Cyrenic sect (by Aristippus from Cyrene in Africa;) the Megaric sect (by Euclid of Megara;) the Eliac sect; &c. The most important were the Academic sect by Plato, the Cynic by Antisthenes, the Peripatetic by Aristotle, and the Stoic by Zeno from Cyprus.

Plato at the age of 20 years attended to the instruction of Socrates, remained eight years with him, and was his most illustrious disciple. At the death of Socrates he went to Megara and studied under Euclid; he then travelled in Magna Græcia was instructed in the mysteries of the Pythagorean system; he also visited Theodorus of Cyrene, and became his pupil in mathematical science; he even went to Egypt to learn from the Egyptian priests astronomy, returned to the Pythagorean school at Tarentum and finally to Athens where he opened a school in a small garden and spent a long life in the instruction of youth. He mixed the doctrines of his masters with his own conceptions, showed a great propensity to speculative refinement, he therefore attached himself to the subtleties of the Pythagorean school and disdained the sober method of reasoning introduced by Socrates. His discourses on moral topics are more pleasing than when he loses himself with Pythagoras in abstract speculations expressed in mathematical proportions and poetical diction.

According to Plato philosophy as it is employed in the contemplation of truth is termed *theoretical*, and as it is conversant in the regulation of actions, is *practical*. The theoretical philosophy inquires, besides the contemplation of truth and virtue, the right conduct of understanding and the powers of speech in the pursuit of knowledge.

Plato remembered the inconveniences which several of his predecessors among the Greeks had brought upon themselves by an undisguised declaration of their opinions. On the other hand he knew how successfully the Egyptians and Pythagoreans had employed the art of concealment to excite the admiration of the vulgar who are always inclined to imagine something more than human in things which they do not understand. Yet he did not, after the example of Pythagoras, demand an oath of secrecy from his disciples, but he purposely threw over his public instruction of various subjects a veil of obscurity which was only removed for those who were thought worthy of being admitted to his more private and confidential lectures.

Plato divides his theoretical philosophy into three branches: theological, physical and mathematical. He admitted God and matter as eternal, since nothing can proceed from nothing, but he ascribed to God the power of formation: farther he speaks of the soul of the world from which God separated inferior souls and assigned them down to earth into human bodies as into a sepulchre or prison. From this cause he derived the depravity and misery to which human nature is liable. Life is the conjunction of the soul with the body, death is their separation.

The human soul consists of three parts: 1st, Intelligence; 2d, Passion; 3d, Appetite.—Passion and appetite depend on matter; intellect comes from God, and the rational soul alone is immortal. The human understanding is employed, 1st, upon things which it comprehends by itself, and which in their nature are simple and invariable; or 2d, upon things which are subject to the senses and which are liable to change. Sense is the passive perception of the soul through the medium of the body.

In his republic or political doctrine he wished to subjugate passion and appetite by means of reason or abstract contemplation of ideas, a conception which prevails still now-a-days and which will be cleared up by phrenology.

His notions of morality were exaggerated. He placed the greatest happiness in the contemplation and knowledge of the first good—God; and the end of knowing God in endeavoring to render men as like to God as the condition of human nature will permit. This likeness consists in prudence, justice, sanctity and temperance. To attain this state it is necessary to be convinced that the body is a prison, from which the soul must be released before it can arrive at the knowledge of real and immutable things. The virtuous tendency of man is a gift of God, the effect of reason alone, and cannot be taught.

The followers of Plato introduced in his philosophy various changes and new opinions, and increased thereby its obscurity;—This happened particularly in Alexandria, where Platonic philosophy was mingled with traditionary tenets of Egypt and Eastern nations and with the sacred principles of the Jews and Christians.

Aristotle, from Stagyræ a town in Thrace, at the age of 17 years went to Athens, devoted himself to the study of philosophy in the school of Plato, and continued in the Academy till Plato's death. Several years later he was chosen as preceptor of Alexander son of Philip, was eight years with Alexander, and when Alexander undertook his Asiatic expedition formed a new school in the Lyceum—a grove in the suburb of Athens, which was used for military exercise. Since he walked in discoursing with his disciples, his sect was called the Peripatetics. He had two classes of disciples. In the morning he instructed the select, in the evening the Lyceum was open to all young men without distinction. His study is rather that of words than of things, and tends more to perplex the understanding with subtle distinctions than to enlighten it with real knowledge.

His logical dissertations are not sufficiently clear; they contain many subtleties which of course produce obscurity. He was

fond of syllogistic reasoning, but did not carefully distinguish between words and ideas. He reduced the general terms to ten classes—or categories. Plato had learnt the arrangement of categories from the Pythagorean school, who considered ten as a perfect number. Aristotle's categories are, 1st, substance;—2d, quantity;—3d, relation;—4th, quality;—5th, action;—6th, passion;—7th, when or time;—8th, where or place;—9th, situation or local relation;—10th, habit. Later five other general heads were added, viz. opposition, priority, coincidence, motion, and possession. In his physics the explanation of the natural appearances is tedious.—In his metaphysical doctrine of the Deity and soul, he divests God of the glory of creation, connects him with a world already formed by the chain of necessity, but makes him the first spring and cause of all motion. God is constantly occupied with the contemplation of his own nature, and so removed from the inferior parts of the universe that he is not even a spectator of what is passing among the inhabitants of the earth, and therefore cannot be a proper object of worship, prayers and sacrifices.—The human soul has three faculties: nutritive, sensitive and rational. By the nutritive faculty life is produced and preserved;—by the sensitive we perceive and feel. He nowhere says whether the soul is mortal or immortal. He placed moral felicity neither in the pleasures of the body, nor in riches, civil glory, power, rank, nor in the contemplation of truth, but in the exercise of virtue, which is in itself a source of delight. Virtue is either theoretical—the exercise of the understanding, or practical—the pursuit of what is right and good.—Practical virtue is acquired by habit.

Aristotle, by his metaphysical doctrines offended the priesthood. Apprehensive of meeting with the fate of Socrates, he left Athens saying: I am not willing to give the Athenians an opportunity of committing a second offence against philosophy. He had continued his school twelve years and appointed Theophrastus, one of his favorite pupils, as his successor.

The Cynic sect, founded by Antisthenes, an Athenian, was not

so much a school of philosophy as an institution of manners. Socrates perceiving the great tendency of the Athenians for futile speculations, extreme effeminacy, luxury and vanity, recommended practical wisdom. The Cynics fell in the other extreme.—They taught simplicity of manners, but passed beyond the limits of decorum, and at last became ridiculous and disgusting.

Zeno admired the general principle of the Cynic school, but could not reconcile himself to their peculiar manners, nor could he adopt their indifference about every scientific inquiry. He attended the different masters of philosophy and then became a founder of a new sect, called Stoic from *Stoa*—porch, viz. the place of their school. There were great contests between Zeno and the academy on one side and between Zeno and Epicurus on the other. Zeno borrowed his doctrine on physics from Pythagoras and Plato; he excels more by his strict system of moral discipline. Whilst Epicurus taught his followers to seek happiness in tranquillity and freedom from labor and pain, Zeno imagined his wise man not only free from all sense of pleasure, but void of all passions and emotions, without fear and hope, and capable of being happy in the midst of torture. Epicurus believed in the fortuitous course of atoms whilst Zeno admitted fate or an eternal and immutable series of causes and effects. According to the Stoics wisdom consists in the knowledge of things divine or human. Virtue is the only true wisdom; and the mind of man is originally like a blank sheet wholly without character but capable of receiving any. The conformity to nature is the great end of existence. Virtue is to be sought for not through the fear of punishment, or the hope of reward, but for its own sake. Virtue, being in conformity to nature, is in itself happiness.

Man has duties towards God, towards himself and towards his neighbors. God is the author of all that is good and the Supreme director of all human affairs. The pious man reveres God in all events, is in every thing resigned to God's will, considers whatever befalls him as right and the will of God, and cheerfully follows wherever divine providence leads him, even to suffering or

death. Piety, in short, is nothing but a quiet submission to irresistible fate.

Man's duty with respect to himself is to subdue his passions of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, and even pity. It is virtuous self-denial and self-command. Man may withdraw from life because life and death are indifferent things, and death may be more consistent with nature than life.

Our duty towards others is to love all men, even our enemies. A wise man will injure no one, will feel pleasure in protecting and serving others. He will not think himself born for himself alone, but for the common good of mankind. He is rewarded for his good by itself without applause or recompense. The wise man will disdain sorrow from sympathy as well as from personal suffering. He is ready to exercise lenity and benignity, and to attend to the welfare of others and to the general interest of mankind, but pity towards a criminal is weakness.

Another great branch of Greek philosophy sprung from Pythagoras and sprouted out into the Eleatic, Heraclitean, Epicurean, and Sceptic sects. Pythagoras, probably from Samos, went to Egypt, spent there 22 years, underwent at Thebes many severe and troublesome ceremonies in order to gain the confidence of the priests and to be instructed in their most concealed doctrines. His method of teaching was mysterious and after the example of the Egyptian priests. He even boasted to be capable of doing miracles, and to have received his doctrine from heaven. He had public and private disciples. The oath of secrecy was given by the initiated concerning the doctrine of God and nature. He taught theoretical and practical philosophy. The former contemplates things of an immutable, eternal and incorruptible nature, the other teaches things necessary for the purposes of life. Theoretical or contemplative wisdom could not be obtained without a total abstraction from the ordinary affairs of life and a perfect tranquillity of mind; hence the necessity of a society separated from the world for the purpose of contemplation. Man was composed of body and soul, the soul of a rational principle, seated

in the brain, and of an irrational part including the passions and seated in the heart. The rational part (λογικόν) is immortal, the irrational part perishes. The rational soul after suffering successive purgations by transmigration, and sufficiently purified, is received among the gods and returns to the eternal source from which it first proceeded. The Pythagoreans, therefore, abstained from animal food and from animal sacrifices. The object of all their moral precepts was to lead man to the imitation of God. They supposed, like the Egyptians, the air full of spirits and demons, who caused health or sickness among men and beasts.

Among the *Eleatic* sect was Democritus, the derider who laughed at the follies of mankind, whilst Heraclitus of Ephesus, another follower of Pythagoras, was perpetually shedding tears on account of the vices of mankind and particularly of his countrymen, the Ephesians.

Epicurus, an Athenian, was of opinion that nothing deserved the name of learning which was not conducive to the happiness of life. He excelled by urbanity and captivating manners, made pleasure the end of his philosophy and wisdom a guide to it. He treated vulgar superstitions with contempt, dismissed the gods from the care of the world, admitted nothing but material atoms, was opposed to the austerity of the Stoics, and rejected providence and fate, doctrines so strongly maintained by the Stoics. He considered the regulation of manners (Ethics) as more important than the knowledge of physics. He was an enemy of the third part of philosophical doctrines—dialectics, as only productive of idle quibbles and fruitless cavilling.—He placed truth above any other consideration, and the end of living in happiness. Philosophy ought to be employed in search of felicity: bodily ease and mental tranquillity through temperance, moderation, fortitude, justice, benevolence and friendship.

Among the philosophers who regarded the testimony of the external senses as illusive, Pyrrho, from Elea, the founder of the Pyrrhonic sect, carried his doubts to the extreme. This school rejected every inference drawn from sensations and admitted as a

fundamental principle that to every argument an argument of equal weight might in all cases be opposed. The Pyrrhonic philosophers had the tendency rather to demolish every other philosophical structure than to erect one of their own. If it be true that Pyrrho carried his scepticism to such a ridiculous degree that his friends were obliged to accompany him whenever he went out that he might not be run over by carriages or fall down precipices, his mind was deranged.

The Romans conquered the Greeks by arms, but submitted to their understanding and manners. They found among them philosophical systems for all tastes. The gloomy and contemplative adopted the Pythagorean and Platonic creeds. Brutus was favorable to the union of the Platonic and Stoic philosophy. Cicero was rather a warm admirer and an elegant memorialist of philosophy than a practical philosopher himself. He held Plato in high respect, especially for his philosophy of nature; he also was an admirer of the Stoic system concerning natural equity and civil law; he praised their ideas concerning morals, but he was continually fluctuating between hope and fear, averse to contention, and incapable of vigorous resolutions, and full of vanity. Cato of Utica was a true Stoic;—Lucretius and Horace were of the Epicurean sect;—Plutarch, like Cicero, rather an interpreter of philosophers than an eminent philosopher himself. Epictetus taught the purest morals, and his life was an admirable pattern of sobriety, magnanimity and the most rigid virtue. Marcus Aurelius was the last ornament of the Stoic school.

About the close of the second century arose at Alexandria the Eclectic system: a mixture of the different tenets of philosophy and religion, to the detriment of both. Pagan ideas were mixed with Christianity, and the different sects of philosophy were arbitrarily interpreted. Subtle distinctions, airy suppositions and vague terms were introduced; and innumerable trifles were proposed under the appearance of profound philosophy.—Pagans became Christians and associated their ideas and language with Christianity, and the fathers of the Christian church studied the

ancient philosophers to furnish themselves with weapons against their adversaries, to show the superiority of the christian doctrine and to adorn themselves with the embellishment of erudition. Many did not distinguish between the light of revelation and that of reason. Nothing could be expected for philosophy from those who were busily occupied in disputes with infidels and heretics.

From the beginning of the seventh century to the twelfth the Scholastic and Mystic theology sprung up. The irruptions of Barbarians had confined philosophy and learning to monastic institutions, whilst the people were ignorant and superstitious. During the dark ages up to the fourteenth century philosophy resembles a barren wilderness; it was the handmaid of theology; and though the Scholastics paid to Aristotle almost religious reverence, their minds were darkened by Aristotle's dialectics and logic, and their idle contests continued to disturb the world. The syllogistic form of reasoning became general, and the forms of technical phraseology were infinite. I copy only one example from Dr Th. Brown's lectures on philosophy, (stereotype edition p. 327) where he quotes how a scholastic logician proves by a long technical argumentation that the impossible differs from what is possible: 'whatever of itself and in itself includes things contradictory, differs in itself from that which of itself and in itself does not imply anything contradictory. But what is impossible of itself and in itself involves things contradictory, for example, an irrational human being, a round square. But what is possible of itself and in itself, includes no contradiction. Therefore what is impossible in itself differs from what is possible.'

Various sects, as the Nominalists, Realists, Verbalists, Formalists, Thomists, Scotists, and Occamists, were at open war with each other.

The Aristotelian philosophy was kept up, since it was the common opinion that the ancient Greeks had attained the summit of science, so that after all the question was what Aristotle, Plato, or Pythagoras had taught, rather than what was true. Philosophy and religion were so mixed together that some called themselves

Scriptural philosophers, not to show that the general principles of reason and the natural law of morality agree with the doctrine of scripture, but to designate that all philosophy, even of physical and metaphysical science, is derived from divine revelation. Others called themselves Theosophists and professed to derive their knowledge from divine illumination or inspiration. Fraud and hypocrisy were encouraged to secure the credit of the church among the vulgar and ignorant. Nay it became a rule: abroad with the people, at home as you please.

At last in the fourteenth and fifteenth century the taste for polite literature revived in Italy, and the bold reformers in Germany endeavored to correct the errors and corruption of religion. Luther perceived the connexion of philosophy and religion, and declared, that it would be impossible to reform the church without entirely abolishing the canons and decretals and with them the scholastic theology, philosophy and logic, and without instituting others in their stead. Luther, Paracelsus, Ramus and Gassendi were eminent demolishers of the Aristotelian philosophy.

After the revival of letters and restoration of sciences, Bacon, Descartes and Leibnitz were eminent in philosophy. Bacon became the great reformer and founder of true philosophy. He established observation and induction as the basis of knowledge, whilst the essentials of Descartes' philosophy, like those of many predecessors, were thought and the knowledge obtained by thought. Leibnitz, like Plato, never arranged his philosophy methodically, yet he admitted two kinds of perceptions: one without and the other with consciousness; farther, he considered the knowledge procured by the senses as individual, accidental and changeable, but that obtained by thinking and reasoning as general, necessary and positive. According to Leibnitz the reasoning power is endowed with principles, all phenomena are intellectual, and there is an harmony preestablished between the knowledge *a priori* and external sensations. The latter only quicken the former. Phrenology denies the established harmony of Leibnitz between innate ideas and external sensations; it considers sensations and ideas as

acquired, and admits only innate dispositions to acquire sensations and ideas. Yet it admits also a kind of preestablished harmony, concerning existence, between the special powers and the object of their satisfaction. Wherever there is a power, it finds an object. This has been the cause, that many philosophers have derived the powers from their objects of satisfaction. There are objects to be perceived; these were said to be the cause of the perceptive power, whilst the power of perceiving and the object of being perceived exist separately and are only calculated for each other. There may, however, be many objectivities which man cannot perceive for want of special powers.

Hobbes was persecuted for his theological and political heresies, and therefore his views of philosophy were neglected, though Locke borrowed from him some of his most important observations on the association of ideas.

According to Malebranche, God is wherever there is mind, and God is the medium of sensation. Malebranche furnishes to Locke his notions on habits and genius, to Hartley his theory on vibrations, and to Berkley the ancient theory of Pyrrho, viz. that the material objects have no other existence than in the mind.

Locke's philosophy became the basis of the greater number of philosophical opinions in England and France. He denied the innate ideas and innate principles of morality, and maintained with Aristotle* that all knowledge begins with experience, or that all primary notions begin with sensation. According to him, the mind begins with external sensations, and then by means of its perception, retention, contemplation, comparison, reflection, or by its faculties of composing and abstracting, it executes all the particular operations of thinking and volition. In his system even the feelings and moral principles result mediately from the understanding.

Locke has some merit; he is a great lover of truth, and his work contains many judicious remarks brought together from va-

* Nilil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.

rious quarters, and he has greatly contributed to do away the rubbish of a learned jargon about the innate ideas and Platonic mysticism. But there is a want of originality, consistency and precision in his work. He is a wordy commentator of Bacon, Hobbes and Malebranche. The besetting sin of all his compositions is diffuseness and indistinctness.—Hobbes had compared the mind with a slate, Locke compared it with a white paper. This prepared the errors of Condillac, who gave all to the senses, and to those of Dr Hartley who explained the operations of the mind by vibrations, and who thought ‘that all the most complex ideas arise from sensation, and that reflection is not a distinct source, as Mr Locke makes it.’

I think with Dugald Stewart that the work of Locke has been more applauded than studied. The French writers, particularly Voltaire, have most contributed to his celebrity. Voltaire said that Locke alone had developed the human understanding, and he calls him the Hercules of metaphysicians; yet the French did not understand the basis of Locke’s philosophy, when they maintained that he denied the innate dispositions of the mind, and when they confounded Condillac’s philosophy with that of Locke.

Among the Scotch philosophers the most remarkable are, Hume, who not only confined all knowledge to mere experience, but also denied the necessity of causation;—Dr Reid, who speaks of intellectual and active powers of man;—Dugald Stewart, who deserves more credit for his style than for his ideas;—and Dr Th. Brown.

The principal modern schools of philosophy in Germany, are the critical philosophy, the transcendental idealism, and the philosophy of nature. Kant, the founder of the critical philosophy, distinguished two kinds of knowledge, one experimental (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*), and another founded on belief (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*.) He maintained that the first kind is only relative, subjective, or phenomenal, or that we know only the relation of the subject to the object; that we do not know either the subject or the object in itself, but both in their mutual rela-

tions only, and that this relation constitutes their reality to us. The subject he conceived endowed with particular categories which are applied to the object; whatever is general and necessary in knowledge belonged to the subject, while the particular and variable is the attribute of the object. Hence all experimental knowledge is founded upon dualism; upon the union of the subject and object; for, even the categories, though inherent in the subject, and conceived by the mind from within, acquire objective reality only by their application to the object. Kant, though he considered both subject and object, had, however, the subject more in mind than the object. He reduced all categories or forms, according to which the mind acquires experimental knowledge, to four kinds—to quantity, quality, relation, and modality; of these the two first concern objects in general, and the two last the relations of objects to each other and to our understanding. Thus Kant admits notions independent of experience, as conceptions of space, time, cause, and others; and considers these conceptions, not as the result of external impressions, but of the faculties of the subject: they exist from within, and by their means we are acquainted with the objects. Our notions of morality, of God, and of immortality, are not experimental, but belong to the practical understanding, and originate *a priori*. Liberty is a postulatium.

Fichte went farther, and taught the system of transcendental idealism, according to which all certainty and reality is confined to the subject, who has knowledge only of his own modifications, and by means of abstraction and reflection, arrives at intellectual intuition.

The philosophy of nature of Schelling rejects subject and object, makes no abstraction or reflection, but begins with intellectual intuition, and professes to know objects immediately in themselves. It does not consider the objects as existing but as originating; it constructs them speculatively *a priori*. Absolute liberty and existence without qualities, are the basis of this system.

As the philosophy of Locke has hitherto prevailed in England, as it has given occasion to that of Condillac, and as the system of Dr Th. Brown admits more fundamental powers of the mind than any former philosophy, I shall compare them with phrenology.

I agree with both authors in placing truth above any other consideration and in maintaining that we cannot examine the mind in itself, but are confined to the contemplation of the mental phenomena.

Locke and Brown consider the functions of the external senses as dependent on the nervous system, but the other mental operations as independent of organization; whilst phrenology proves that every mental phenomenon depends on some bodily condition or organ after the example of the external senses.

Locke admits in the mind understanding and will;—Dr Brown, intellect and emotions. The subdivision of understanding by Locke is into perception, retention or memory, contemplation or judgment and imagination; and that of will into various degrees, from simple desire to passion. The subdivision of intellect by Th. Brown is 1st, into simple suggestions, including every association of ideas, conception, memory, imagination, habit, and all conceptions and feelings of the past; and 2d, into relative suggestions of coexistence or of succession; the former of which include the suggestions of resemblance or difference, of position, of degree, of proportion, and of the relation which the whole bears to its parts; and of which the second comprehends judgment, reason and abstraction. His subdivision of emotions is into immediate, retrospective and prospective. He admits a greater number of primitive emotions independent of intellect, and in this respect he comes nearer phrenology than any other philosopher; he also calls the division of Locke into understanding and will illogical. Thus in the great division of the mental phenomena he agrees with phrenology, which positively has the priority over him. But Dr Brown's subdivisions of the mental phenomena are very different from the phrenological analysis and classification.

Farther, Dr Brown considers the various emotions of the mind^s independently of brain. His philosophy therefore coincides with phrenology only in the first principle, viz, in admitting mental phenomena different from the intellectual states of mind; but his philosophy can never be confounded with phrenology.

Locke denied the innate ideas and the innate moral principles. I agree with him in that respect, but he admits only innate dispositions for ideas and derives the moral principles from them, whilst I admit also innate moral dispositions, which are as essential to the conception of moral principles as the innate intellectual dispositions to the formation of ideas.

The reason why Locke denied the innate maxims of morality, viz, because certain children or adults and certain nations are without them or possess them variously modified, is not at all valuable, since innate faculties may be inactive on account of the defective development of their respective organs, and their functions may be modified by their combined operation with other faculties.

Locke derives the *primitive* activity of the mind from external impressions on the senses; phrenology on the contrary, in admitting external senses and two orders of internal faculties, maintains that the internal dispositions, though they may be excited by external impressions, are often active by their own inherent power alone. According to Locke moral principles must be proved. I think they must be felt. It is to be remarked that according to phrenology, there is an internal and spontaneous or instinctive activity, independent of external impressions, as far as the feelings are concerned, but also as the intellectual faculties and experimental knowledge are implicated. The abstract conceptions or intuitive notions are furnished by the intellectual faculties themselves. The notion of identity, for instance, or that the same is the same; that the whole is greater than the half; that two and two are four; that nothing can exist except in space; that nothing can happen except in time; and that there is nothing

without a cause, &c., are internal operations of mind as well as the instincts, propensities and sentiments.

Another essential difference between Locke, Dr Brown and all other philosophers on one side, and phrenology on the other, is that the former think that we perceive the existence of external objects and their original qualities, such as size, figure, mobility, number, color, &c., by means of the five senses and their impressions alone, whilst I treat of the immediate and mediate functions of the senses (See Vol. I. Art. external senses,) and ascribe very few ideas to the external senses, but the greater number, as those of size, figure, weight, color, order and number, to internal faculties.

Thus I admit in the mind external senses by which the mind and the external world are brought into communication, and made mutually influential. The internal faculties are feelings and intellect. Both sorts may act by their internal power, or may be excited by appropriate impressions from without. The knowledge of our feelings is as positive as the experimental from without. Every determinate action of any faculty depends on two conditions, the faculty and the object. The intellectual faculties are perceptive and reflective. The feelings and perceptive faculties are in relation and adapted to the external world, whilst the reflective faculties are applied to the feelings and experimental knowledge and are destined to bring all the particular feelings and notions into harmony.

From this summary view of philosophy it follows that the ancient philosophers were principally occupied with theogony, cosmogony, physics, logic, dialectics, ethics and politics, and that in reference to man they examined his intellectual operations, moral actions and social relations rather than his nature.

Though this important object—the basis of all political sciences—has been investigated by later philosophers, its study will be newly modelled and its principles established by phrenology, in showing a posteriori the nature, number and origin of the hu-

man faculties, the conditions of their operations, their mutual influence, their modes of acting and the natural laws by which their manifestations are regulated. I conclude this chapter with D'Alembert in saying that hitherto there has been a great deal of philosophising in which there is but little philosophy.

CHAPTER II.

RECTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR VIEWS OF PHILOSOPHERS.

In order to prosecute advantageously the study of the mental functions, a capital error must be avoided,—an error which prevails in the systems of all philosophers, and which consists in their having been satisfied with general ideas, and not, like naturalists, having admitted three sorts of notions: general, common, and special. This distinction is essential to the classification of beings into kingdoms, classes, orders, genera, and species. In knowing the general qualities of inanimate objects, such as extension, configuration, consistency, color,—even in knowing the common qualities of metals, earths, or acids; we are not yet made acquainted with iron, copper, chalk, or vinegar. To indicate a determinate body, its specific qualities must be exposed. In natural history it is not sufficient to say that we possess a stone, a plant, an animal, a bird, &c., it is indispensable to mention the species of each possessed, and if varieties exist, to state even their distinctive characters.

In the study of the human body, general and common notions are also distinguished and separated from those which are particular; the body is divided into several systems, such as the muscular, osseous, nervous, glandular, &c.; determinate functions, too, are specified, as the secretion of saliva, of bile, tears, &c. But this distinction between general, common, and special notions is entirely neglected in the study of the mind, and even

in that of the functions which in animals take place with consciousness.

Instinct.

Zoologists divide and subdivide the organization of the beings they study, and determine the structure of each particularly, but they consider their animal life in a manner quite general. Whatever is done with consciousness is explained by means of the word instinct. Animals eat and drink, and construct habitations by instinct; the nightingale sings, the swallow migrates, the hamster makes provisions for the winter, the chamois places sentinels, sheep live in society, &c., and all by instinct. This is certainly a very easy manner of explaining facts; instinct is the talisman which produces every variety in the actions of animals. The knowledge conveyed, however, is general, and therefore completely vague. What is instinct? Is it a personified being, an entity, a principle? or does the word, according to its Latin etymology, signify only an internal impulse to act in a certain way in ignorance of the cause? I take it in the latter signification; thus the word *instinct* denotes every inclination to act arising from within.

Instincts, moreover, are merely effects, and do not express peculiar causes producing determinate inclinations. In stating that one animal sings and that another migrates, we specify some sorts of instincts, but leave their individual causes undetermined. The term instinct may be compared with that of motion. Planets revolve round the sun; the moon round the earth; the magnetic needle points towards the north; rivers fall into the ocean; animals walk, run, or fly; the blood circulates; and all these phenomena are conjoined with the idea of motion. Motion certainly attends on all, just as the actions of animals are always joined with instinct, but the causes of the various motions and of the different instincts are not alike, and must, therefore, be looked for and specified.

Finally, it is an error to say that animals act solely by instinct. It is true that some of their doings, such as the labors of insects, are the result of mere instinctive powers, but many animals modify their actions according to external circumstances, they even select one among different motives, and often resist their internal impulses or instincts. A dog may be hungry, but with the opportunity he will not eat, because he remembers the blows which he has received for having done so under similar circumstances. If, in following his master, he is separated from him by a carriage, he does not throw himself under the feet of the horses or its wheels, but waits till it has passed, and then by increasing his speed he overtakes his master.

This shows that some animals act with understanding. On the other hand, though new-born children cry, and suck the finger, they certainly do not act from understanding. And, if men of great genius manifest talents without knowing that such faculties exist; if they calculate, sing, or draw, without any previous education, do they not so by some internal impulse or instinct, as well as the animals which sing, build, migrate, and gather provisions? Instinct, then, is not confined to animals, and understanding is not a prerogative of mankind.

The above reflections on instinct elucidate the ideas entertained by philosophers generally in regard to the mind and its faculties. Many of them reduce all the mind's operations to *sensation*, and all its faculties to sensibility; others call this general faculty *understanding*, or *intellect*.

Understanding.

We must make reflections on understanding similar to those already made on instinct. There are, in the first place, different sorts of understanding, which may exist independent of each other. Great painters cannot always become great musicians; profound mathematicians may be without any talent for poetry; and excellent generals may be miserable legislators. Hence, in the

study of man, it is necessary to specify the different kinds of understanding or sensation. For, if we say, with Destut de Tracy, that memory, judgment, and imagination, are only modifications of sensation and the effects of unknown causes, it is still necessary to specify the kinds of sensation, since sensations of hunger, friendship, hatred, anger, or compassion, and knowledge of forms, colors, localities, &c., cannot be of one and the same sort, any more than the senses of feeling, smelling, tasting, hearing, and seeing. Thus, then, it is necessary to specify the various internal, as well as the external senses.

Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of understanding must also be pointed out, and new observations in consequence become necessary. Finally, I repeat, that man does not always act with understanding. Suddenly threatened by any danger, the limbs are drawn back before there has been time to think of the means of escape. All the gestures and peculiar sounds which accompany the rather energetic expression of the sentiments, are as involuntary as the feelings themselves, and by no means the effect of understanding. Who can say that he always acts with understanding? We too often choose the worse even in knowing the better.

The greater number of philosophers explain the actions of man upon the supposition of two fundamental powers: understanding and will. They, however, merit the same reproach as the zoologists who consider the actions of animals as effects of instinct, and those of man as effects of understanding alone. They attach themselves to generalities, and neglect particulars; they ought, however, to specify the kinds of will as well as those of understanding. For it cannot be the same faculty which makes us love ourselves and our neighbors, which is fond of destroying and of preserving, which feels self-esteem or seeks others' approbation. Moreover, the causes of the different kinds of love and of will, which are taken at one time in a good, at another in a bad acceptation, must be laid open.

Many philosophers who consider understanding and will as the

fundamental powers of the mind, have conceived particular modes of action in each of them. In understanding they admit perception, conception, memory, judgment, imagination, and attention, —one of the most important of these modified operations; to the will they ascribe sensuality, selfishness, vanity, ambition, and the love of arts and sciences, in proportion as understanding is enlightened and external circumstances modified.

All philosophical considerations on the mind hitherto entertained have been general; and whilst the study of the understanding has especially engaged one class of thinkers, another has devoted itself to that of the will, principally as embracing the doctrine of our duties. The proceeding of either was fallacious. They have always taken effects for causes, and confounded modes of action, in quantity or quality, with fundamental faculties. They have also overlooked one of the most important conditions to the exhibition of affective and intellectual powers, viz, the organization of the brain. They considered the functions of the external senses in connexion with organization, but were not aware that all phenomena of mind are subject to the same condition.

The first of these classes of philosophers is styled *Idealogists*, the second *Moralists*. This separation, and the consequent destruction of that harmony which ought to reign between the two, are to be lamented. Idealogists and moralists differ not only in their pursuits, but each criminales the other, and endeavors to confine him within certain limits. Idealogists deride the studies of Moralists, and these often decry Idealogists as the greatest enemies of mankind.

Many ponderous volumes are filled with their several opinions. I shall only consider, in a summary way, the most striking of their particular views, and begin with those of Idealogists.

I. *Consciousness and Sensation.*

Speculative philosophers incessantly speak of single consciousness and of there being nothing but consciousness and sensation

in animal life. Dr Reid and others consider consciousness as a separate faculty, and Condillac reduced all phenomena of mind to sensation, so that his philosophy is to mind what alchymy was to matter. Now though it be true, in a general way, that all operations of the mind are accompanied with consciousness, it by no means follows that consciousness of the impressions is one of its fundamental faculties. Consciousness is a general term and is an effect of the activity of one or several mental faculties. It is identic with mind and exists in all its operations: in perception, attention, memory, judgment, imagination, association, sympathy, antipathy, pleasure, pain, in affections and passions. Mind cannot be thought of without consciousness. There are various kinds of consciousness which are the special faculties of the mind, which may be possessed separately or conjointly and which must be specified by philosophy.

II. *Perception.*

Two important questions present themselves: first, whether all the impressions which produce consciousness or sensation, come from without through the external senses; and secondly, whether all fundamental powers of the mind are perceptive, or have consciousness of their peculiar and respective impressions, or whether some of them procure impressions, the consciousness of which is only obtained by the medium of other faculties?

The majority of modern philosophers have investigated the perceptions of external impressions only, which they consider as the first and single cause of every varied mental function. The mind, say they, is excited by external impressions, and then performs various intellectual or voluntary acts. Some thinkers, however, have recognised many perceptions as dependent on merely internal impressions. Of this kind are the instinctive dispositions of animals, and all the affective powers of man. Those who would consider this subject in detail, may examine, in the first Vol. of *Phrenology*, my ideas on the external senses and on

the affective faculties. There it will be seen that I admit two sources of mental activity: one external and the other internal.

An answer to the second question is given with more difficulty than to the first. Dr Reid with some of his predecessors distinguished between sensation and perception. He understood by the former the consciousness of the mind which immediately follows the impression of an external body on any of our senses; and by perception the reference of the sensation to its external corporeal cause. Certain particles of odorous matter act on the olfactory nerve and produce a peculiar sensation. When this peculiar sensation is referred to an object, for instance a rose, then it is perception.—Gall thinks that each external sense and each internal faculty has its peculiar consciousness, perception, memory, judgment, and imagination; in short, that the modes of action are alike in each external sense and in each organ of the brain. To me, however, the individual faculties of the mind do not seem to have the same modes of action; I conceive that the functions of several faculties are confined to the procuring of impressions which are perceived by other faculties. The instinct of alimentativeness and all the fundamental faculties, which I call affective, seem destined only to produce impressions, which accompanied with consciousness are called inclinations, wants, or sentiments. The affective functions are blind and involuntary, and have no knowledge of the objects respectively suited to satisfy their activity; the nerves of hunger do not know aliments, nor circumspection, the object of fear, nor veneration, the object deserving its application, &c., &c. Even supposing the affective powers had an obscure consciousness of their own existence, a point which, by-the-by, is not proved, it is still certain that the intellectual faculties alone procure clear consciousness. The internal senses of *Individuality* and *Eventuality*, combined with those of comparison and causality, determine the species of both internal and external perceptions. As it is, however, much more difficult to specify the internal than the external sensations, the species of the former have remained almost entirely unknown to philosophers.

Thus, perception is an essential constituent in the nature of the intellectual faculties generally, and one of their particular modes of activity; yet it is no special faculty of the mind; it is a mere effect of activity in the perceptive powers.

From the preceding considerations, it follows that in my opinion every fundamental faculty of the mind is not *perceptive*, consequently I make a distinction between perceptive powers and kinds of perception. There are as many sorts of perceptions as fundamental functions, but the intellectual faculties alone seem to be perceptive.

It is remarkable that consciousness and perception are not always single, that in the same person they may be healthy with respect to some faculties and diseased with respect to others. There are also cases on record, where persons subject to nervous fits, completely forget what occurs during the paroxysms, when these are over, and remember perfectly during subsequent paroxysms, what has happened during preceding fits. The same phenomenon is related of the state of persons under the influence of animal magnetism. Mr Combe mentions the fact observed by Dr Abel in an Irish porter to a ware-house, who forgot when sober, what he had done when drunk, but who, being drunk again, recollected the transactions of his former state of intoxication. On one occasion, being drunk, he had lost a parcel of some value and in his sober moments could give no account of it. Next time he was intoxicated he recollected that he had left the parcel at a certain house and there being no address on it, it had remained there safely and was got on his calling for it.—It seems that, before recollection can exist, the organs require to be in the same state they were in when the impression was first received.

III. *Attention.*

Almost all philosophers speak of attention as a primitive power of the mind, active throughout all its operations and the basis on which observation and reflection repose. ‘It is attention,’ says

Helvetius,* 'more or less active which fixes objects more or less in the memory.' According to Vicq d'Azyr apes and monkeys are turbulent, because they have no attention. Dr Reid† makes a distinction between attention and consciousness, calling the first a voluntary, the second an involuntary act; whilst other philosophers with Locke, confound these two mental phenomena. Dr Brown confounds attention with desire; he thinks that without desire there can be no attention.

To all that has been said upon attention as a faculty of the mind, I reply, that *attention*, in none of its acceptations, is a single faculty; for if it were, he who possesses it in a particular sense should be able to apply it universally. But how does it happen that an individual, animal or man, pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another? Sheep never attend to philosophy or theology; and while the squirrel and ring-dove see a hare pass with indifference, the fox and eagle eye it with attention. The instinct to live on plants or flesh produces unlike sorts of attention. In the human kind, individuals are influenced in their attention to different objects, even by sex and age: little girls prefer dolls, ribands, &c., as play things; boys like horses, whips, and drums. One man is pleased with philosophic discussion, another with witty conversation; one with the recital of events which touch the heart, and another with accounts of sanguinary battles, and so on.

The word *attention* denotes no more than the active state of any intellectual faculty; or, in other terms, attention is the effect of the intellectual faculties, acting either from their proper force, or from being excited by external impressions, or by one or several affective faculties. Hence there are as many species of attention as fundamental faculties of the mind. He who has an active faculty of configuration, of locality, or of coloring, pays attention to the objects respectively suited to gratify it. In this manner we conceive why attention is so different, and also why

* De l'esprit, ch. de l'inégale capacité de l'attention.

† Essays on the intellectual powers of man p. 60.

it is impossible to succeed in any pursuit or undertaking without attention. It is, indeed, absurd to expect success in an art or science, when the individual power on which its comprehension depends is inactive. Again, the more active the power is, the more it is attentive. The affective faculties, though they have no clear consciousness, yet excite the intellectual faculties, and thereby produce attention. The love of approbation, for instance, may stimulate the faculty of artificial language; boys who are fond of applause will be apt to study with more attention and perseverance than those who are without such a motive.

Thus, perception and attention, though both modes of activity, may be distinguished from each other, as perception denotes knowledge of the external and internal impressions in a passive manner, or as perceptivity or passive capability of Kant, whilst attention indicates the active state of the intellectual faculties and their application to their respective objects, or spontaneity, in Kant's language.

IV. *Memory.*

Memory is another mental operation which has, at all times, occupied speculative philosophers. Those, too, who have written on education, have given it much consideration. It is treated of as a faculty which collects the individual perceptions, and recalls them when wanted; and is further considered as being assisted by the faculties of attention and association. Memory varies more in its kind than any other of the intellectual faculties recognised by philosophers. It is notorious that some children occasionally learn long passages of books by heart with great facility, who cannot recollect the persons they have seen before, nor the places they have visited. Others, again, remember facts or events, while they cannot recall the dates at which they happened; and, on the contrary, this latter sort of knowledge gives great pleasure to others. The Jesuits, observing nature, conse-

quently admitted a memory of facts, a local memory, a verbal memory, and so on. Even the causes of these differences in memory were looked for. Malebranche supposed some peculiar and modified state of the cerebral organization to explain the facts, such as softness and flexibility of the cerebral fibres in youth, their hardness and stiffness in old age, &c.

Is memory, then, a fundamental power of the mind? Gall thinks not; he considers it as the second degree of activity of every organ and faculty; and therefore admits as many memories as fundamental faculties.

My opinion also is, that memory is not a fundamental faculty, but the repetition of some previous perception, and a *quantitative* mode of action. The question arises whether memory takes place among both the affective and intellectual faculties. It is true the affective powers act without clear consciousness, and the mind cannot call up into fresh existence the perceptions experienced from the propensities and sentiments with the same facility as the perceptions of the intellectual powers; yet it renews them more or less, and consequently, I cannot confine the mode of action under discussion to the intellectual faculties. However, I distinguish between the faculties which have clear memory and the species of notions remembered: the perceptive faculties alone have clear memory, and all kinds of perceptions are remembered. Further, as the intellectual faculties do not all act with the same energy, memory necessarily varies in kind and strength in each and in every individual. No one therefore has an equally strong memory for every branch of knowledge. Attention too, being another name for activity of the intellectual faculties applied to their respective objects, naturally strengthens memory: viz, it facilitates repetition. Exercise of the faculties, it is further evident, must invigorate memory, that is, repetition is made more easy. Let us now see the difference between memory and

V. *Reminiscence or remembrance.*

We have reminiscence, if we remember how certain perceptions have been acquired, while memory consists in the perfect re-production of former perceptions. Reminiscence is often taken for a fundamental faculty of the mind; sometimes, also, it is considered as a modification of memory.

I neither consider reminiscence as a fundamental faculty, nor as a modification of memory, but as the peculiar memory or repetition of the functions of *Eventuality*, that faculty which takes cognizance of the functions of all the others.

This view shows how we may have reminiscence, but no memory of the functions of our affective faculties. And also, how we may remember having had a sensation which we cannot re-produce, and repeat a perception without remembering how it had been acquired. Thus we may recollect that we know the name of a person without being able to utter it, and also repeat a song without remembering where we learned it. The special intellectual faculties, in general, repeat their individual perceptions and produce memory, while that of eventuality, in particular, recollects, or has reminiscence. Reminiscence, then, is to eventuality that which each kind of memory is to the other intellectual faculties.

VI. *Imagination.*

This expression has several significations: it is employed to indicate at one time a fundamental power, called also the faculty of invention, and in this sense it is said to invent machinery, to compose music and poetry, and in general to produce every new conception. Imagination, again, is sometimes taken for the faculty of recalling previously-acquired notions of objects. This signification even corresponds to the etymology of the word: the images exist interiorly. At another time imagination indicates a lively manner of feeling and acting. Imagination, in fine, is a

title given to facility of combining previous perceptions, and of producing new compositions.

To the preceding considerations I answer, that imagination is in no case a fundamental faculty. There can be no single faculty of invention, or else he who displays it in one ought to show it in all arts and sciences. And it is notorious that powers of invention are very different in the same as well as in different persons. A mechanician who invents machines of stupendous powers, may be almost without musical talent, and a great geometrician may be perfectly insensible to the harmony of tones; whilst the poet who can describe the most pathetic situations and arouse the feelings powerfully, may be quite incapable of inventing mathematical problems. Man, it is certain, can only invent, or perfect, according to the sphere of activity of the peculiar faculties he possesses; and therefore there can be no fundamental power of invention. Each primitive faculty has its laws, and he who is particularly endowed in a high degree, often finds effects unknown before; and this is called invention. Imagination is, consequently, no more than a quantitative mode of action of the primitive faculties, combined particularly with those of causality and comparison. Inventions are, probably, never made by individual faculties; several commonly act together in establishing the necessary relations between effects and causes.

The fundamental faculties sometimes act spontaneously, or by their internal power, and this degree of activity is then called imagination also. In this sense imagination is as various in its kinds as the primitive faculties. Birds build their nests, or sing, without having been taught, and men of great minds do acts which they had never either seen or heard of. In calling the degree of activity of the faculties which produces these effects *imagination*, it is still a mere result of existing individual powers. All that has been said of imagination, as the faculty of recalling impressions, is referrible to the mode of action styled memory of the intellectual faculties, and is not an effect of any single power.

Finally, imagination, used synonymously with exaltation, or poetic fire, results from activity of the fundamental faculty which I call ideality, and to the consideration of which mental power in Vol. I. of *Phrenology*, I refer my reader for farther information.

From the preceding reflections on perception, attention, memory, and imagination, it follows, that they are *quantitive* modes of action of the fundamental faculties, each of which may act spontaneously, or be roused by external impressions. The intellectual faculties alone perceive or know impressions, and being directed towards the objects of which respectively they have cognizance, produce attention; repeating notions already perceived, they exert memory; and being so active as to cause effects as yet unknown, they may be said to elicit imagination.

VII. *Judgment.*

Judgment is commonly believed to be a fundamental power of the mind. It is said to have been given to counterbalance imagination and the passions, and to rectify the errors of intellect. Memory and judgment are sometimes also maintained to exclude each other, but experience shows this opinion to be erroneous, for some persons possess excellent memory as well as great judgment. These two kinds of manifestations, however, may also exist separately; and the conclusion then follows, that they are neither the same faculty nor the same mode of action. Let us first see whether judgment be a fundamental power or not.

Gall, observing that the same person may possess excellent judgment of one kind, and have little or none of another that a great judge of mathematics, for instance, may have almost no capacity to judge of colors or of tones, considers judgment as the third degree of activity of every fundamental faculty; and admitting as many kinds of judgment as special faculties, denies it the prerogative of being looked on as a primitive power. In his opinion, every fundamental faculty has four degrees of activity:

the first is perception; the second, memory; the third, judgment; and the fourth, imagination.

I, myself, neither consider judgment as a fundamental faculty, nor with Gall, as a degree of activity, or as a mode of action to every faculty. Judgment cannot be a quantitative mode, and certainly not the third in degree, for some individuals judge very accurately of impressions as soon as perceived, without possessing the memory of them to a great extent; and others, with an excellent memory of particular kinds of impressions, judge very indifferently of the same. It even happens that certain faculties are in the highest degree, or spontaneously, active, while the judgment in relation to these very powers is bad. In other cases, the faculties are exceedingly active, and also judge with perfect propriety. Moreover, judgment cannot be an attribute of every fundamental faculty of the mind, since the affective powers, being blind, neither recollect nor judge their actions. What judgments have physical love, pride, circumspection, and all the other feelings? They require to be enlightened by the understanding, or intellectual faculties; and on this account it is, that when left to themselves they occasion so many disorders. And not only does this remark apply to the inferior but also to the superior affective powers; to hope and veneration, as well as to the love of approbation and circumspection; we may fear things innocent or noxious, and venerate idols as well as the God of the true Christian.

I conceive, then, that judgment is a mode of action of the intellectual faculties only; and not a mode of quantity but of quality. The better to understand this my meaning, let us observe, that there is a relation between external objects themselves, and also between external objects and the affective and intellectual faculties of man and animals. These relations are even determinate, and in their essence invariable; they admit modifications only. Hunger and aliment, this and digestion have a mutual relation. Now, if these relations are seen to be perfect and to exist as they are usually found, we say the function is good or

healthy. If the sense of taste approve of aliments which man commonly employs and digests, the taste is good and perfect; but there is disorder or aberration whenever the functions depart from their ordinary modes of manifesting themselves; if, for instance, the taste select articles generally esteemed filthy or unfit for food, such as chalk, charcoal, tallow, &c., it is disordered or bad.

The intellectual faculties are in relation with the affective powers and with external objects, and their functions are subject to determinate laws. The faculties of coloring and of melody cannot arbitrarily be pleased, the one with every disposition of colors, and the other with every combination of tones. Now, the functions of the intellectual faculties may be perfect or imperfect, that is, be in harmony, or the contrary, with their innate laws, and the product of these two states announced is judgment; for the intellectual faculties alone know their own and the relations of the affective powers with the external world. The expression judgment, however, it must be observed, is used to indicate as well the power of perceiving the relations that subsist between impressions themselves, as the manner in which this power is affected by these. We distinguish different saviors from each other, and we feel the different impressions they make. In both these operations we judge. The same thing holds in regard to all the perceptive faculties: they perceive the relations of their appropriate and peculiar impressions, and recognise the effect this act of perception produces. The faculty of coloring, for instance, perceives several colors, and is then affected agreeably or disagreeably; in consequence, it approves or disapproves of their arrangement. The perception of any relation whatever is the essence of judgment.

The judgment of the faculties which perceive the physical qualities of external objects, even of tones or melody, is also called *taste*. We are said to have a good or a bad taste or judgment, in coloring, drawing, and music, in speaking of forms, proportions, &c.

Each perceptive faculty feels impressions and relations of one kind only; that of configuration knows forms; that of coloring colors; and that of tune tones. The judgment or the more or less healthy action of each is in like manner confined to its special function. There are consequently as many kinds of judgment as perceptive faculties, and one kind must not be confounded with another. The regular and perfect manifestation of the functions of the two reflective powers, however, examining the relations of all the intellectual and affective faculties to their respective objects, and the relations of the various powers among themselves, particularly deserves the name judgment; it essentially constitutes the philosophic judgment, which is applicable to every sort of notion. It is synonymous with reasoning. Comparison and causality being the highest intellectual powers, and an essential and necessary part of a reasonable being; their perfect action or good judgment consequently ranks above all other kinds of judgment. However, reason or the reflective faculties *in themselves* are not infallible; they may be deceived by the erroneous notions and feelings, on which they operate. Sound and true reasoning requires two things; first, sound reflective faculties; and second, exact notions and just feelings, viz. sound premises.

VIII. *Association.*

Several philosophers in Great Britain, and especially Dugald Stewart, have lately spoken much of a peculiar faculty of association. They have examined the laws of its activity, and ascribed to it a great influence on our manner of thinking and feeling; they have even considered it as the cause of the sublime and beautiful.

These propositions I conceive are erroneous; association, in my opinion, being but an effect of the mutual influence of the fundamental faculties. One being active, excites another, or several, and the phenomenon is association, which occurs not only among the intellectual faculties, when what is called associ-

ation of ideas results, but also among the affective and intellectual together, and, indeed, among all the fundamental faculties. The sight of a rose may recall one we love; ambition may excite courage, or an intellectual faculty; artificial signs may arouse the perceptive faculties; and these, in their turn, make us remember arbitrary signs.

Association is a phenomenon of some importance in the practical part of anthropology; and when I come to speak of the modifications of the mental functions, I shall enter into its consideration at some length.

The principles of association are the same as those of sympathy. Faculties whose organs are situated near each other, or which act at the same time, will readily excite one another. Faculties also, which contribute to the same peculiar function, will be apt to exert a mutual influence. The strongest of the faculties will further excite and overwhelm the weaker with ease.

The mutual influence or association of the fundamental faculties explains the principles of Mnemonics, or the science of artificial memory, and shows its importance. To enable us to recall ideas or words, we may call in any of our other faculties which acts with great energy to assist. If that of locality, for instance, be vigorous, ideas will be easily recollected through the assistance of localities; that is, by associating ideas with localities. Local memory will remember the peculiar ideas associated with particular places. The same means or faculties, however, it must be understood, will not serve in every case. Individuals must severally make use of their strongest to excite their weakest powers; one will employ form, a second color, a third places, and others numbers, analogies of sounds, causes, and so on, with success.

This consideration in its whole extent may be kept in view with advantage in education. No intellectual faculty is ever to be tutored singly, but all which are necessary to the perfect understanding of a subject are to be exercised together. Geography will aid the memory of events, and the reverse; and so on with the rest.

Association also elucidates the common saying: We think in our mother tongue. The meaning of this phrase is not determined; if language be supposed primitively to produce thought, a grave error is committed; for we think in no language; the feelings and ideas existed before the signs which express them, and we may have feelings and thoughts without a term to make them known. Language is only associated with the feelings and thoughts; but as this is done very frequently and with extreme rapidity, even in conformity with the succession of thoughts, we are said to think in our native language. The fact, however, is interesting in itself, and proves the importance of the mutual influence of the faculties. Several of the modern languages, it is true, have a determinate structure, and do not admit of inversions, and ideas consequently follow regularly in a certain order; but ideas are not therefore results of the signs by which they are expressed. It is obvious, however, that the structure of a language must give a peculiar direction to the mental operations; and again, that the prevailing spirit or general mental constitution of every nation may be known by its language. The French directs the mind especially to individual objects and their qualities; the German, on the contrary, forces it to combine, at once, all particular notions. Notwithstanding these admitted effects of language, signs must never be confounded with ideas, nor simultaneous action mistaken for identity.

The second idea which Mr Alison and others entertain of association as the source of the beautiful and of the pleasure that flows from it, is also unsupported by observation. Pleasure does not derive from association only. Every faculty is in relation to certain impressions; these, being either in harmony with it, or the reverse, produce pleasure or pain. The power of configuration is pleased with certain forms, and displeased with others. The faculty of coloring likes certain colors, and dislikes others. In the same way impressions of tones are immediately pronounced agreeable or disagreeable. The perceptive faculties are pleased by their respective harmonious impressions.

On the other hand it is, however, certain that association may increase or diminish the absolute pleasure or pain. Pleased with a rose in itself, we may call it beautiful; but the pleasure and the beauty may still be heightened by recollections of the person who planted or presented it. Impressions, little agreeable in themselves, may gain by association. A national air may rank very low as a musical composition, and even offend a scientific ear, and yet delight him, the scenes of whose boyhood, and of whose home, the remembrances of whose relations and friends, it recalls.

IX. *Categories.*

Even those who recognise certain laws, or categories, according to which the mind operates, confine too much their considerations to general views. If Kant, in his treatise on Experimental Knowledge, admits a category of quality, his conception is still general. We know, it is true, the qualities of natural objects, but there are various kinds of these, and none of them is either specified in Kant's philosophy, or considered as a fundamental faculty of the mind.

Idealogists have therefore recognised certain effects and modes of action of the mental powers, and certain laws according to which the mind acts, but few of the fundamental faculties. Among the categories of Aristotle and Kant those of space and time, and that of causality by Kant, are fundamental faculties of phrenology, but the others are mere modes of action and general conceptions. The various conceptions of philosophers exist in nature, but they are defective, and need rectification, that is, the faculties and their modes of acting must be specified and their existence demonstrated by observation; in this way alone will philosophy become applicable to man in his social relations.

Moralists.

Man must soon have felt that every kind of mental operation could not be called intellectual. Philosophers have accordingly acknowledged a second, and a different sort, which they name *Will*.

Living in society, man is in relation with his parents, his friends, his enemies, with those who are inferior or superior, and by an innate power he examines his actions in a moral point of view. In conceiving supernatural beings, and admitting their influence on his situation, he also contrived means to render himself agreeable to them.

Those philosophers, then, who examine the moral conduct of man, and its rules, viz. Moralists are particularly interested in the knowledge, not only of the intellectual faculties and their modes of action, but also of the inclinations and sentiments, of the affections and passions, of the motives of our actions, of the aim of our faculties, and of the means of arriving at it. The study of moralists, however, is not more exact than that of ideologists. Like them, ignorant of the fundamental powers of the mind, they confound modes of action with the faculties themselves, disagree about the origin of morality, its nature, and the means of advancing it; the philosophic doctrines of the will, affections and passions. I therefore begin with their elucidations.

X. Desire and Will.

Many philosophers understand by the expression *Will*, all sorts and all degrees of inclinations, desires, and sentiments. Moralists commonly say that the will alone is the cause of our actions and omissions, and even that mankind is degraded by any other explanation than this. The will is considered as an entity and styled weak or strong, good or bad. These terms, however, are vague, and require consideration.

In the common acceptance of the word, Will is no more a fundamental power than the instinct of animals, it is only the effect of every primitive faculty of the mind and synonymous with desire; each faculty being active produces an inclination, a desire, or a kind of will; and in this signification there are as many species of will as fundamental faculties; the strength of each, too, is in proportion to the activity of the individual faculties, and exists involuntarily. Such a sweeping and general acceptance of the term Will, then, is evidently defective.

That desire which overwhelms the others is also called will. Now, in this sense, every faculty in its turn may become will. A dog, for instance, is hungry, but having been punished for eating the meat he found upon the table, he, without ceasing to feel appetite, for fear of a repetition of the blows, does not indulge; he desires to eat, but he will not. Will, therefore, in this acceptance, cannot be any fundamental power, it is only an effect of the most active powers.

Let us here ask whether man in his healthy state of mind is compelled by nature to consider certain desires as superior and others as inferior? The answer is affirmative. I shall detail this point later, in speaking of the moral nature of man; meanwhile I adopt it as quite positive, and only add that the preference given is founded on intelligence which knows the different desires, and determines the election which is made. Now by calling Will the mental operation which appreciates the value of the desires, and chooses among them, it is evident that it depends on, and is proportionate to, intellect; hence, that it is not a fundamental faculty.

It is of the utmost importance to be aware that there is no moral Will without intelligence, though this does not constitute will, and that will is no fundamental power, but the effect of the reflective faculties applied to the affective and perceptive powers of the mind.

Legislation, in general, recognises intelligence as an indispensable condition of will. Idiots, and the insane, therefore, are

not answerable for their actions. All the affective faculties, indeed, are blind, and dispose us to act according to pleasure, not according to will, which may frequently be opposed to pleasure. In conformity the moral code of Christianity distinguishes between desires and will.

Let us for a moment suppose that will is a fundamental power, and of a higher order than intellect; but, on this hypothesis, how can will act at one time in this and at another in the opposite direction? How happens it, that in one the will looks only for selfish gratifications, and in another for general happiness? Can will take a determinate direction without any cause? Is it different in itself, or is it influenced by other causes—may it, for instance, be excited by the feelings? In this case, however, it would become dependent and exposed to aberrations.

The Christian law commands the will to resist inferior temptations, and to follow the inspirations of the spirit. Pious persons, also, in their addresses to the Great Guiding Power, pray that their will may be directed towards certain actions, and turned away from others. This proves that they consider will as susceptible of being influenced, and by no means as independent, and acting without any cause. Such an independent will would, indeed, be a principle, and could have only one, never opposite tendencies.

Thus, in the world, will has been separated from mere desires, or from the affective faculties; and intelligence been considered a condition necessary to its manifestations. Yet intelligence does not constitute will; for a person with an excellent intellect may take very little interest in the welfare of other beings. He may acknowledge the better, and still incline and even yield to his inclination to pursue the worse. Two conditions then, the feelings and intellect, are necessary to will; in other terms, will consists in the application of reason to the affective and perceptive faculties.

The greater number of persons take their individual inclinations and pleasures for will, forgetting that these give motives

blindly and involuntarily. We may, indeed, say, that the exhibition of true will is very rare; it is too generally in opposition to our inclinations. This state has been noticed by several moralists. 'The spirit,' it is said, 'is willing, but the flesh is weak.'* 'For that which I do,' says the Apostle Paul, 'I allow not: for what I would that do I not; but what I hate that do I.†'

Here it is sufficient to know that will can neither be confounded with the individual inclinations nor with intellect; and that it is no special faculty, but the application of reason, or the reflective powers, to our desires and notions. I shall afterwards show that in its true signification it is the basis of liberty.

XI. *Affections.*

There is a great confusion of ideas in the works which treat of the affections. The name affection is sometimes given to fundamental powers, as to physical love, to self-love, to the love of approbation, and to hope. Affections are also confounded with passions. Moreover, affections are occasionally put for the pathognomical signs, which indicate different states of satisfaction or discontent of the fundamental powers; for instance, smiling, laughing, sighing, yawning, shedding tears, &c.

I employ the word in none of the preceding significations, but solely according to its etymology, to indicate the different states of being affected of the fundamental powers. The sense of feeling, for instance, may convey tickling, itching, burning, or lancing pain; its various modes of sensation are affections. In the same way the internal faculties may be differently affected.

The affections of the fundamental faculties may be divided into qualitative and quantitative. The former may again be subdivided into five sorts: 1st, general, which exist in each fundamental power; 2d, common, which inhere in several faculties; 3d, special, which belong to individual powers; 4th, simple or compound; finally,

* Matt. xxvi. 41.

† Rom. vii. 15.

5th, which are common to man and animals, and which are proper and peculiar to man.

The *quantitive* affections may be subdivided into two sorts: 1st, the fundamental powers and their qualitative affections may be active in very different degrees, from indolence to passion; and 2d, they may act with more or less quickness and duration.

Among the qualitative and quantitive, and among the simple and compound affections, we may also distinguish those which appear in the state of health from those which occur in disease. Let us now quote examples of each kind.

A general quantitive mode of action or affection is *desire*: each faculty being active desires; hence, there are as many sorts of desire as fundamental faculties. The sensations of pleasure and pain are two sorts of general qualitative affections; they are effects, and happen, the former if any faculty be satisfied, the latter if its desire be not complied with. There are consequently as many kinds of pleasure and of pain as individual faculties.

The mode of being affected, called *sentiment*, is common to several affective faculties. That known under the name of *memory*, belongs to the intellectual faculties. *Fury* is common to combativeness and destructiveness. Simple affections take place in individual faculties. *Anger*, in my opinion, is a special affection of combativeness or destructiveness; *fear*, of circumspection; *compassion*, of benevolence; and *repentance* or *remorse*, of conscientiousness. Compound affections, on the contrary, depend on the combined activity of several faculties; jealousy, for instance, whose essence is egotism, is modified according to the peculiar faculties which desire, as physical love, friendship, love of approbation. *Envy* is another compound affection: it is jealousy without benevolence; it increases by the want of the superior feelings. An envious person covets for himself alone; he would possess all enjoyments, to the entire exclusion of others; while a jealous man desires to enjoy and is especially careful not to lose possession of the pleasure he enjoys.

The affections common to man and animals, and those proper

to man, depend on the respective faculties. Anger, fear, jealousy, envy, appear in man and animals, as the faculties to which these affections belong inhere in both; while adoration, repentance, admiration, and shame, pertain, like the faculties from which they arise, to man alone.

Let us now remark that the fundamental powers and their qualitative affections may be more or less active or strong. The different degrees of activity are called velleity, desire, ardent desire, passion; of the agreeable affections, pleasure, joy, and ecstasy; and of the disagreeable affections, pain, grief, and misery.

The nervous irritability, which is styled sentimentality in friendship, irascibility in courage, sensibility in benevolence, indicates only a higher degree of excitability or activity of the fundamental powers, and irregularity of application.

The affections may, further, be sudden and transitory, or slow and durable. Finally, the difference of the affections in the healthy and diseased state is easily understood. The complete absence of a faculty may be called *imbecility*, if it never existed, and *fatuity*, if it have been destroyed by disease. Fury, melancholy, despair, and irresistibility of any inclination, are diseased affections. But this subject is treated of at greater length in my work on Insanity, and I shall not dwell longer on it here.

Physicians, as well as moralists, must study the doctrine of the affections, on account of their influence on the vital functions and on man's actions in society. The same may be said in regard to the following article on

XII. *Passions.*

This word *Passion* is commonly confounded with affection. What I have stated upon the affections, however, being known, the signification which I attach to the term *passion* will be easily understood; I use it to indicate only the highest degree of activity of any faculty. Passions, therefore, are not fundamental

powers, but quantitative modes of action, and effects; there are, consequently, as many sorts of passions as of faculties.

Physicians, ideologists, and moralists, incessantly complain of the influence of the passions, since they ruin health and often occasion insanity, disorder judgment, cloud reason, and are causes of many errors and criminal actions.

Passions being the highest degree of activity of every faculty, we easily conceive why great results, whether good or bad, follow from them; why they advance the arts and sciences, and why they may be excessively dangerous. This depends on the nature of the faculties which act with the utmost degree of energy. The lower feelings, however, let me remark, are commonly the most active; and in speaking of passions, we are apt to think of them. Still, the superior sentiments and the reflecting powers also act with passion in some, that is, they act with the greatest possible energy. Two feelings, selfishness and the love of glory, have been considered by Helvetius as the greatest, or principal passions, and the cause of all our actions. There is no doubt that these two feelings are very active in the majority of individuals, and excite and employ the other faculties to procure their satisfaction. But certain it is, also, that they cannot produce talents. There are ambitious people eager for distinction, who labor hard, and who notwithstanding all, never excel in any one particular.

As there reigns a natural harmony among the fundamental powers, those faculties which are too energetic, or which act with passion, must obviously disturb this balance or order. A youth in love and a fanatic in religion sacrifice the rest to their passion and do harm. Yet in complaining of the passions, we do not stigmatize the fundamental powers themselves, but only their too great energy. This remark applies to the religious and moral feelings, as well as to the most brutal propensities. Selfishness, though it undermines morality, is still necessary to self-preservation. The love of approbation, though the main cause of political slavery, has a useful destination in private life. And religion,

though the source of incalculable misery, procures the greatest consolation to humanity.

I shall make one observation more upon passions: the factitious passions, spoken of in books, do not exist. The primitive powers, on which they depend, are innate; their applications alone may be called factitious. Love of approbation is inherent in human nature; its satisfaction by external marks, titles, &c. is artificial.

I conclude with repeating that the various conceptions of philosophers, of ideologists as well as of moralists exist in nature, but they are defective and need rectification, that is, the fundamental powers of the mind and their modes of acting must be specified, and their existence demonstrated by observation. This great task was reserved to Phrenology, by which alone philosophy will become applicable to man in his social relations.

SECTION II.

The following new classification of the fundamental phenomena of the mind is the result of all physiological inquiries, contained in my work entitled *Phrenology*, and constitutes a summary of its philosophy.

ORDER I.

Affective faculties or feelings.

The essential nature of the affective faculties is to feel emotions. I shall indicate their nature, the aim of their existence, the disorders to which they dispose, and the consequences of their inactivity.

GENUS I.—*Feelings common to man and animals.*

Hunger and thirst are desires felt and known by means of the brain and there is a special organ in which these impressions inhere.

(Alimentiveness.)

Aim: The preservation of the individual.

Disorders: Gluttony—Drunkenness.

Its inactivity is accompanied by want of appetite.

DESTRUCTIVENESS.

Aim: Destruction, and the violent death of animals, for the sake of living on their flesh.

Disorders: Murder, cruelty.

Its inactivity prevents destruction.

PHYSICAL LOVE—(*Amativeness.*)

Aim: The propagation of the species.

Disorders: Fornication, adultery, incest, and other illegitimate modes of satisfaction.

Its inactivity predisposes to passive continency.

LOVE OF OFFSPRING—(*Philoprogenitiveness.*)

Aim: The preservation of the offspring.

Disorders: Too active; it spoils children, or causes their loss to be felt as an insupportable calamity.

Its inactivity disposes to neglect, or to abandon the progeny.

INHABITIVENESS.

Aim: Animals have peculiar instincts to dwell in determinate localities. Nature destined all places to be inhabited.

Disorder: Nostalgia.

ATTACHMENT—(*Adhesiveness.*)

Aim: Attachment to all around us. It appears variously modified, and produces friendship, marriage, society, habit, and general attachment.

Disorders: Inconsolable grief for the loss of a friend.

Its inactivity predisposes to carelessness about others.

COURAGE—(*Combateness.*)

Aim: Intrepidity and defence.

Disorders: Quarrelsomeness, disputation, attack, anger.

Its inactivity predisposes to cowardice, timidity, and fear.

SECRETIVENESS.

Aim: To conceal.

Disorders: Cunning, duplicity, falsehood, hypocrisy, dissimulation, intriguing, lying.

Its inactivity predisposes to be deceived by others.

ACQUISITIVENESS.

Aim: To acquire that which is necessary to our preservation.

Disorders: Theft, fraud, usury, corruptibility.

Its inactivity makes one's own interest be neglected.

CONSTRUCTIVENESS.

Aim: Construction in general.

CAUTIOUSNESS.

Aim: To be cautious and circumspect.

Disorders: Uncertainty, irresolution, anxiety, fear, melancholy.

Its inactivity predisposes to levity.

SELF-ESTEEM.

Aim: Self-esteem.

Disorders: Pride, haughtiness, disdain, arrogance, insolence.

Its inactivity predisposes to humility.

LOVE OF APPROBATION.

Aim: Love of approbation and distinction.

Disorders: Vain glory, vanity, ambition, titles, distinctions.

Its inactivity predisposes to indifference about the opinion of others.

GENUS II.—*Affective faculties proper to man.**

BENEVOLENCE.

Aim: Benevolence in general.

Disorders: Benevolence to the undeserving, or at the expense of others.

Its inactivity predisposes to selfishness, and not to regard others.

* The rudiments of some of them exist also in animals; but they are much stronger and more extensive in their sphere of application in man.

REVERENCE.

Aim: To respect what is venerable.

Disorders: Idolatry, bigotry.

Its inactivity predisposes to irreverence.

FIRMNESS.

Aim: Firmness.

Disorders: Stubbornness, obstinacy, and disobedience.

Its inactivity predisposes to inconstancy and changeableness.

CONSCIENTIOUSNESS.

Aim: Justice, conscientiousness, and duty.

Disorders: Remorse for actions which are innocent, or of no importance.

Its inactivity predisposes to forgetfulness of duty.

HOPE.

Aim: Hope.

Disorders: Love of scheming.

Its inactivity predisposes to despair.

MARVELLOUSNESS.

Aim: Admiration, and belief in supernaturality.

Disorders: Sorcery, astrology, the belief in demons.

Its inactivity predisposes to incredulity in revealed ideas.

IDEALITY.

Aim: Perfection.

Disorders: Too great exaltation, eccentricity.

Its inactivity predisposes to taking things as they are.

MIRTHFULNESS.

Aim: Glee, mirth, laughter.

Disorders: Raillery, mockery, irony, satire.

Its inactivity predisposes to seriousness.

IMITATION.

Aim: Imitation, expression in the arts.

Disorders: Buffoonery, grimaces.

Its inactivity hinders expression in the arts, and imitation in general.

ORDER II.

Intellectual faculties.

The essential nature of the intellectual faculties is to procure knowledge.

GENUS I. External senses.

GENUS II. Internal senses or perceptive faculties which procure knowledge of external objects, their physical qualities, and various relations.

Individuality.

Configuration.

Size.

Weight and resistance.

Coloring.

Locality.

Order.

Calculation.

Eventuality.

Time.

Tune.

Language.

GENUS III. *Reflective faculties.*

Comparison.

Causality.

SECTION III.

Origin of the Mental dispositions.

Not the nature of the mental powers only, but their origin, or the cause of their existence also, has constantly been an object of investigation. Philosophers have never differed in opinion upon the vegetative qualities of man. His digestion, circulation, respiration, and various secretions and excretions, are natural functions, and cannot be acquired by will nor intelligence; but, in regard to the origin of the mental powers, many, and different opinions, have been, and are still, entertained. According to some, man is every thing by nature; to others, there are a few general fundamental faculties which produce all particular manifestations; whilst others, again, hold that man is born without any determinate disposition, a *tabula rasa*, or blank sheet, and that his faculties are the result of external impressions both natural and artificial. Let us examine these different opinions, and see how far each is exaggerated.

CHAPTER I.

Man is every thing by Nature, or, all is innate in Man.

According to the philosophers of antiquity, we look in vain for qualities in man which are not given to him from birth. This language was used both by profane and religious writers. Plato, in his Republic, considers philosophical and mathematical talents, memory, and the sentiments of pride, ambition, courage, sensuality, &c., as innate. Hippocrates, in treating of the quali-

ties necessary for a physician, speaks of natural and innate dispositions. Aristotle, in his work on Political Science, adopts the principle, that some are born to govern and others to obey. Quintilian said, 'If precepts could produce eloquence, who would not be eloquent?' Cicero, Seneca, &c., were of opinion that religion is innate; so thought Lavater also. Herder* considered man's sociability, his benevolence, his inclination to venerate a superior being, his love of religion, &c., as innate. Condillact† says, 'Man does not know what he can do, till experience has shown what he is capable of doing by the force of nature alone; therefore, he never does any thing purposely till he has once done it instinctively. I think this observation will be found to be permanent and general. I think also that, if it had been duly considered, philosophers would have reasoned better than they have done. Man makes analyses only after having observed that he has analyzed. He makes a language after having observed that he had been understood. In this manner poets and orators began before they thought of their peculiar talents. In one word, all that man does he did at first from nature alone. Nature commences, and always commences well. This is a truth that cannot be repeated too frequently.'

'When the laws,' says he in another passage,† 'are conventions, they are arbitrary. This may be the case; and, indeed, there are too many arbitrary laws; but those which determine the morality of our actions cannot be arbitrary. They are our work in as far as they are conventional; but we alone did not make them; nature dictated them to us, and it was not in our power to make them otherwise than they are. The wants and faculties of man being given, laws are given also; and, though we make them, God, who created us with such wants and such faculties, is, in fact, our sole legislator. In following these laws conformably to nature we obey God; and this is the completion of the morality of our actions.'

* Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophie der Menschheit. Th. 1. S. 252.

† Œuv. Compl. 8vo. T. III. p. 115.

‡ Loc. cit. p. 55.

The ancient institution of castes, or tribes, in eastern countries, shows that endeavors were made to preserve the purity of the races. The prejudice of nobility in certain families can be explained only by admitting the innateness of dispositions.

The religion of Christ also recognises the innateness of the faculties. According to it, all is given from above. 'A man can receive nothing, except it be given to him from Heaven*.' 'No one can come unto me except it were given to him by my Father†.' 'Who hath ears to hear, let him hear‡.' 'All men cannot receive this saying, save they to whom it is given§.' St. Paul says, 'When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which show the word of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another||.'

The doctrine of predestination is also conformable to the opinion that every thing is innate. Pious persons implore the influence of God and of various spirits. The doctrine of divine grace also agrees with the principle that man has natural gifts.

Thus the principle of innateness is obvious, and has been admitted from the remotest antiquity; but what it is that is innate, and how it is so, are points not sufficiently known. Before I examine them, however, I shall rectify the two other notions, already mentioned, in regard to the origin of the faculties of the mind.

CHAPTER II.

A few general Faculties produce all particular Dispositions.

At all times philosophers had a great fondness for general conceptions. They have shown the same liking in their explanation

*John, iii. 27. †John, vi. 65. ‡Matt. xiii. 9. §Matt. xix. 11. ||Rom. ii. 14. 15.

of the causes of our actions. A certain activity of the mind is commonly admitted as necessary to profit being made of external impressions; but some general modes of action have seemed sufficient to account for all the particulars.

i. *Wants and pleasure produce our Faculties.*

The expression Want is here taken as synonymous with desire. This general term however, designates no determinate faculty, but the effect of each power being active; there are as many wants, or desires, as fundamental faculties, and these wants are proportionate to the activity of the faculties. Those, therefore, who speak of wants, in this sense, must specify them, and point out their individual causes. For it cannot be the same cause which finds pleasure in construction and in demolition; in benevolence and in cruelty; in righteousness and in sensual enjoyments; in the study of history and of mathematics; in poetry and in ascetic contemplations, &c. Thus the general proposition of philosophers, that desire of pleasure and aversion to pain produce our actions, must be rectified. The pleasures are different, and effects of individual active faculties; these then must be made known, and the objects of their satisfaction indicated.

ii. *Attention is the cause of our Faculties.*

Attention is very commonly considered as the cause of all internal faculties. Helvetius even said, that each well-organized person might exercise his faculties by means of his attention, with such success, as to arrive at the first rank in society.

The word attention as I have shown, has two acceptations: it denotes consciousness in general; and consequently, in this sense, accompanies the activity of every faculty; and it explains why one animal or man pays great attention to one object, and very little or none to another; why individuals are attentive to different objects, even according to sex and age; and why attention is proportionate to the activity of the respective faculty, so that, if the senses be not exercised, much stronger

impressions are required to arouse their attention. The attention, therefore, of every faculty may be cultivated and improved by its exercise; but attention, as a general quality, cannot be the appanage of any particular power.

Moreover, as attention also denotes a distinct consciousness, a reflection on sensations and actions, the aptitudes and instincts of animals cannot certainly be its effect in this signification. No one will maintain, that the rabbit, badger, mole, marmot, or hamster, make burrows, because they have examined with attention the advantages of such dwellings; or that the beaver builds a cottage, because it has studied the laws of mechanics. Among men, geniuses also burst forth quite unconscious of their talents. This kind of attention then may excite, but can never produce, the particular faculties.

iii. *Understanding is the cause of our Faculties.*

This proposition is also cleared up by Phrenology. The affective powers must be separated from the intellectual faculties, and there are several sorts of understanding, and each special power, affective or intellectual, is a fundamental gift, in the same way as each external sense.

iv. *The Will is the cause of our Faculties.*

This opinion is refuted by daily observation. Who can doubt that every thinker as well as every dreamer in philosophy has occasionally felt the limits of his faculties, and has done things disapproved of by reason. What had then become of the will? I do not agree with those who object, that man is degraded by having his actions explained. Those who use such language seem to me to speak without attaching any meaning to their words. Is man degraded by having it said that he must submit to the laws of the creation? Can he change the laws of his organization, of his senses, of his understanding, or alter the principles of music, algebra, &c.? Were man degraded by a determinate nature, all beings are so, even

God himself, seeing that, by his nature, he cannot will evil, nor do an injustice. Now, if God act according to his nature, man cannot be degraded by laws dictated to him by the Creator, or by his will not being absolute. In the same way man is not degraded by our saying that he cannot produce the talents and feelings he desires.

CHAPTER III.

Man's Faculties are the result of Education.

The doctrine of innate ideas, of innate moral principles and of predestined actions lost its authority by degrees, and it was easy to combat it, as it is not conformable to nature. That so many errors on this point should have prevailed during centuries is almost inconceivable; for every day observation belies the principle. How could philosophers maintain that man is every thing from birth, with the fact before them of the difference in so many particulars between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, occasioned by the dissimilarity of the laws which governed each nation? And is it not obvious too, that several modern nations neglect the arts and sciences only because their religious creeds interdict such pursuits? And further, is not every one of us aware that his notions and his actions are modified by external circumstances, and by the education he has received? The doctrine of universal innateness has been examined and refuted by Locke, Condillac, and others, and I find it superfluous to say more on the subject here. But some of these authors and their followers fell into the opposite extreme, and conceived men and animals born indifferent—*tabula rasa*, or blank sheets, and maintained all the instincts of animals, from the insect to the dog and elephant, to be the consequences of instruction. Helvetius,—the great champion of this opinion—maintains that foxes hunt because they have learnt hunting from their parents; birds sing and build

nesses in consequence of instruction; and man becomes man by education.

The opinion of Helvetius and his school, being still much accredited, and many institutions being founded on it, deserves a particular examination, but the answer to their positions is, that education produces no faculty whatever, either in man or animals. According to their hypothesis, arts and sciences ought to improve in proportion as they are taught, and mankind ought to become perfect under the care of moral and religious preachers. Why then is the progress of the arts and sciences so slow? Why are we forced to allow that men of genius are born? Why has every one of us certain faculties stronger than others? Truth lies at neither of the extremes, but between the two, and this is what I shall endeavor to prove. I shall consider, under three separate heads, the ideas according to which man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education. The first concerns the external senses; the second fortuitous circumstances; and the third, instruction and the external circumstances which are voluntarily prepared.

i. *Of the external Senses as cause of the mental faculties.*

The external senses, it is certain, are indispensable to the acquiring of knowledge of the external world, and to the fulfilment of social duties; it is also certain that they are given by nature. But it is only because they are absolutely necessary to our actions that they have been considered as their cause.

This subject has been particularly examined in the first volume of this work, and I shall only repeat that the internal faculties are not in proportion to the external senses, and that these are mere intermedia. The hands may be used to take food, to write to a friend, to draw, to play on a musical instrument, &c.; but they do not produce hunger, friendship, drawing, music, &c. Let us observe instead of supposing, and we shall find that the internal faculties are only manifested by means of the external senses and of voluntary motion.

ii. *Of fortuitous or accidental Circumstances as the cause of our faculties.*

The following language is very common:—Necessity makes man act and invent; occasions produce talents; revolutions bring forth great men; danger gives courage; society causes the passions, and these are the principal motives of our actions; climate and food beget powers, &c.; in short, circumstances produce the mental faculties.

Whatever has been said of fortuitous circumstances as the cause of faculties, may be reduced to two considerations: they present the faculties with opportunities necessary to the exhibition of their activity; or they excite the faculties, without, however, originating them.

‘Demosthenes,’ says Helvetius, ‘became eloquent because the eloquence of Callistratus made so deep an impression on his mind that he aspired only to this talent.’ According to the same author, ‘Vaucanson became famous in mechanics, because, being left alone in the waiting-room of his mother’s confessor, when a child, he chanced to find a clock, and after examining its wheels, endeavoring, with a bad knife, to make a similar machine of wood. He succeeded, and therefore constructed his surprising machines, the automats. Milton would not have written his *Paradise Lost*, had he not lost his place of secretary to Cromwell. Shakspeare composed his plays because he was an actor; and he became an actor because he was forced to leave his native county on account of some juvenile errors. Corneille fell in love, and made verses to the object of his passion, and therefore became famous in poetry. Newton saw an apple falling, and this revealed to him the law of gravitation, &c.’

In this manner of reasoning the origin of the faculties is confounded either with the opportunity necessary for their manifestation, or with some external excitement. It is evident that external circumstances must permit the internal faculties to act; opportunities, however, do not, therefore, produce faculties.

Without food I cannot eat; but I am not hungry because food exists. A dog cannot hunt if it be shut up, but its desire of hunting is not produced by leading it into the fields. Many millions are often placed in the same circumstances, and, perhaps, a single individual alone takes advantage of them. Revolutions make great men, not because they produce faculties, but because they offer opportunities necessary to their display. Circumstances often favor the attainment of distinction and the acquisition of celebrity, but every individual does not reach an eminent place. Buonaparte alone knew to acquire the supremacy over all French generals who rose before and with him.—The Revolution of Spain is far from having produced the same results as that of France. It is not certainly enough to be an actor in order to compose such plays as those of Shakspeare. Theatrical performers were almost ranked with slaves, at Rome, yet *Æsop* and *Roscius* appeared; whilst in Greece, where this profession was esteemed, no actor of renown is on record. France has produced a greater number of eminent actors than England; yet in the former country performers were excommunicated and in the latter honored. How many children are exposed to similar influences without manifesting the same energy of faculties, while, on the contrary, some individuals not only make use of occasions present, but prepare and produce others which permit their faculties a still greater sphere of activity!

On the other hand, it is true that our faculties are often excited by events, and that without external excitement they would remain inactive. Yet however useful, the study of excellent models may be in the arts, I am still convinced that the principles of every science, art, and profession, are readily conceived by those who possess the faculties each requires in a high degree. This is the case with moral principles and religion also, which are easily developed if the innate conditions on which they depend be possessed.

Society.

Many authors treat of the natural state of man in opposition to his social condition, and consider numerous qualities as the result of society. According to their hypothesis, man is made for solitude; the social state is contrary to his nature; and many of his virtues and vices would never have existed, had he not abandoned his state of isolation.

Excepting certain idiots, however, where, and at what time, has man lived a solitary being? History, so far as it goes, shows that he has always lived in society; in families, at least; and families, though scattered through the woods, form communities. As we find man everywhere united in societies, then, is it not natural to conclude that he is a social being? Animals, it is necessary to recollect, in regard to the instinct of sociability, are divided into two classes: several species are destined to live in society, as sheep, monkeys, crows, &c; others to live solitary, as the fox, hare, magpie, &c. Man belongs to the social class. Now we may easily conceive that the social animals are endowed with faculties destined for society, and that these cannot act without it. And every individual is, in fact, generally calculated for society; all his faculties are in harmony with this aim. Bustards and cranes place sentinels; a flock of wild geese forms a triangle in flying; a herd of chamois is led by a female; bees act in concert, &c.; and all these peculiarities inhere in animals along with the social instinct. Consequently society is itself a natural institution;—a law established by creation, and the faculties of social animals are not the result of society. This proposition is also proved by the fact of social animals having different and often opposite faculties; which if society produced any of them could never happen.

Misery.

Want, that is, some disagreeable sensation, misery, poverty, or painful situation, is often considered as the source of the in-

instincts, propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of man and animals.

Want, in this signification, certainly excites the internal faculties, but it is not true that it produces them; or else the same external wants ought to create the same faculties in animals and in man: yet we observe that not merely every kind of animal, but even every individual, acts differently under like impressions from without. The partridge dies of hunger and cold during sharp winters, and the sparrow falls benumbed from the housetop, while the nightingale and quail take wing to temperate climes before the season of want arrives. The cuckoo requires a nest to lay its eggs in as well as the wagtail or the redbreast, and yet builds none. The idiot makes no effort to defend himself from the inclemencies of the weather, while the reasonable man covers himself with clothing. Moreover, the faculties of animals and man are active, without any necessity from external circumstances. The beaver, though shut up and protected against the weather, builds its hut; and the weaver bird, though in a cage, makes its tissue. It consequently follows, that external wants excite the activity of the internal faculties, but do not produce them; and in this respect their influence is important. The faculties of the poor, for instance, are more active than those of the affluent; when the faculties, however, have not been given by nature, external wants cannot excite them.

On the other hand, misery exercises innate benevolence and improves the softer feelings, whilst riches are prone to excite and encourage lower passions, and in this sense it may be said that the Lord inflicts pain upon those he likes, that is, they grow better; and Jesus Christ condemned riches, yet it remains certain that misery does not produce benevolence.

I have already shown that the expression Want, taken as synonymous with inclination or desire, is the effect and not the cause of the internal faculties; that there are as many wants as different faculties; and that wants are proportionate to the activity of these.

Climate and mode of Living.

Several philosophers have supposed that climate, mode of living, and even the nurse's milk, might be the cause of man's faculties.

In this manner of thinking, the modifications are confounded with the origin of our faculties. The opinion, however, must be considered. The arguments adduced in support of it only prove that manifestation of the faculties depends on the organization; for climate, eating, drinking, &c., have a powerful influence upon the body. Instead, therefore, of denying the influence of climate, food, air, light, &c., I consider it as of great importance, in as far as the activity of the faculties is concerned. The milk of nurses certainly contributes to the growth and organic constitution of children, and consequently to the manifestation of the affective and intellectual faculties, inasmuch as the body is necessary to this. All these external influences, however, cannot, it is evident, produce any faculty. If parents were right in attributing the inferior propensities of their children to the nourishment they had received, why should not grown-up people, who live on beef, veal, mutton, pork, &c., accuse the ox, calf, sheep, and pig, for their want of intelligence and their peculiar character? The activity of our faculties varies with the modifications of our organization, just as the milk and butter of cows vary according to the food they live on; or as the flesh and fat of animals are modified according to the articles with which they are fattened. The activity of men fed on game differs much from the activity of men living upon potatoes and other vegetables; and it seems possible to show the influence of different aliments upon certain systems in the healthy state, just as it may be shown that some medicines act more upon one than upon another. From the same reason we may also conceive the utility of certain rules of fasting in subduing sensual appetites. Particular degrees of excitement suppress the activity of certain faculties, while they increase that of others.

Climate certainly exerts a great influence upon the organization, and it is natural to suppose that one contributes more than another to develop certain faculties. The influence of climate is not, however, so powerful on man as on animals; for man, by means of his intellectual faculties, opposes its effects. The Jews are a proof of this. They are dispersed over the whole world, and though somewhat modified in different countries, their primitive and characteristic organization is still everywhere the same. The effects of innateness and of the laws of propagation are much more potent than those of any thing external. In saying, therefore, that climate and food influence the activity of the faculties, this is not to be confounded with their primitive origin.

iii. *Of prepared Circumstances, and Instruction as the cause of our Faculties.*

Having once considered external circumstances as cause of the mental faculties, men naturally thought that to teach arts and sciences, and moral and religious principles, to found academies and schools, to pay large sums to masters, and to study the works of great men, might be sufficient to produce superior talents.

This opinion must be opposed, by observing:—

i. *The Constancy of the Nature of Animals and Man.*

Were animals susceptible of change from every impression and not endowed with determinate natures, how comes it that every species always preserves the same characters? Why do not fowls coo when they are reared with pigeons? Why do not female nightingales sing like males? Why do birds of one kind, hatched by those of another, display the habits and instincts of their parents? Why does the duck, hatched by a hen, run towards the water? Why does not the cuckoo sing like the bird that reared it? Why do squirrels, when pursued, climb trees, and rabbits hide themselves in burrows? Why are dogs attach-

ed in despite of the unkind blows they receive, &c.? It is true that animals are not confined in their actions solely to such as are required for their preservation. They vary their manners according to the circumstances in which they live; and are susceptible of an education beyond their wants. Horses, monkeys, dogs, &c., may be taught to play various tricks. This power, however, of modifying their actions is still limited, and is always conformable to their nature.

The same reasoning applies to man. If his faculties be the result of external influences, why does he never manifest any other nature but his own? Children pass most of their time with mothers and nurses; yet boys and girls, from the earliest infancy, show the distinctive characters which continue and mark them through life.

ii. *The Occurrence of Geniuses among Animals and Men.*

Did animals and men learn all from others, why should individuals, similarly circumstanced in regard to manner of living and instruction, excel the rest? Why should one nightingale sing better than another living in the same wood? Why, amongst a drove of oxen, or horses, is one individual good-tempered and meek, and another ill-natured and savage? M. Dupont de Nemours had a cow which singly knew how to open the gates of an enclosure: none of the herd ever learned to imitate its procedure, but waited impatiently near the entrance for their leader. I have the history of a pointer, which, when kept out of a place near the fire by the other dogs of the family, used to go into the yard and bark; all immediately came and did the same; meanwhile he ran in, and secured the best place. Though his companions were often deceived, none of them ever imitated his stratagem. I also knew of a little dog, which, when eating with large ones, behaved in the same manner, in order to secure his portion, or to catch some good bits. These are instances of genius among animals which are by no means the result of instruction.

Children often show particular dispositions and talents before

they have received any kind of education. Almost every great man has, in infancy, given earnest of future eminence. Achilles, hidden in Pyrrha's clothes, took the sword from among the presents of Ulysses. Themistocles, when a child, said that he knew how to aggrandize and render a state powerful. Alexander would not dispute any prize at the Olympic games, unless his rivals were kings. At fourteen years of age, Cato of Utica showed the greatest aversion to tyranny. Nero was cruel from his cradle. Pascal, when twelve years old, published his treatise on Conic Sections. Voltaire made verses when only seven years of age. The number of such instances is very great, and it is unnecessary to mention more here, as they must be within the scope of every one's knowledge.

iii. *Individualities among Animals and Men.*

Individual animals of every species have universally something particular in their mental constitution; every bird of the same brood does not acquire its song with equal facility; one horse is fitter for the race than another; and sportsmen know very well that there is a great difference among dogs. It is the same with the human kind. Children of the same parents differ in talents and disposition, though their education has been the same. How then should the same education possibly produce the peculiarities of different children? Or why have not teachers yet found means to confer understanding, judgment, and all other good qualities? Why are we not all geniuses? Why cannot moral and satirical discourses keep us from abusing our faculties? And why must we lament so many errors and crimes?

To prove that man acquires his affective and intellectual faculties by education, some assert that the savages who have been found in the woods, and destitute of all human faculties, resemble beasts only because they have not received any education.

This presumption is refuted as soon as the condition of these unfortunate beings is known. They may be referred to two

classes; being ordinarily defective in organization, with large dropsical heads, or brains too small and deformed. They are almost always scrofulous, have hanging lips, a thick tongue, swollen neck, bad general constitution, and an unsteady gait; they are more or less completely idiots, and have commonly been exposed and left to the care of Providence, having been found burthens by their parents. In some countries, the lower classes consider such unhappily-constituted creatures as bewitched, and take no care of them. Idiots too have sometimes a determinate propensity to live alone, and consequently escape to the woods. At Haina, near Marbourg, where there is a great hospital, Dr Gall and I were told, that on sending people to search for some idiots who had escaped, others were found who had fled from different places. We saw a mad woman near Augsburg, who had been found in a wood. At Brunswick we saw a woman also found in a forest, who was incapable of pronouncing a single word. The pretended savage of Aveyron, kept in the Institution of the Deaf and Dumb at Paris, is an idiot in a high degree. His forehead is very small, and much compressed in the superior part; his eyes are small, and lie deep in the orbits, and we could not convince ourselves that he hears; for he paid no attention to our calls, nor to the sound of a glass struck behind him. He stands and sits decently, but moves his head and body incessantly from side to side. He knows several written signs and words, and points out the objects noted by them. His most remarkable instinct, however, is love of order; for, as soon as any thing is displaced in the room, he goes and puts it to rights.

Such unfortunate beings, then, are idiots, not because they are uneducated, but because their imbecility unfits them to receive education. It is difficult to conceive a well-organized person long wandering about like a savage in our populous countries without being discovered. Were such an individual, however, to escape in infancy, and be afterwards discovered in a forest, though he could not be acquainted with our manners, and the

sciences we teach, he would still manifest the essential and characteristic faculties of the human kind, and would soon imitate our customs and receive our instructions. The girl of Champagne proves this assertion.

Thus, education produces no faculty either in man or in animals; but let us not conclude that education is superfluous. My ideas on education are published in a separate volume, and I only remark here that it excites, exercises, determines the application, and prevents the abuses of the innate faculties; and that on this account it is of the highest importance. Mechanics and peasants, confined to their laborious occupations, are frequently ignorant; but many of them, with a good education, might surpass thousands of those who have enjoyed its advantages.

From the preceding considerations on external circumstances, it results, that they either present opportunities which favor the activity of the faculties, or excite and guide, but do not in any wise produce them.

I shall now consider the share Nature has in originating the powers of man and animals, in the following chapter.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Innateness of the Mental Dispositions.

Let us now see what is innate. The fundamental powers of the mind, as well as the organization on which their manifestations depend, are given to man by the Creator. The constancy of human nature affords the first proof of this position. The human kind, in as far as its history is known, has ever been the same, not only as regards organic, but also as concerns phrenic life. The skeletons of ancient mummies are the very same as those of the men at the present day; and all ages have exhibited

virtues and vices essentially similar. Thus, the special faculties of man have ever been the same; the only difference observable at different times, is, that they have been more or less active, and variously modified in individuals. Here one has unjustly seized a piece of ground, there a place of distinction; here mistresses have been celebrated on an oaten-reed, there on a harp; conquerors in one quarter have been decorated with feathers, in another with purple and crowns, and so on; these modifications are, however, all grounded upon primitive faculties essentially the same. And man, though endowed with proper and peculiar faculties, still receives them from creation; the truly human nature is as determinate as the nature of every other being. Though man compares his sensations and ideas, inquires into the causes of phenomena, draws consequences, discovers laws and general principles, measures immense distances and times, and circumnavigates the globe; though he acknowledges culpability and worthiness, bears a monitor in his interior, and raises his mind to conceive and to adore a God,—yet none of the faculties which cause these acts results either from accidental external influences or from his own will. How indeed could the Creator abandon and give man up to chance in the noblest and most important of all his doings? Impossible! Here, as in all besides, he has prescribed laws to man, and guided his steps in a determinate path. He has secured the continuance of the same essential faculties in the human kind,—faculties whose existence we should never have conceived had the Creator not bestowed them upon us.

The uniformity of the essential faculties of mankind, notwithstanding the influence of society, climate, modes of living, laws, religion, education, and fortuitious events, affords another great proof that nothing can change the institutions of nature. We everywhere find the same species; whether man clothe himself or go naked, fight with slings or artillery, stain his skin, or powder his hair, dance to the sound of a drum or the music of a concert, adore the sun, moon, and stars, or in his religion be

guided by Christian principles, his special faculties are universally the same.

I have also spoken of genius, in order to prove that education does not produce our faculties, and mentioned that children often show peculiar faculties before they have received any kind of instruction. External circumstances are sometimes very unfavorable to the exhibition of genius; but gifted individuals do not always wait for opportunities, they even make them, and leave parents, professions, and all behind, to be at liberty to follow their natural inclinations. Moses, David, Tamerlane, and Pope Sixtus the Fifth, were shepherds; Socrates, Pythagoras, Theophrastus, Demosthenes, Moliere, Rousseau, and a thousand others, who have lived to adorn the world, were the sons of artificers. Geniuses sometimes surmount great difficulties, and vanquish innumerable impediments, before their character prevails and they assume their natural place. Such individuals, prevented by circumstances from following their natural bent, still find their favorite amusement in pursuing it. Hence peasants, shepherds, and artisans, have become astronomers, poets, and philosophers; and, on the other hand, kings, and prime ministers, employed themselves in the mechanical arts; all, indeed, unites to prove the innateness of the primitive mental faculties.

Men of genius, however, have been said to form a particular class, and to be incomparable with persons whose faculties are of middling excellence.

This, however, is the same as saying that hunger and circulation do not depend on organization, because all have not immoderate appetite and fever; or that the mole does not see with its eyes, because the stag sees better; or that man has no smell, since the dog's is superior. But, if we admit that organization causes the highest degree of activity of the different faculties, the lowest degree must also depend on it. Moreover, the greatest genius in one particular is often very weak in others. William Crotch, at six years of age, astonished all who heard him by his musical talents; but in every other respect he was a child.

Cæsar could never have become a Horace or a Virgil, nor Alexander a Homer. Newton could not have been changed into so great a poet as he was an astronomer; nor Milton into so great an astronomer as he was a poet. Nay, Michael Angelo could not have composed the pictures of Raphael, or the contrary; nor Albano those of Titian, and so on.

The mental faculties again must be innate, since, although essentially the same in both sexes, they present modifications in each. Some are more energetic in women, others in men. The feelings are, in general, stronger in women, the intellectual faculties more active in men. These modifications inhere naturally, and it is impossible to give to one sex the dispositions of the other.

We may add, that in every nation, notwithstanding the uniformity of its opinions, customs, professions, arts, sciences, laws, religion, and all its positive institutions, each individual composing it differs from every other by some peculiarity of character. Each has greater capacity and inclination in one than in another direction, and even in childhood manifests his own manner of thinking and feeling. Every one excuses his frailties by saying, *It is my nature; it is stronger than I; I cannot help it, &c.* Even brothers and sisters often differ extremely, though their education is uniform. The cause of difference, must, therefore, be internal.

The innateness of the faculties must also be admitted, because there is a direct relation between their manifestations and a certain organic apparatus.

Finally, if we believe that man is a being of creation, it is only rational to suppose that his faculties are determinate and ordained. I consequently, with all these considerations in view, contend for the innateness of every faculty of the mind. But here it is of importance to notice an observation of Locke upon innateness. He, to show that ideas are not innate, stated that children do not manifest certain qualities, and that different nations have different, nay, opposite principles of morality. This po-

sition, however, in relation to the innateness of ideas and moral principles, must not be confounded with the innateness of the faculties. No sensation, no idea, no principle, is innate. Sensations and ideas of external objects follow from external impressions, and these being accidental, ideas of them cannot be innate; but the faculties which perceive impressions, and conceive ideas, are innate. Thus the idea of a stone, plant, or animal, is not innate; but these objects make impressions on the senses, which produce sensations or ideas in the mind, and both the senses and the mental faculties are innate. In the same manner, sensations and ideas of external and accidental events, and, in general, determinate actions of the faculties, are not innate. The propensity to love, and not the object of love; the faculty of speaking, not the peculiar language; the faculty of comparing and judging, not the determinate judgment; the faculty of poetry, not the particular poem, &c., is innate. There is, therefore, a great difference between innate faculties and innate ideas and sensations.

It is also true that children do not manifest all the faculties, but we cannot from this conclude that these are not innate. Birds do not make nests, the hamster and marmot do not collect provisions, the swallow does not migrate immediately after birth; neither do animals propagate, nor females give suck, when they come into the world; yet all these qualities are innate. This difficulty is easily explained. Every faculty has its own organ, in proportion to whose development are its manifestations. Now in childhood several organs are very little, and in adult age very greatly developed; and while some are proportionately larger in children than in the grown-up, others are fully developed in both. The manifestations of the faculties being, as I have stated, always proportionate to the development and activity of their organs, it becomes evident why some of them do not appear in infancy.

Why moral principles differ in different nations is also obvious. I agree with Locke that they are not innate, but maintain that the faculties which form them are. I shall afterwards show that

moral principles depend on several faculties, and vary in nations in consequence of different combinations of their organs; the justice of a libertine without benevolence and veneration must differ entirely from that of a charitable, modest, and continent person. The same fundamental faculties exist everywhere, but their manifestations are universally modified. Men everywhere adore a Supreme Being; they everywhere have marks of honor and of infamy; there are everywhere masters and servants; all nations make war, whether with clubs and arrows, or with muskets and artillery; and everywhere the dead are lamented, and their remembrance cherished, whether it be by embalming their bodies, by putting their ashes into an urn, or by depositing their remains in the tomb. Hence, though the functions of the faculties in general are modified in different nations, and of those consequently which determine the moral principles also, the same fundamental powers still appear in the customs, manners, and laws of all.

An essential part of the study of man, therefore, is to show that his nature is determinate, that all his faculties are innate, and that nature's first prerogative is to maintain the number and the essence of his special powers, whilst she permits many modifications of the functions of all, in the same way precisely as she preserves species, but continually sacrifices individuals.

The second right of nature is to allow more or less activity to individual faculties in different persons; that is, she endows all with the same faculties, but gives them in very different degrees. Some few are geniuses, but the majority are middling in all respects. Nature then produces genius, and the individual dispositions of every one.

Finally, nature has stamped a difference upon the sexes: some faculties are more active in women, others in men. Men will never feel like women, and women will never think like men.

These are facts which observation proves. Philosophers, therefore, can only examine how nature produces such phenomena, and see whether it is possible to imitate and to assist her.

Thus, the principle of Phrenology—that the faculties of the mind are innate—is indubitable.

SECTION IV.

The Brain is indispensable to mental phenomena.

After having seen what nature does in man, let us inquire into the means by which she effects it. Religious people commonly believe in a mere supernatural dispensation of gifts; but there cannot be a doubt of natural causes also contributing to produce the phenomena of mind.

I may follow the example of other natural philosophers, and confine myself to proving a relation between the body and the manifestations of the mind, or, I may endeavor to determine the special powers of the mind and the respective organs. This latter task has been accomplished by *Phrenology*. Here I shall only show, in a summary way, how reasoning coincides with observation. It is important duly to appreciate my expressions upon this subject: I do not say that the organization produces the affective and intellectual faculties of man's mind, as a tree brings forth fruit, or an animal procreates its kind; I only say that organic conditions are necessary to the manifestations of mind.

I never venture beyond experience; and therefore consider the faculties of the mind only in as far as they become apparent by the organization. Neither denying nor affirming any thing which cannot be verified by experiment, I make no researches on the lifeless body nor on the soul alone, but on man as a living agent. I never question what the affective and intellectual faculties may be in themselves, do not attempt to explain how the body and soul are united and exercise a mutual influence, nor examine what the soul can effect without the body. The soul may be united to the body at the moment of conception or afterwards; it may be different in every individual, or be of the same

kind in all; it may be an emanation from God, or something else. Whatever metaphysicians and theologians may decide in regard to these various points, the position, that manifestation of the faculties of the mind depend, in this life, on organization, cannot be shaken. Let us then consider the proofs which reasoning affords of this principle of Phrenology.

i. *Difference of the Sexes.*

The faculties of the mind are modified in the sexes: some are more energetic in men, others in women. Do then the souls of men and women differ, or is it more probable, that the faculties are modified because their organs or instruments vary? Phrenology shows that certain parts of the brain are more developed in men, others more in women; and thus renders the peculiarities in the mental manifestations of each, easily explicable. There are, however, many instances in which the intellectual faculties of women resemble those of men, and the contrary.

ii. *Individuality of every Person.*

The mental faculties are modified in every individual. Now, is it probable that the soul differs universally, or is it more likely, that as the whole human kind has descended from an original pair, all modifications of the faculties may be explained by differences in the organs on which each respectively depends? Like species of animals, and man also, have essentially the same corporeal structure; there is merely difference of proportion and development in the various parts of which the body is composed; and these differences in the organs produce corresponding varieties in the functions attached to them.

iii. *Ages.*

Mental manifestations are modified by age. Either the soul, or its instruments, therefore, must produce these modified manifestations. It is ascertained that certain faculties appear early in life, or at a later period, according as the peculiar organs of each are developed.

The same law holds in both affective and intellectual faculties: the manifestations of all are not simultaneous. Several of both orders appear in infancy, others not before maturer years; several, too, disappear earlier, whilst others endure till the end of life. Now as we know that manifestations of the mental powers always accord with certain organic conditions, it is impossible to overlook their dependence on organization.

iv. *Influence of Physical Conditions.*

All that disorders, weakens, or excites the organization of the nervous system, influences especially the manifestation of the mental faculties also. It is generally observed that organs are enfeebled if their growth be very rapid; their functions too, are, in consequence, less energetic. This is chiefly remarkable in the climacteric years, or periods of increase; a knowledge of which is so very important in practical medicine. Vegetables are known to increase particularly at two periods; in the spring, and in the middle of summer. The growth of the human body is also more rapid at certain times than at others. Now rapid growth weakens the organs, both of vegetative and animal life, and consequently the functions they perform respectively. Girls who grow too suddenly turn pale, chlorotic, and consumptive, &c. Individuals, therefore, during the periods of growth, are not fit for active business, and ought not to exercise their intellectual faculties much. Rest is necessary till the organs acquire maturity, when all the faculties of the mind and body will resume their energy. Organs of particular faculties are occasionally too soon developed, and are then apt to be exercised overmuch. Incurable exhaustion often results from this, and early genius is nipt in the bud.

Adult men and animals are still subjected to variable degrees of excitement from seasons, temperature, food, and especially from particular laws to which the organization is subjected. We see animals resume and abandon at different periods, their instinct to sing, to build, to gather provisions, to live solitarily

or in society, to migrate, &c.; and the faculties of man do not always act with the same degree of energy. Who can overlook the influence of such evacuations as the catameni, hemorrhoids, &c.; or of pregnancy, digestion, fasting, and whatever exhausts the corporeal powers? Who can deny the effects of disease upon the manifestation of our faculties; or of external and internal excitements, as of agreeable impressions, fine weather, music, dancing, &c.? Now all these act upon the organization only; manifestation of the mental faculties consequently depends on the organization.

Exceedingly defective mental powers have been known to grow very active when excited by external or internal causes. Haller relates the case of an idiot, who happening to be wounded on the head, manifested great understanding so long as the wound remained open, but who, as soon as this healed up, fell into his former stupidity. He speaks of another patient whose eye being inflamed, saw perfectly during the night whilst the inflammation lasted. Fatler Mabillan, in his infancy, gave little promise of superior abilities; but, having received a blow on his head, he, from that moment, displayed talents. I have heard of a boy who, at the age of fourteen, seemed incapable of improvement; having fallen down stairs one day, however, and got several wounds in his head, he afterwards began to excel in his studies. I have seen a girl, nine years old, whose right arm grew gradually weak and almost paralytic, in consequence of a blow on the same side of the head; her lower jaw trembled incessantly, and she was often convulsed; but her intellectual faculties had acquired great energy and perfection; her whole deportment indeed, was exceedingly imposing. I shall mention only one other case of this kind from the *Edinburgh Review*,* in an article upon the *Retreat*, an institution near York for insane persons of the Society of Friends: ‘A young woman, who was employed as a domestic servant by the father of the relater when he was a boy, became insane, and, at length, sunk into a

* No. XLV. p. 197.

state of perfect idiocy. In this condition she remained for many years, when she was attacked by a typhus fever; and my friend, having then practised some time, attended her. He was surprised to observe, as the fever advanced, a development of the mental powers. During that period of the fever when others are delirious, this patient was entirely rational. She recognised, in the face of her medical attendant, the son of her old master, whom she had known so many years before, and she related many circumstances respecting his family and others, which had happened to herself in her earlier days. But, alas! it was only the gleam of reason: as the fever abated, clouds again enveloped the mind; she sunk into her former deplorable state, and remained in it until her death, which happened a few years afterwards.' These facts are positive, and there can be no doubt of similar causes influencing the faculties of the mind surprisingly; yet they can only act immediately upon the organization. We must perforce conclude, that when physical and organic causes excite the most impudent lasciviousness, the most arrogant pride, despair which rejects all consolation, and so on, these various manifestations depend on the organization.

Sleeping and dreaming.

The states of watching, sleeping, and dreaming, also prove the manifestations of the mind dependent on organization; for corporeal organs can alone be fatigued and exhausted. Now it is known that mental operations cannot be continued incessantly, that rest is indispensable, and that a regular recurrence of that inactive state of the mental faculties called sleep, is necessary to enable them to display their perfect energies.

If single organs be by any cause excited, and enter into action while the others are inactive, partial sensations and ideas, or *dreams*, arise. Dreams, then, are almost always the result of certain material causes, and are conformable to the age and organic constitution of the dreamer. Men and women of an irritable habit of body, find difficulties and endless impediments in their

dreams, and generally suffer pain, and feel anxiety and alarm. This constant relation between dreams and bodily frame, which has been verified by an infinity of observations, proves further that the mental manifestations depend on organization.

vi. *Exercise.*

The possibility of exercising and of training the faculties of the mind, also shows their dependence on the organization; for that an immaterial being can be exercised is inconceivable.

vii. *Relation between the Brain and the manifestations of the Mind.*

The preceding arguments are founded on reasoning, and prove that all manifestations of the mind depend on organic conditions. In the first volume of this work is demonstrated that individual faculties manifest themselves by means of particular cerebral parts, and that the faculties appear, increase in strength, and diminish in vigor, in proportion as the organs on which they depend are developed, increase in size, and shrink again. The brain of the new born child scarcely shows any traces of fibres; these appear, become firmer by degrees, and attain perfection between the twentieth and fortieth year. As years accumulate, its convolutions, which had been plump, become flabby, and are less closely packed together.

In conformity with the state of the brain at birth, animal life is confined to spontaneous motions, to the perception of hunger and thirst, to some obscure sensation of pain and pleasure, and to an imperfect state of the external senses. By degrees the number and energy of the affective and intellectual faculties augment, and the child begins to acquire knowledge and determinate ideas of external objects. Through the periods of boyhood and adolescence the faculties gradually gain strength; and, in manhood, they at length manifest the greatest degree of energy. From

this state of perfection, however, they soon begin to decline; and, in extreme old age, the propensities are blunted, the sentiments weakened, and the intellectual faculties almost or entirely annihilated.

If the organs of the faculties, however, do not follow the usual order of increase, but be either precocious or tardy, their respective functions are also manifested with corresponding variations. If the intellectual faculties are often more energetic in rickety children than beseems their age, their brain will also be found extraordinarily developed or irritable. Independently of all disease, however, particular portions of the brain are occasionally developed at too early a period, and then their functions likewise appear prematurely.

On the other hand, when parts of the brain or its whole mass arrives very late at maturity, the mental imperfections of childhood remain longer than usual, sometimes till about the tenth or twelfth year, so that parents despair of the rationality of their children. After this age, however, the cerebral organs will often take on a particular growth, and the faculties then appear with great vigor. One of the most distinguished physicians at Berlin, when ten years old, could not use his organs of speech, and Gessner, at the same age, had made such slender progress in his studies, that his preceptor declared him half an idiot; yet it is known how famous he became afterwards.

If the growth of the cerebral organs be incomplete, the faculties of the mind are equally defective. It is impossible to determine with exactness the degree of organic development necessary to the due manifestation of the mental powers; for this depends not on the size of the organs alone, but on their peculiar constitution also. A very small brain, however, is always accompanied with imbecility.

Children have sometimes the same organic constitution of brain as their parents, and then manifest precisely similar affective and intellectual faculties. Characteristic forms of head are often transmitted from generation to generation; and thus are

mental faculties propagated in families during centuries. It is an acknowledged fact that children who resemble each other or their parents, manifest similar faculties, making allowances for difference of age and sex. I have seen twin-boys so like each other that it was almost impossible to distinguish them; their inclinations and talents were also strikingly similar. Two other twin sisters are very different; the muscular system in the one being most developed, the nervous in the other; and while the first has little understanding, the second is eminently talented.

To conclude this point, I say that, as the peculiar organs of the affective and intellectual faculties can positively be demonstrated, it is impossible to deny the dependence of mental phenomena on the organization.

The principle of phrenology, therefore—that the manifestations of the affective and intellectual faculties of the mind depend on the brain—is also ascertained.

SECTION V.

ON THE RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

General view.

The examination of this subject has been opposed at all times and in all countries by all sorts of obstacles. This higher portion of human nature has constantly been injured, and trampled upon by civil and religious establishments. In this respect, in particular, man has been treated as a beast that stands in need of a master. It may be added that Cicero's sentence—'*man desires to be deceived*'—finds its special application as far as his religious dispositions are concerned.—Those who dare to think for themselves and to instruct others, must still be prepared to struggle for truth. The ancient philosophers commonly took care not to offend the ignorant multitude on the religion of the state, but initiated their chosen disciples with their secret thoughts upon these matters.

The religious doctrines in general are involved in numberless contradictions and inconsistencies. The great remedy consists in the love of truth and free inquiry. Refined ideas are commonly buried under heaps of rubbish and superstition, so that it is extremely difficult to separate the true from false doctrines. We find sublime precepts at the bottom of all the great religious systems among the Indians, Chinese, Roman Catholics and others, though the chief place is occupied by childish, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances. No Christian who has arrived at refined notions of an All-perfect Being will object to the Shastra treating of God in the following expressions; 'He who considers the Being that is infinite, incompre-

hensible and pure, as finite, perceptible by the senses, limited by time and place, subject to passion and anger, what crime is such a robber of Divine Majesty not guilty of.—Acts and rites that originate in the movements of the hands and other members of the body, being perishable, cannot effect beatitude that is eternal.—Those who worship forms under appellations continue subject to form and appellation, for no perishable means can effect the acquisition of an imperishable end.’ Yet the religion of the common Indians is disfigured by, and almost reduced to, external ceremonies. Similar remarks are applicable to the other great establishments of religion. The sublime principles are too often neglected or even forgotten by the fault of those who teach and of those who are taught. The former commonly lay more stress upon the necessity of belief in the messengers who revealed the doctrine, and upon ceremonious observances, than upon virtuous actions; and the latter find it more easy to follow outward ceremonies than to excel by inward virtue, self-denial and wisdom.

On the other hand, men of disinterested, kind and pious feelings, of amiable and charming habits, great goodness, love of truth and sound judgment, are met with in all countries and under every church-establishment, among the Jews and Gentiles, Mahometans, Roman Catholics and Protestants. These individuals, as St Paul said, have the law written in their heart, and we are wrong in ascribing their moral perfection to the religious creed in which they are born and brought up. Fenelon, for instance, would have been mild, amiable, innocent, benevolent and useful to his fellow-creatures under any church-government, because his pure mind inhabited a pure body. He therefore preserved his innate goodness and candor in the midst of the selfishness, hypocrisy and intrigue of the French court.

However delicate the object of religion may be, I do not hesitate to examine it, placing truth above any other consideration, relying on the decrees of the all-wise Creator, and being intimately convinced that truth is the corner-stone of human happi-

ness, and that true christianity will gain by free investigation. The principal points to be considered are, atheism;—God's existence;—God's attributes;—God's relationship with man;—the importance of a temporal revelation;—the aim of religion;—its improvement;—and the sublimity of Christianity.

1. *On Atheism.*

Atheism is the doctrine which denies the existence of God, the creator of the universe. It has been an object of discussion among thinkers of ancient and modern days. Many ancient philosophers denied the existence of a creator and supreme Being that governs the world; they believed in an essence or ether, commonly styled the soul of the world, which as they said penetrated all beings and produced all phenomena. The soul of man was a portion of it, and at the death of every one united with other bodies. Others went still farther by rejecting such a general cause infused into all beings and by admitting only a certain number of elements and their combinations: mere mixture and form of matter. This sort of Atheism then may be confounded with materialism. According to it there is no God, no creator, no soul, no religion, no immortality, no beginning, no end, nothing but matter governed by invariable laws.

2. *On God's existence.*

The number of Atheists has always been, and ever must be very small, but that of Deists seems to be considerable. It appears certain that the heathen philosophy from the remotest times admitted a supreme Deity, the fountain of all other divinities. In discussions of this kind, however, Deists are often confounded with Atheists, and the latter denomination is used in order to decry every new idea unfavorable to any old or accredited belief. In this erroneous sense, to be an Atheist means a mere unbeliever, which may happen with respect to any religious notion or

interpretation of individual passages of the revealed law, whilst the person persecuted under the name of Atheist, may firmly believe in God's existence and his all-wise government. The names of an Atheist, a Deist, and an unbeliever or infidel, therefore, ought to be carefully distinguished from each other, their significations being extremely different. The term Atheist should be applied only to him who rejects the idea of a Creator and of a supreme governor;—that of Deist to him who confines his belief in the existence of a Supreme Being, the creator of all, according to invariable laws;—finally, an unbeliever or infidel in any religion is he who disregards the divine revelation given to man since his creation. An unbeliever in that sense among Christians contradicts the divinity of Jesus, among the Mahometans the divine mission of their prophet. Unbeliever or heretic may also be called he who denies certain interpretations of established churches. The Protestants are heretics in the eyes of the Roman catholics, and the Quakers in the English church.

There is no positive religion or established creed without acknowledging the existence of a Supreme and other subordinate heavenly beings. The Jewish dispensation, and Christianity, being proclaimed as God's will and command are inseparable of the belief in God's existence. Even reason alone cannot consider the admirable concatenation of all things in nature and their mutual relations without thinking of a primitive cause; and it is obliged by its very nature and laws to admit such a cause—an all-wise Creator—a Supreme understanding—God.

3. *On God's attributes.*

According to the doctrine of mythology, individual deities were entrusted with particular powers and presided over individual natural phenomena. The believers in one single God ascribed to him various attributes. Even in the Jewish law and in Christianity the Supreme Being is represented as endowed with very different qualities. The God of Israel is a God of war and

partial to the Jews; that of the Christians, on the contrary, a God of peace and the father of the whole of mankind. I shall not transcribe all particulars of this kind, contained in the Old and New Testament, but the intelligent reader may earn great benefit from comparing them in detail.

Reason is obliged to resign any endeavor to determine the whole of God's nature. Man, in order to be able to conceive it, ought to be God's equal, but an inferior can never understand a superior Being. At all times, therefore, man, confined to his natural endowments, anthropomorphises God; that is, attributes to him such qualities as his intellect can penetrate and as seem the most agreeable and most harmonious with his own inclinations. Savage tribes make their gods glorious warriors, always armed and occupied with battles. Nations who believe in one Supreme Being, ascribe to him the qualities of a tyrant whilst they continue to live in ignorance and barbarism, and they believe in his softer feelings in proportion as their own manners and habits are more refined. Stupid persons are not shocked by inconsistencies in God's commandments, whilst reasonable men think him degraded by such suppositions. The worship varies according to God's attributes. If men fancy God an ill natured Being, armed with infinite power, who takes delight in the misery of his creatures, they fear him, but cannot love him.—The doctrine of God's attributes is also of great influence on the moral conduct of man, since he feels inclined to imitate his maker. If God indulge in fancies, tricks, and lower passions, why should man not be allowed to follow the example of his Great Master. If God be revengeful, why may man not become intolerant. But if God be love, forbearing and forgiving, then man must forbear and forgive as he hopes to be done by, by his Creator.

4. *On God's relationship with man.*

It is natural to think that the Maker is in relation to his work, but with respect to the relationship between God and men in-

numerable opinions prevail in different religious systems. In every one there are articles of belief, which may be subdivided into two kinds. 1st, they are relative to the divinities in Paganism or to the Supreme Being in Judaism, Christendom and various other religious doctrines.—2d, they concern man in his social intercourse. In Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, Mahometism, Buhdaism and all other established churches, the doctrine of ceremonious observances and outward performances is blended together with moral precepts, and the whole is founded on religious belief in such doctrines being revealed by supernatural ways and means. Now it is a fact that among all nations, and at all times, ceremonious observances made up the principal part of religious duties. Among the Indians and Jews a peculiar cast of people is appointed to preside over the execution of such external performances and to teach this important point of their religion.

Even among Christian sects outward forms and ceremonious observances are more or less numerous, and a particular profession, though their service is greatly altered by the New Testament, is kept up and entrusted with teaching religion and with attending to the fulfilment of religious duties. But as among all Christian churches some sort or other of service to God, to his praise and glory, is prescribed, and as priesthood too often confound their personal views with the Supreme Being; as some even seem to wish to persuade the ignorant that they themselves must live splendidly to the glory of their heavenly Father; our duties towards God deserve to be well defined.

Natural religion.

Gall admits a fundamental faculty of God and religion. In my opinion the religious phenomena are the result of several faculties. Causality searches for a cause of every thing and of every event. Individuality personifies the Supreme cause it arrives at; another faculty inspires admiration and wonder, and believes in some relationship between God and man; a third feeling in-

spires respect and reverence, and religion exists. It is strengthened by the feelings of hope, conscientiousness and cautiousness.

Natural religion implies the belief in a Supreme Being and implicit obedience to his will, consisting in the laws of the creation, whilst revealed religions make known to men God's particular decrees.—Natural religion, therefore, distinguishes between the pretended ministers of God and their versions and the Creator and his eternal laws.

Phrenology proves not only the innateness of religious feelings, but also their acting without understanding like all other feelings. Their direction depends on the use of reason. The reflective faculties ought not to be neglected in any religious consideration any more than in every other knowledge. Nay, natural religion may, like natural morality, become a science.

It is commonly believed that there can be no religion without revelation. This however is an error which will not be committed by those who understand the innate feelings of man. This is rather the language of priestcraft. It is to be regretted that religious people are averse to reason. It may be so since many points of their doctrine do not stand the scrutiny of reason. I think with an able writer that 'religion has been wronged by nothing more than by being separated from intellect, and by being removed from the province of reason.' I also think with him that 'Christianity was given not to contradict and degrade the rational nature, but to call it forth, to enlarge its range and its powers; that it admits of endless development, and is the last truth which should remain stationary.' I farther say with him; 'Religious and moral truth is appointed to carry forward mankind, but not as conceived and expounded by narrow minds, not as darkened by the ignorant, not as debased by the superstitious, not as subtilised by the visionary, not as thundered out by the intolerant fanatic, not as turned into a drivelling cant by the hypocrite. Like all other truths it requires for its full reception and its powerful communication a free and vigorous intellect.' God

gave reason to man and why should its use be interdicted in the most important subject—religion.

Natural religion is entirely guided by reason, and the feelings proper to man. It seems hostile to priesthood to conceive the Supreme Being as reasonable. He is particularly described as having negative qualities, whilst his positive powers are those of the animal nature. Sometimes he is represented as an arbitrary tyrant, nay, very often he is demonised by fanatics. Atheism, however, would be preferable to demonism. We cannot conceive the whole nature of God. To be able to do so, we ought to be his equal. But to degrade him under the better part of our nature is abomination. Let the idea of him be formed at least after the image of a good, noble minded and reasonable man. Theologians and priestcraft have shockingly abused the religious sentiments of man and turned them to their advantage, quite forgetting the sublime lessons of Christianity. They think it sufficient to cover themselves with the shield of mysteriousness and to demand unbounded belief. But reason tells us that religious belief must work on kindness, reverence, justice in practice, and that religion cannot exclude intellect and moral conduct. It also tells us that any religious creed that does not tend to the glory of God and the general good of man is objectionable and may degenerate to demonism. Doctrines which are contradictory in themselves or contradict common sense must be surrounded with awe and imposed; this is expedient to selfish or superstitious theologians, but it is not in conformity with reason and pure Christianity. Reason cannot deny the reality of revelation; it even finds in it a great motive of moral conduct. But human reason does not detect that God is fond of perfumes, tabernacles, songs,—all sorts of fineries;—sacrifices &c; such things he must be told by God's messengers. In general no irrational notion of God's attributes, providence and likings can be admitted without being supported by special revelation, but the friends of mankind must lament the mischief priests have inflicted on their fellow-creatures and on the good cause of religion by

their nonsensical views of God and his decrees. It would have been more profitable to mankind at large, if the teachers of religion had been penetrated with the superiority of pure Christianity, and if they had followed the example of their great model. Reason perfectly agrees with the precepts, to refer every thing to God as the first cause;—to venerate his almighty power and providence;—to submit to his decrees and arrangement of things;—to feel gratitude for his benevolence;—and to adore him in truth and in spirit. Natural religion, as well as the systems which are announced as revealed, endeavors to make us acquainted with God's attributes and with our duties to him, but having reason and the powers proper to man for its guide, it rejects all notions which are opposed to them.

Phrenology brings new light. Hitherto reason alone was considered as a sufficient guide in natural religion; but reason is influenced by the feelings as well as by intellectual notions, as by materials on which it acts. If our knowledge be incorrect, our judgment cannot be sound. In the same way our judgment of religious subjects depends on the feelings with which we are animated. But then it is a law of the Creator that reason places the feelings proper to man above those which are common to him and animals. Those who believe in natural religion as well as those who rely on revelation, will modify their religious conceptions according to their innate dispositions or gifts, and he who possesses the human feelings and the reflective faculties in a high degree will reject any revealed law or interpretation that contradicts human sentiments and reason.

According to reason the Supreme Being is all perfection, and can neither gain nor lose in felicity by the terrestrial creation. If his happiness depended on his creatures, on their respect to him or on their regulations, his nature were imperfect. 'The giving glory to God,' says Bishop Taylor*, 'and doing homage to him, are nothing for his advantage, but only for ours; and God created us, not that we can increase his felicity, but that he might have a subject receptive of felicity from him.' It

seems, on the other hand, reasonable to admit that all sentient beings have been created for their own happiness, and that to secure this the Creator has traced them determinate laws. The end of natural religion, then, is an entire submission to the Will of the Creator, be it accomplished by love or by fear; 'For this is the love of God,' says St John,* 'that we keep his commandments.' We may suppose that he prefers the motive of love to that of fear, which, however, is also reasonable, since he makes no exceptions, but applies his laws invariably. The first law, says Michel Montague,† which God gave to man was that of obedience. Thus, if we can do nothing for the sake of God, nothing to promote his happiness, it follows that all our doings concern ourselves, our like, and the other beings of creation, or that in this life religion consists in morality, and that morality becomes religious as far as it is the will of God. All religious regulations, therefore, ought to be only auxiliary means of rendering mankind morally good. Hence it is presumptuous and pitiful to perform ceremonies by way of rendering service to God. Many ceremonies destined to glorify God, are ridiculous, and rather calculated to amuse children than to edify reasonable beings. Their aim, which may be laudable and respectable, ought never to be disguised, nor obscured by absurdities or immoral proceedings. It is edifying to assemble and to sing together the greatness of God's perfections, but it is ridiculous to attribute to him qualities for which we despise each other in society; let us reflect on the benevolence and justice of the Supreme Being, but let us not debase him by low passions; particularly, let us never lose sight of the principal object of religion, viz. the moral improvement of man. As we can understand God's nature only as far as we possess qualities in common with him, and as we possess qualities in common with animals, and others which are proper to man, it is evident that in speaking of man being created in the likeness of God only his higher nature can be said to constitute this likeness. Our religion or union with God or liking to him, then, only consists in exertions of such

*First Epistle, v. 3.

†Essais, liv. ii. ch. 19.

powers which constitute our higher nature. In unfolding and enlarging these powers we truly honor God. Nothing foreign to our original constitution can be required from us, and the cultivation of our rational and moral existence is evidently the noblest tribute we can render to our Creator and the end of our godlike nature.

Importance of Revelation.

It is certain that religious and moral feelings are innate, but the regulation of their manifestations is an important point. We learn from history that the functions of these powers have been liable to infinite abuses and disorders. The principal object of revelation then is to regulate and direct the actions of the religious and moral feelings. Reasonable persons, therefore, will never object to revealed laws, but they will not submit indiscriminately to every thing commanded in the name of God. It is really of consummate importance to bear in mind that the pretended ministers of God are men and therefore liable to be deceived themselves as well as to deceive others. We should never forget that a revealed law must be in harmony with the skill of the Creator or adapted to human nature, and tend to the honor of God and the welfare of mankind. Interpretations to the contrary give a deathblow to all assumed prerogatives of infallibility.

It is remarkable that the belief in Divine revelation is quite general. It is known that the most ancient governments were theocratical and that their civil and religious regulations were imposed as the will of God. Farther, a peculiar kind of craft, or the same spirit has always guided those who call themselves the ministers or confidants of God, and there is something common to all the religious creeds both of ancient and modern times. Every religion has its miracles, mysteries, and martyrs. Each boasts of the most irrefragable testimonies, the most respectable authorities, and the most plausible reasons; each is proposed as true, and requires unbounded belief and blind obedience. The

Indians who rub themselves with cow's-dung; the Jews who eat no pork; the Mahometans who neither drink wine nor eat pork, but make, at least, one pilgrimage to Mecca during their lives; and the believers in the infinite number of other religious creeds scattered over the world, have all received special revelations. Diametrically opposite and even immoral opinions, have been defended even to death, and always in the persuasion that God was rather to be obeyed than man. If any article of faith be found irrational, it is called a mystery, and belief in it is not at all less obligatory. Who does not know that it is the will of God, and necessary to salvation, to make war, or to maintain peace, to immolate victims, or to preserve that which God has created, to sing kneeling or standing upright, the head covered or uncovered, to repeat certain prayers in a foreign language, to eat certain dishes on certain days, to eat them cold or warm, to burn perfumes, &c., &c.? However dissimilar religious doctrines may be in regard to the attributes of God, to his influence on us, to the nature of the soul and its future state, belief is always supported by revelation; it is always God who has spoken either immediately or by means of his messengers.

Religious belief has its advantages and disadvantages. To the former belong the powerful influence it exercises on our actions; and though I am far from rejecting natural goodness, I am, however, convinced from experience, that benevolent persons who have religious belief, are more ready to assist their suffering neighbor than those who have no other motive to act but their innate charity. This, too, is easily conceived since our actions depend on motives and the greater the number of the latter is, with the more confidence we may expect their effect. On the other hand, however, I do not think that religious belief alone is sufficient to dispose every one to act with charity and righteousness. I merely reckon it among the powerful motives of action, and like to see it employed as a means of happiness, but lament every sort of disorder inseparable from its misapplication.

Another great advantage of religious faith is to inculcate determinate notions of God's attributes and perfections and of the final state of man. Reason can conceive neither beginning nor end; it is confined to observation and induction, and the number of those who are apt to reason, is small. It is, therefore, necessary to impose to the great bulk of mankind whatever they must believe, omit or do.

But here lies the great stumbling block, the delicacy and difficulty to distinguish truth from error, true from false prophets and voluntary from involuntary deceivers. The ignorant are satisfied with faith without reasoning. They commonly obey every commandment which is proposed as divine. They attach themselves more to the legislator and to the manner of communicating his will than to the excellency of his precepts. They look for miracles from those who announce the law. They are most ready to believe in that religion which promises most and flatters the feelings of man to the greatest amount. It is obvious therefore, why pretended ministers of God have always been, and are still interested in presenting ignorance as a virtue, and in preventing thinking people from communicating their opinions freely. As their religious interpretations do not always agree with the innate laws of intellect, it is rather convenient to interdict the exercise of reason, and unfortunately, hypocrites succeed too easily.

Reason indicates quite another course. It does not allow to any one to arrogate the right of commanding in the name of God; it commands to pay more attention to the nature of the revealed laws than to the time when, the place where, and the means by which they are made known. The precepts of Christian morality, for instance, have been and will be always the same independently of time and place, for they are inherent in, and adapted to, the nature of man. Truth has its own intrinsic value and does not acquire its worth from those who teach it. It may be overlooked or not be felt by the ignorant, but it cannot be in opposition to reason. The superior qualities of man, called Theolo-

gical, for instance, cannot be given to mankind in order to gratify the selfish views of some individuals or to entail misery upon the community. Reason will admit every cognition of any immutable law, whether physical or moral, as the will of God, but it will not acknowledge any proposition contrary to the evident decrees of the Creator nor will it pardon those who impose duties to others which they themselves neglect.

The aim of religion.

Notions of this kind are intimately connected with those of the relationship between God and man. Most contradictory opinions prevail amongst religious persons. This study has been and commonly still is, considered as the monopoly of a peculiar profession, and degraded to a technical phraseology. A priesthood everywhere decided about the articles of belief and declared the terms *unbeliever* and *immoral* as synonymous. But we ought to be aware that belief cannot be forced upon man any more than physical love, attachment, benevolence or any other feeling. Religious intolerance therefore can only encourage hypocrisy. On the other hand, religious belief must be distinguished from our innate moral feelings; hence the moral and religious sentiments may act separately from each other, or in union.

Though marvellousness is an essential part of the constitution of man, religion should be ranked with other sciences and liberal researches. I think with Dr Channing that 'the claims of religion on intelligent men are not yet understood, and the low place which it holds among the objects of liberal inquiry will one day be recollected as the shame of our age.' Whoever believes in the existence of God, should consider religion as the most important object of his reflections, and being personally concerned in this respect, his union with God should be left free from human authority, particularly from the spirit of those who have seized upon it as their particular property. It is evident that all mental applications ought to be rational; is it not therefore

strange that religion—the most important of human concerns—shall not admit the use of human reason, but that on this subject human understanding shall be obscured by symbolic terms and trampled upon by civil and religious governments;—and that in this enlightened age, religion shall remain a technical study, disjoined from all liberal inquiries, and disfigured by errors which gathered round it in times of barbarism and ignorance.

Priesthood, it is true, does no longer lay down all the moral precepts; their power has gradually diminished and civil governments have established a moral code independently of religious belief, so that now a days we distinguish between civil laws and the rules of religious legislators. Who does not observe many of the pretended Christians neglect the moral precepts of their religious code, confine their religious duty to the belief in the miraculous part of Christianity, and conduct themselves according to the laws of their civil government.—Civil legislators now decide even on the value of religious systems, declare one preferable and dominant and merely tolerate the others. They feel their rights and their duties, and endeavor to promote general order and happiness; their statutes, in fact, are wiser and more forbearing than the interpretations of revealed legislation. It is a positive historical fact that religious governments have done more mischief to mankind than civil rulers. Nay, civil governments have been and still are faulty and injurious to the commonwealth in the ratio of their interference with, or of their being guided by religious opinions. Perceiving the influence of religious ideas on mankind in general, civil rulers often unite with priests for the advantage of both parties whilst the sacerdotaly commonly contend for exclusive superiority. In the actual state of things it is still impossible to prevent every kind of disorder which may result from the union of, or the contest between, civil and religious powers. Among many changes, necessary to the progress of human happiness, a religious reform is indispensable. Mischief is unavoidable so long as religion and morality are under the direction of two distinct classes of governors, and so long as

civil governments interfere with theological opinions strictly speaking.—Sacerdotal supremacy must terminate and civil governments should abstain from meddling with any religious belief *which corresponds with the general order and happiness of the community.* There should be no exception in the civil code. It should be the same for every member of the nation: for those who sing to the glory of God, and for those who do not sing; for those who on certain days eat flesh and for those who eat vegetables; for the rich and the poor, for the gay and the gloomy.—It should have only one aim—general happiness. Whatever does not concern this, ought to be out of its province. Every marvellous conception which neither is in opposition to general happiness, nor troubles the order of the community, should be remitted to the conscience of every believer, and every kind of Churchdom should be abandoned. Religious teachers might form a liberal profession, and their lessons should be attractive, enlivening and above all, practical. Farther, in every religious system, its morality or the ideas which it involves respecting purity or impurity of tendencies, innocence or guilt of actions, should constitute its most important part. Religion should unite all men in peace before their Creator, but theological subtleties and technical phraseology will never produce such a desirable effect, and many generations will pass, and great changes must take place, before man arrives at that degree of perfection.

On the improvement of religious notions.

It does not appear superfluous to examine whether religious notions must remain stationary as priesthood universally maintains, or whether they vary and must vary with the different degrees of civilization, and may improve like the functions of every other innate faculty. Common sense tells that persons of mature age cannot feel and think like children, and that civilized and well informed people cannot be satisfied with notions that please the ignorant no more in religion and morality than in arts

and sciences. It seems evident that priesthood should not be permitted to check religious and moral improvement any more than academies have the right to impede the advancement of arts and scientific inquiries in general. The cold, obscure and technical theology of the times of slavery, ignorance and superstition is to make place to intelligible doctrines which harmonise with human nature. I respect every one's manner of thinking provided it agrees with the general welfare of mankind, but history shows that the religious notions of man, however slow their variations and improvements have been or may be, do not remain unchanged. Progress is the supreme law of the human mind. An irresistible proof of my proposition may be drawn from the revealed law itself. God manifested his will at different times and always with improved additions. He made a covenant with Noah, his seed, and with every living creature;*—he made another with Abraham ;†—he again instructed Moses and revealed the whole Mosaic law.‡—But Jeremiah foretold that this covenant should not last, but be succeeded by a new one.§ In fact, neither the Jewish dispensation nor Paganism were adapted to the civilization when Jesus Christ appeared; and St Paul in the most positive way, speaks|| of 'the mediator of a *better* covenant, established upon *better* promises,' adding that if that first covenant had been *faultless* then would no place have been sought for the second. The gospel, particularly the sermon on the mount, contains rules of conduct very different from those of the Mosaic law. The interpretations of Christianity are numerous. Those which seemed adapted and necessary to former generations, will no longer attract enlightened minds. Religious ideas cannot be stationary any more than civil legislation. Jesus frequently spoke in parables, complained of his disciples not understanding their meaning;¶—distinguished between the things as they were from the beginning of the creation, or had been modified in time; ** and positively stated that he had to say many things which

* Gen. ix. 12.

† Ibid. xvii. 4.

‡ Exodus.

§ xxxi. 31.

|| Heb. viii. 6.

¶ Matth. xv. 16.

** Mark x. 6.

they could not yet bear.*—I firmly believe that in many points of Christianity the letter which kills must be replaced by the spirit which vivifies;—and that wherever reason is allowed to reflect on religious matters, the uniformity of doctrine is impossible. It is a common tendency of the sacerdotaly to keep religious notions stationary and to monopolise certain advantages connected with their office. It is therefore natural that they decry every improvement which may be proposed. Accordingly the Roman, English, Scotch or any other dominant church will contend for the necessity of some uniform discipline. But then even in admitting the soundness of the principle the great difficulty remains concerning its application and decision about the nature of the discipline, that is, whether it shall be childish or reasonable, useful to a few or profitable to mankind at large. It has happened that priesthood in feeling it necessary to yield to the march of intellect did it secretly and without mentioning it openly. Sometimes they altered the language, but continued to act with the former spirit. This their proceeding must change. Religious opinions as they have been established in dark ages to the advantage of a few, require a reasonable reform in the actual state of civilization. To that end it is desirable that in every country the clergy keep pace with the public in the acquirements of natural sciences. In that case alone they will be ready to admit every improvement which reason and justice demand not only in language but also in work.

Sublimity of Christianity.

It is not my intention to examine the various systems of religion which have governed mankind at different times and in different countries. I shall, however, say a few words on Christianity, which deserves the most serious and continued attention of every reflective mind on account of its influence on mankind. The lawgiver and the law surpass all other codes in excellence. In proportion as men's moral sentiments have been refined, Christ's moral character has been found praiseworthy. Since

* John xvi. 12.

the introduction of Christianity all private and public economy and all institutions have been changed, and mankind have made great progress, but in every advanced condition of the world, Christianity unfolds nobler views and keeps in advance of every improved stage of society. Whoever applies Christian morality in his daily transactions is conscious of its adaptation to his noblest faculties. In short this moral code seems to me the most pure, the most noble, and the most salutary, of all which are mentioned in history. Its laws alone are universal and invariable. It alone appeals to reasoning and to the consequences of its knowledge as the best proofs of its excellency; alone it is forbearing; alone it invites examination, and asks the inquirer to hold by that which is true; it alone is founded on the faculties proper to man, alone places general happiness above patial love and personal interest, and alone agrees with the natural law of morality. I do not hesitate to say that, in my opinion, true Christianity is little understood. Many, many changes must take place before it can be re-established in its primitive purity. I say with Benjamin Franklin,* ‘I do not desire faith diminished nor would I endeavor to lessen it in any man. But I wish it were more productive of good works than I have generally seen it; I mean real good works, works of kindness, charity, mercy, and public spirit; not holyday-keeping, sermon-reading, or hearing; performing church ceremonies or making long prayers, filled with flatteries and compliments, despised even by wise men and much less being capable of pleasing the Deity. The worship of God is a duty; the reading and hearing of sermons may be useful, but if men rest in hearing and praying, as too many do, it is as if a tree should value itself on being watered and putting forth leaves, though it never produced any fruit. The great Master thought much less of these outward appearances and professions than many of his modern disciples. He preferred the *doers* of the word, not the mere *hearers*; the son that seemingly refused to obey his father, and yet performed his commands, to him that professed his readiness but neglected the work; the heretical

* Dr. Franklin's Memoirs and private correspondence, vol. III.

but charitable Samaritan to the uncharitable though orthodox priest, and sanctified Levite ; and those who gave food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, raiment to the naked, entertainment to the stranger, and relief to the sick ; though they never heard of his name, he declares shall in the last day be accepted, when those who cry Lord ! Lord ! who value themselves upon their faith, though great enough to perform miracles, but have neglected good works, shall be rejected. He professed that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance ; which implies his modest opinion, that there were some in his time who thought themselves so good that they need not hear even him for improvement ; but now a days we have scarce a little parson that does not think it the duty of every man within his reach to sit under his petty ministrations and that whoever omits them offends God.'

Materialism and Spiritualism.

I lament with all philanthropists, that man is so much inclined to run into extremes. Idealogists have commonly too much confidence in their reasoning powers ; they neglect observation, consider religion and morality as mere means of leading mankind, and assume their own manner of thinking and of feeling as a type of the human race ; while moralists demand blind and unbounded confidence in their assertions as emanating from a superior authority, and discountenance or interdict reasoning. In this way, idealogists and moralists wage continual warfare, mutually disparage their subjects, and retard the knowledge of the nature of man : they are more attached to the love of dominion than to the love of truth. Abuses and prejudices are kept up for the sake of selfish views, and dialectic subtleties are called reasoning. If they love truth, let both parties examine, without prejudice. Philosophers will find that man is naturally inclined to religious considerations ; and the interpreters of the will of God, if they do not act from selfish motives, will not

reject the light of reason ; they will soon be convinced that the feelings are blind, and must be guided by reflection, which can alone establish harmony among the fundamental powers and their functions.

It is certain that ‘ there is a much more exact correspondence between the natural and moral world than we are apt to take notice of ; ’ * and that truth and the knowledge of nature are neither dangerous nor in opposition to morality and true religion. It is proved by incontestible facts, that the affective and intellectual faculties are inherent in the nature of man, that their manifestations depend on the cerebral organization, and that the physical world is subservient to the moral ; but ignorance, and hypocrisy, and envy, have taken part in the discussion. The basis of Phrenology was first attacked, viz. its reality was denied. To others it seemed more convenient to blame its consequences, and without knowing why or explaining how, to cry out that it is dangerous. This, in all ages, has been the reception of every discovery. The disciples of the various philosophical schools of Greece inveighed against each other, and made reciprocal accusations of impiety and perjury. The people, in their turn, detested the philosophers, and accused those who investigated the causes of things of presumptuously invading the rights of the Divinity. Pythagoras and Anaxagoras were driven from their native countries, on account of their novel opinions ; Democritus was treated as insane by the Abderites, for his attempts to find out the cause of madness by dissections ; and Socrates, for having demonstrated the unity of God, was forced to drink the juice of the hemlock. Several of those who excelled in physics in the fourteenth century were punished with death as sorcerers or magicians. Galileo, when seventy years of age, was cast into prison for having proved the motion of the earth. Vesalius, Varolius, and Harvey, were persecuted on account of their discoveries. Those who first maintained the influence of climate upon the intellectual faculties

* Bishop Butler, Sermon vi.

of man were suspected of materialism. The pious philosophers Bonnet, Linnæus, Buffon, the virtuous Lavater, and many others, have been treated as materialists and fatalists.

The instances of Aristotle and Descartes may be quoted, to show the good and bad fortune of new doctrines. The ancient antagonists of Aristotle caused his books to be burned ; but in the time of Francis I. the writings of Ramus against Aristotle were similarly treated. Whoever opposed Aristotle was declared heretic ; and under pain of being sent to the galleys, philosophers were prohibited from combating Aristotle. At the present day, the philosophy of Aristotle is no longer taught except at the university of Oxford in England. Descartes was persecuted for teaching the doctrine of innate ideas ; he was accused of atheism, though he had written on the existence of God ; and his books were burnt by order of the university of Paris. Shortly afterwards, however, the same learned body adopted the doctrine of innate ideas, and when Locke and Condillac attacked it, the cry of materialism and fatalism was turned against them.

Thus the same opinions have been considered at one time as dangerous because they were new, and at another as useful because they were ancient. What is to be inferred from this, but that man deserves to be pitied ; that the opinions of contemporaries on the truth or falsehood, the good or bad consequences of a new doctrine are always to be suspected ; and that the only object of an author ought to be to point out the truth. Ancillon is therefore right in saying with Bonnet : *Reason does not know any useless or dangerous truth.* That which is, is. This is the proper answer for those who, valuing things only by the advantage they themselves may reap, are incessantly asking, *Cui bono—what is this good for ?* and for those also who anxiously ask, *To what does this lead ?* Jesus, the son of Sirach, long ago said, ‘ We ought not to demand what is this good for ; the usefulness of everything will be known in its due time.’

Gall and I never doubted that ignorance and knavery would attack our doctrine with abuse ; what does not man abuse ?

Tell him that he ought to expiate his sins, and in his superstition he will immolate his children. Have not Lucretius and his disciples bent all their powers to prove, that belief in the immortality of the soul inspires fear of death, and poisons every enjoyment of life ? while Christians consider it as the basis of order, of happiness, of morality, and the chief and best solace amid all the calamities that assail them. Establishments for vaccination, and conductors for lightning upon buildings, are, in the opinion of some, laudable and beneficial to humanity ; but, in the eyes of others, they are offences against Divine Providence. In one word, man finds some cause of complaint in all ; but we may say with St Bernard, ‘ We ought to judge differently the complaints of the ignorant and those of the hypocritical. The former complain from ignorance, the latter from malice ; the first because they do not know the truth, the second because they hate it.’

Malebranche has very well painted the enemies of new truths. ‘ Persons of solid and true piety,’ says he, ‘ never condemn what they do not understand ; but the ignorant, the superstitious, and the hypocritical do. The superstitious by a slavish fear are enraged when they see an ingenious and penetrating man. If he assign the natural causes of thunder and its effects, they deem him an atheist. Hypocrites, on the contrary, though led by particular motives, make use of notions generally venerated, and combat new truths under the mask of some other truth ; sometimes they secretly deride what every one respects, and produce in the minds of others a reputation which is the more to be feared, in proportion as the things which they abuse are more sacred.’

It is a pity that religious people and those who contend for knowledge, instead of uniting their exertions in order to establish truth, constantly endeavor to restrain each others’ pursuits ; the former particularly maintain, that knowledge is to be limited by religion, whilst the latter admit with Lord Bacon that ‘ a little natural philosophy inclines the mind to atheism ; but a farther pro-

ceeding brings the mind back to religion,' adding at the same time with the same extraordinary man that 'there are, besides the authority of scriptures, two reasons of exceeding great weight and force why religion should dearly protect all increase of natural knowledge: the one because it leads to the greater exaltation of the glory of God; for as the psalms and other scriptures do often invite us to consider, to magnify the great and wonderful works of God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of those which first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to the majesty of God as if we should judge of the store of some excellent jeweller by that only which is set out to the street in his shop. The other reason is because it is a singular help and a preservative against unbelief and error: For says our Saviour, you err, not knowing the scriptures nor the power of God; laying before us two books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error. First, the scriptures revealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing his power.' There is no revelation of natural sciences, but the revealed truth does not prohibit the knowledge of nature. Moses was well acquainted with all the Egyptian learning;—Solomon petitioned for wisdom from God, and in the prophecy of Daniel it is said that 'science shall be increased.' Its progress indeed has been extraordinary since the times of Lord Bacon, yet I think we may still repeat that which he mentions in his essay on the interpretation of nature, viz. that 'the new found world of land was not greater addition to the ancient continent than there remains at this day a world of inventions and sciences unknown, having respect to those that are known.' None of the arts and sciences conducive to the commodities of life is revealed,—will therefore pious people reject them? Let us rather come to the conclusion that understanding and religion do not exclude each other but should be cultivated in harmony, that divines have no more right to interdict the examination of the Creator's works than natural philosophers are allowed to stop the investigation into his revealed will concerning our moral conduct in this life and our state in that to come.

Phrenology, by maintaining that the manifestation of the faculties of the mind depends in this life on the organization of the brain, is said to establish materialism. Let us set out by observing, that the word materialism has two different significations. One class of materialists maintain that there is no Creator; that matter has always existed; and that all the phenomena of the world are effects of matter. The ancient Romish church used materialism in this sense, and, at the present day, the word is often taken as synonymous with atheism. The position, that mental manifestations depend on the brain, has nothing in common with this sort of materialism. He who inquires into the laws of phenomena, cannot be an atheist; he cannot consider the admirable and wise concatenation of all things in nature, and their mutual relations, as existing without a primitive cause.

Another kind of materialism is taught by those who admit a Creator, but maintain that man does not consist of two different entities—body and soul; and that all phenomena, ordinarily attributed to the soul, result only from forms and combinations of matter. The soul, in their opinion, is a fluid of extreme tenuity distributed over all things, and enlivening the whole organization. Neither has Phrenology any thing in common with this opinion. Nor Dr Gall nor myself have ever endeavored to explain final causes; we have always declared, that we make no inquiry into the nature of the soul, nor into that of the body; that we are led solely by experiment. Now we have seen that every faculty is manifested by means of the organization. When our antagonists, however, maintain that we are materialists, they ought to show where we teach that there is nothing but matter. The entire falsehood of the accusation is made obvious by a review of the following considerations: The expression *organ* designates an instrument by means of which some faculty proclaims itself; the muscles, for example, are the organs of voluntary motion, but they are not the moving power; the eyes are the organ of sight, but they are not the faculty of seeing. We separate the faculties of the soul or of the mind from the organs, and consid-

er the cerebral parts as the instruments by means of which they manifest themselves. Now, even the adversaries of Phrenology must, to a certain extent, admit the dependence of the soul on the body. In the very same passage in which Professor Walter of Berlin imputes materialism to our physiology of the brain, he says: 'The brain of children is pulpy, and in decrepit old age it is hard. It must have a certain degree of firmness and elasticity, that the soul may manifest itself with great splendor. But this consideration does not lead to materialism, it shows only the mutual union of the body and soul.'

The mutual relation between mind and body is an ancient doctrine. Many placed the feelings in the viscera and intellect in the brain. The whole brain is commonly considered as the organ of understanding, whilst we consider the anterior lobes as sufficient to intellect, and ascribe special manifestations of the mind to individual portions of the brain. In fact we assign smaller organs to mental manifestations and therefore cannot be more materialists than our predecessors, whether anatomists, physiologists, or philosophers and moralists, who have admitted the dependence of the soul on the body. Materialism is essentially the same, whether the faculties of the mind be said to depend on the whole body, on the whole brain, or individual powers on particular parts of the brain: the faculties still depend on organization for their exhibition.

To show that all ancient and modern philosophers and the fathers of the Christian church agree with us that the manifestations of the mind depend on the body, I shall quote a few of their opinions. Plato considered the body as a prison of the soul. Seneca says: '*Corpus hoc animi pœna ac pondus est*, (Epist. 66.) The Cartesians, by their doctrine of the tracts which they suppose in the brain, admit the influence of organization on the intellectual operations. Malebranche, when explaining the difference in the faculties of the sexes, and the various and peculiar tastes of nations and individuals, by the firmness and softness, dryness and moisture of the cerebral fibres, remarks, that our

time cannot be better employed than in investigating the material causes of human phenomena. Charles Bonnet said, 'That mankind can only be known and penetrated by their physical nature.' St Thomas* said, 'Though the spirit is no corporeal faculty, the spiritual functions, as memory, imagination, cannot take place without the bodily organization. Therefore, if the organs cannot exercise their activity, the spiritual functions are disturbed. For the same reason a happy organization of the human body is always accompanied with excellent intellectual faculties.' St Gregorius Nyssenust compared the body of man to a musical instrument. 'It sometimes happens,' says he, 'that excellent musicians cannot show their talent because their instrument is in a bad state. It is the same with the functions of the soul; they are disturbed or suspended according to the changes which take place in the organs; for it is the nature of the spirit, that it cannot exercise conveniently its functions but by sound organs'. St Augustin,† St Cyprian,‡ St Ambrose,§ St Chrysostom,¶ Eusebius and many other religious and profane writers, consider the body or even the brain as the instrument of the soul, and distinctly teach that the mind is regulated by the state of the body. Phrenologists, therefore, leave the question of Materialism, where they found it.

**Contra Gentiles*, c. 12. n. 9.

† *De lib. arbit.*

§ *De Offic.*

† *De hominis opificio*, c. 12

‡ *De operibus Christi.*

¶ *Homil. II, III, super Epist. ad Heb.*

SECTION VI.

ON THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

The objects, contained in this Section, are of the greatest importance not only to individuals, but to mankind at large. They have been examined at all ages, but they are far from being sufficiently understood, and the most contradictory opinions have been defended. I shall consider in succession the doctrine of fatalism, necessity, free will and morality, in reference to phrenology.

Fatalism.

Phrenology, by contending that all mental dispositions are innate, is said to lead to fatalism. In reply I remark that this term has different meanings. Certain writers understand by fatalism every thing in the world and the world itself as existing, and all events as results of chance and not of a supreme and guiding intelligence. This fatalism involves atheism, and cannot be reproached to phrenology. Another kind of fatalism admits the creation of the world and in every being a determinate nature and operations according to determinate laws, in inorganised as well as organised beings, in vegetative and animal life. No one doubts of this truth in reference to other beings. We can never gather grapes from a thornbush, and an apple tree can never bring forth pears; and a cat can never be changed into a dog, or any animal into another.

It is also certain that the faculties of mankind and their laws are fixed by creation. First, his existence is involuntary. Who has called himself into being? Does it depend on the will of any one to be born in this or in that country? of these or

those parents ? under this or that system of government, or of religion ? Who has determined his sex ? Who can say : I am the eldest or youngest because it was my choice ? Who has chosen the circumstances, surrounded by which he sees the light, the capacities of teachers, the mental frame of those about him from earliest infancy, and the thousand other accidents that influence him through future life ?

The organs of vegetative life perform their determinate functions without our will ; the liver can never perform digestion ; the kidneys can never secrete bile ; what is poison can never become wholesome aliment, and so on. It is the same with animal life. The existence of the five external senses and their laws are an effect of creation. It does not depend on our will to have the power of seeing, hearing, feeling, smelling, and tasting ; we can never hear or see with our fingers, nor smell with our lips, &c. It is impossible to see as red that which is blue, or to see as great that which is small. The propensities, sentiments and intellectual faculties, their mutual influence and their various relations to each other, are determined by the Creator. The determinateness of these faculties may, doubtless, be termed fatalism.

Moreover the individual dispositions of body and mind are given in different degrees and their manifestations depend on organization. There are individuals deaf, blind, stupid and intelligent, from birth. Bishop Butler * says, ‘ If, in considering our state of trial, we go on to observe how mankind behave under it, we shall find that some have so little sense of it, that they scarce look beyond the present day ; they are so taken up with present gratifications as to have in a manner no feeling of consequences, no regard to their future ease or fortune in this life, any more than to their happiness in another. Some appear to be blinded and deceived by inordinate passion in their worldly concerns as well as in religion ; others are not deceived, but, as it were, forcibly carried away by the little passions, against their better judgment and feeble resolutions, too, of acting bet-

* Analogy of Religion, p. 92.

ter ; and there are men, and truly there are not a few, who shamelessly avow, not their interest, but their mere will and pleasure to be their law of life; and who, in open defiance of every thing that is reasonable, will go on in a course of vicious extravagance, foreseeing with no remorse and little fear that it will be their temporal ruin ; and some of them under the apprehension of the consequences of wickedness in another state. And to speak in the most moderate way, human creatures are not only continually liable to go wrong voluntarily, but we see likewise that they often actually do so with respect to their temporal interests as well as with respect to religion.' Daily experience, indeed, shows, that in different persons the various feelings and talents of the mind are active in different degrees. This kind of fatalism is certain and founded in nature, and even in the Supreme Being himself ; for perfection and infinite goodness and infinite justice inhere in the nature of God, and he cannot desire evil. So also the feelings, proper to man, according to nature must desire the common welfare. It is therefore not astonishing that the philosophers of China, Hindostan, and Greece, the eastern and western Christians, and the followers of Mahomet, have blended a certain kind of fatalism with their religious opinions. Indeed, it cannot be dangerous to insist on such a fatalism in so far as it exists. Christ, his apostles, and the fathers of the church have done so. A proverb of Solomon is, 'the Lord gives wisdom ;' —according to Christianity, 'The tree is known by its fruit ;' * —St Paul says, 'And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are the called according to his purpose. For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son ; that he might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called : and whom he called, them he also justified : and whom he justified, them he also glorified.' †—And again : 'Who maketh thee to differ from

*Matt. xii. 33.

† Rom. viii. 23—30.

another ? and what hast thou that thou didst not receive ? ' * St Augustin taught openly and distinctly our dependence on God, and commanded the preaching of this truth. ' As no one,' says he, ' can give to himself life, so nobody can give to himself understanding.' † He calls gifts of God, all good qualities, as the fear of God, charity, faith, obedience, justice, veracity.—He says, ‡ that God has not distributed in an equal manner noble sentiments any more than temporal good, as health, strength, riches, honors, the gifts of arts and sciences. I declare then that I believe in that fatalism or in that determinate arrangement by the Creator, according to which the nature of man, his fundamental dispositions of body and mind, their relations and dependence on organization, are fixed. Man in this life can never be an angel. I believe farther in a certain kind of

Necessity.

The doctrine of necessity has also occupied many minds; it has been admitted by some and denied by others. It is necessary to come to a clear understanding about the meaning of the word. I take it as the principle of causation or in the sense of the relation between cause and effect. This principle is admitted in the physical and intellectual world; but in the moral operations of the mind it is not sufficiently attended to. Yet there is no moral effect without a moral cause any more than a physical, or intellectual event without an adequate cause.

The principle of causation in the moral world is expressed by the connection between motives and actions. It seems to me surprising that this connection should have been theoretically questioned while every human being is daily dependent upon its truth. It is perceived in all our projects, in the direction of our family, in the regulations of the government and in every social proceeding. Motives are proposed whenever we wish to produce actions.

* 1 Cor. iv. 7.

† Lib. de Fide, c. 1.

‡ Lib. de Coreptione et Gratia.

Without the law of causation in the moral world there would be no foresight of events, and no science of politics. One might act reasonably or unreasonably, justly or unjustly, well or ill, because he acts without motive. Such a state is contradictory in itself, and in this supposition all institutions which implicate the happiness of mankind would be useless. Education, morality, religion, reward and punishment should all be inefficient, man being determined by no motive. And we might expect from every one hatred and perfidy as well as friendship and fidelity, vice as well as virtue. Such a state is merely speculative, whilst in reality man is subjected to the law of causation like the rest of nature. This state alone has been professed by ancient philosophers and legislators, and is supposed by religion and moral doctrines, which furnish the nobler motives to direct man in his actions. But I do not believe in

Necessity as irresistibility.

It is positive, that the mental faculties are innate;—that their manifestations depend on cerebral organs (Fatality)—and that without power we cannot act (Necessity.) The adversaries of phrenology object, that, therefore, all actions must be unavoidable and irresistible, and that there is no responsibility.

It is a fact that without power we cannot act, but it is also a fact that the power being given we need not act. Neither in animals nor in man are all the faculties active at the same moment and irresistible. It constantly happens that one power acts while the others are quiescent, and that one deed rather than another is done. If this were not, it should be the height of cruelty to punish animals to prevent peculiar actions. If a dog be punished for having eaten under certain circumstances, do we not see that though hungry, he will not touch a bit under the same occasion? And is it not precisely so with man? He has a great number of faculties, but are they always active, are they irresistible? We can walk, dance and sing, but are we constant-

ly forced to do so? Who does not often feel within himself a wish for something or an inclination to do some act which he combats by other motives? Indubitably then, neither animals nor man are irresistibly forced to act;—St Augustin long ago said,* ‘God in giving the power does not inflict the irresistibility.’ Man then is free and accountable; how far?

Free will, or liberty and responsibility.

Some philosophers attributed to man an unbounded liberty; they made him independent of every natural law, so to say his own Creator, and his will the sole cause of his actions; nay, they gave him an absolute liberty without motives. Such a liberty, however, in a created being is contradictory, and all that can be said in favor of it, is destitute of signification.

Being free is the reverse of being forced, and free will or liberty is the opposite of irresistibility. The whole constitution of man, though determined by the Creator, does not exclude liberty, deliberation, choice, preference and action, from certain motives and to certain ends. All this is matter of experience universally acknowledged, and every man must every moment be conscious of it. Liberty belongs to the constitution of man.

Some moralists, with Dr Price, maintain that understanding is necessary to establish free will, others derive it from an innate moral sense which is everlasting with truth and reason. My view of free will or liberty is as follows. It consists in the *possibility of doing or of not doing any thing, and in the faculty of knowing motives and of determining one's self according to them.* Three things then must be considered in liberty: will, the plurality of motives, and the influence of the will upon the instruments which perform the actions.

The first object to be considered is the meaning of the word Will. I have already stated, and repeat for the sake of clearness, ~~that~~ many authors confound will with the propensities, inclina-

* Lib. de libera et spiritu, c. 31.

tions, or concupiscences, and therefore deny the existence of free-will. Internal satisfaction and free-will, however, are very different things. Satisfaction accompanies the fulfilling of every desire. The sheep and tiger do not act freely, because they are pleased, the one with grazing, and the other with tearing his prey in pieces. Each faculty of animal life being active, gives a desire or an inclination which man and animals experience involuntarily. They are forced to feel hunger if the nerves of that sense act in a certain manner; they must see, if the light strikes the retina of their eyes, &c. Man, then, has neither any power upon accidental external impressions, nor over the existence of internal feelings. He must feel an inclination if its appropriate organ be excited; and not master of this, he cannot be answerable for it. But inclinations, propensities, or desires, are not *will*, because man and animals often have these, and yet *will* not. A hungry dog, for example, which has been beaten, occasionally refuses the food offered to him;—he is hungry, he wants, but *wills* not to eat.—It is the same with man. How often are we all obliged to act against our inclinations! Thus, experience proves not only that the faculties do not act irresistibly either in man or in animals, or, in other words, that there exists *liberty* or *freedom*, but also that inclinations are not yet *will*. Freedom, however, presupposes *will*. How then is *will* originated?

To have *will*, to decide *for* or *against*, I must evidently know what has passed or is to happen; I must compare: hence, *will* begins with the perceptive and reflective faculties, *i. e.* with understanding; the will of every animal is therefore proportionate to its understanding. Man has the greatest freedom, because his will has the widest range; and this because he has the most understanding. He knows more than any animal; compares the present with the past; foresees future events; and discovers the relation between cause and effect. It is even to be observed that not only *will*, but also our participation and accountableness, begin with the perceptive faculties. Idiots

have sometimes inclinations, but they are neither free nor answerable. It is the same with children before a certain age ; they are said not to be capable of distinguishing good from evil. A man of great understanding and good education is also more blameable for a fault than an uncultivated and stupid individual. Thus, the first condition to freedom is *will*, an effect of knowledge and reflection.

The second concerns what is to be known and compared, viz. motives. Will is the decision of the understanding, but is adopted according to motives. These result principally from the propensities and sentiments, and sometimes from the perceptive faculties ; hence they are as numerous and energetic as these, and the animal which has many and powerful faculties, has many and vigorous motives, and freedom in proportion. The plurality of motives, then, is the second condition to liberty. An animal endowed with only one faculty could act but in one way, and cease from action only when this became inactive. If, on the contrary, it were endowed with several faculties, it would be susceptible of different motives, and a choice would become possible. Yet a plurality of motives is not alone sufficient to freedom of action ; for, in that case, the stronger faculty would occasion the deed. If you offer food to a hungry dog, and at the same moment make a hare run before him, he will eat, or follow the hare, according to his strongest propensity. This is not freedom ; the strongest propensity only prevails. If, on the contrary, the dog, endowed with the faculty of knowing and comparing, has been punished for following hares, he may tremble and have palpitations without pursuing ; he chooses between different motives, he desires, but he remembers the chastisement, and he *will* not. Thus liberty requires will and a plurality of motives. It, however, demands still a third condition, viz., the influence of the will upon the instruments by which the actions are performed.

In cases of disease, it sometimes happens that different motives are known, and that the will has no influence upon actions. In convulsive fits, for instance, the patient may know what he

does, but necessarily beats his chest, or head. It is remarkable, too, that the will may put certain faculties into action, while others are abstracted from its influence. It cannot excite the affective faculties, nor prevent their activity, and therefore we are not answerable for our feelings; but it has greater power on the intellectual faculties, and can reproduce their actions in thinking of their functions. It also influences the external senses by means of voluntary motion, and thus has power over the instruments of action. This is the reason why man is accountable for actions proceeding from feelings, though these themselves are involuntary. But soon as voluntary motion is withdrawn from the government of the understanding and will, liberty, responsibility and guilt are no more. Thus, true liberty is founded on three conditions united, and ceases as soon as any one of them is wanting.

‘Examine it narrowly,’ says Diderot, ‘and you will see that the word *liberty* is a word devoid of meaning; that there are not, and there cannot be, free beings; that we are only what accords with the general order, with our organization, our education, and the chain of events. These dispose of us invincibly. We can no more conceive a being acting without a motive, than we can one of the arms of a balance acting without a weight. The motive is always exterior and foreign, fastened upon us by some cause distinct from ourselves. What deceives us is the prodigious variety of our actions, joined to the habit which we catch at our birth, of confounding the voluntary and the free. We have been so often praised and blamed, and have so often praised and blamed others, that we contract an inveterate prejudice of believing that we and they *will* and *act* freely. But if there is no liberty, there is no action that merits either praise or blame; neither vice nor virtue; nothing that ought either to be rewarded or punished. What then is the distinction among men? The doing of good and the doing of ill! The doer of ill is one who must be destroyed, not punished. The doer of good is lucky, not virtuous. —Reproach others for nothing, and repent of nothing; this is the first step to wisdom.’

Similar passages may be found in many works of French writers. But their ignorance of human nature is evident. Man is supposed to be a blank paper, *tabula rasa*, and therefore, every motive considered as '*exterior*,' whilst, according to Phrenology, every condition of liberty is given to man, like all his powers, and their employment is left to the influence of his reflective faculties. Freedom or liberty however is not absolute, and in itself it is a gift of the Creator. Man is free though he is not free to be so, and he is made free in order to be answerable or accountable for his actions. There is no effect without a cause and no action without a motive, but man has received certain faculties to examine the motives of action and to make a choice among them. These faculties again act according to laws which are determined by the Creator, as well as those of life and nutrition. Man, therefore, cannot will every thing indiscriminately, he is obliged to give the preference to that which seems good and to place one motive above another. This choice among motives constitutes our free will.

'God exercises,' says Bishop Butler,* 'the same kind of government over us with that which a father exercises over his children. It evidently appears that veracity and justice must be the natural rule and measure of exercising this government to a being who can have no competition or interfering of interest with his creatures. The intelligent author of nature has given us a moral faculty by which we distinguish between actions and approve some as virtues and of good desert, and disapprove others as vicious and of ill desert, which moral discernment then implies a rule of action.'

'True liberty in itself, however, has not yet a moral character, for many animals exhibit liberty, in different degrees. We must consequently examine where the morality of actions begins.

* Part I. Ch. vi. of the opinion of necessity.

On Morality, its origin and nature.

The doctrine of morality—Ethics—is the most interesting subject which can come under our views. Ethics embraces all that is loved in God and in man, the notions of good and evil, of right and wrong, of virtue and vice, of merit and demerit, of moral liberty and responsibility.

The majority of every existing community require to be conducted by regulations which must even be imposed upon them in a dogmatic way. A very few only are capable of understanding the concatenation of causes and effects; and even the natural laws will be incomprehensible dogmas to the great mass of mankind. Belief in, at least submission to, the true laws is quite indispensable to the well being of man, and hence obligatory upon all but specially upon those who know them.

It is remarkable that hitherto all nations have adopted their religion and a part of their moral laws, from revelation. We may therefore easily conceive that the priesthood will continue to estimate their services highly, to keep religious notions stationary and to make their own interpretations pass as the revealed will of God.

All positive laws are imposed, but the obligation of bowing to them is no proof of their being what they ought to be. Indeed the most opposite rules of conduct have, at different times, been enjoined even as divine and infallible, and it has not generally appeared singular that divine laws have varied according to persons, localities and circumstances. I cannot, however, help saying that my esteem is not great for a legislator who is constantly in contradiction with himself, who desires moral good, but who notwithstanding his omnipotence corrects only by exterminating, who punishes the innocent on account of the guilty.—My intention here is only to show that belief or the necessity of obeying does not prove the perfection of positive laws.

Some actions in the Chrisian doctrine are styled good, and

others bad or sinful, and whilst the first are commanded, the last are forbidden. Good actions are farther stated to be done after the spirit, and sins after the flesh, though the flesh is allowed not to be evil in itself. But if actions be not specified how can we know which are good and which are bad? Is there no standard according to which they may be judged universally?

In every branch of natural science positive and exact knowledge is sought after. I think that the same ought to be done in regard to the morality of human actions. Mere faith in religious opinions will no longer suffice, the reign of positive truth should begin. The moral nature of man ought to be examined with observation as a guide and reduced to principles capable of general and constant application. Invention in the knowledge of man cannot be permitted, and arbitrary interpretations must give place to invariable laws; actions done in conformity with which will be declared as good, and those not in conformity as bad. Morality must become a science.

The nature of every being is regulated by laws, and the human body is evidently so. The laws of propagation and nutrition cannot be changed, and from analogy we may conclude that the moral nature of man is not left to the guidance of chance. But in what do the moral laws consist, or how are they to be determined? Shall it be by force, by a majority of votes? or are they to be sought from among the works and decrees of the Creator?

It is of the highest importance to be convinced that human nature is governed by natural laws. Many philosophers have acknowledged the existence of natural laws of morality as well as of organization. In the opinion of Confucius 'law is that which is conformable to nature.' Cicero thinks that the law cannot vary, but that it is the same for every nation; and that no injustice, whatever name is given to it, can be considered as law, though a whole nation may submit to its infliction. Lord Bacon calls the laws of nature the law of laws. Charron says that wise men conduct themselves, that nature is their guide, and that the laws are

at the bottom of their hearts. Montesquieu observes, that to say there is neither justice nor injustice except that which is so declared by positive laws is to say that the radii of a circle are not equal before it is traced. Nevertheless this writer allowed governments the power of determining or making the law; his comparison however, proves that the law exists prior to governments which are established merely to watch over its execution; the number of governors is here a secondary point, the object remains invariably the same, viz. the enforcement of the natural law. St Paul speaks in the most decisive manner of natural morality in stating that some persons without the law do things ordered by the law, since this is written in their hearts.

‘Man,’ says Volney,* ‘like the whole world of which he is a part, is ruled by natural laws which are invariable in their essence, regular in their application, consequent in their effects, and the common cause both of good and evil. They are not written in the stars, nor hidden in mysterious ideas, but inherent in human nature and identified with man’s existence. They act on his senses, advertise his intelligence, and bring with every action penalty or reward. Let man learn these laws, let him understand his own and the nature of things around him, and he will know the cause of his griefs and the remedy.’

Volney believed in the existence of natural laws; but he did not, in my opinion, understand the basis of natural morality, when he conceived that it was self preservation. In his hypothesis, animals should have a moral nature; but from what I have already said and from what I shall still say, it follows that neither personal interest nor selfishness of any kind can be recognised as the foundation of morality.

From the great influence of the natural laws upon the condition of mankind it follows that it is exceedingly important not to err in their determination. To elucidate the natural laws in general, and those of morality in particular, I make the following remarks.

In examining the origin of morality we find that the greater

* Ruins ch. v.

number of persons derive the moral sense from revelation; that some philosophers consider it as innate; whilst still others ascribe it to intelligence or even to personal interest.

The ancient doctrine that revelation is the only cause of morality must be given up, since the moral feelings are innate independently of religion, and since revelation can only direct the innate sentiments in their functions. On the other hand it is also certain that neither the moral nor any other feelings can be derived from intellect. This may guide the functions of the feelings but cannot produce them. The details of these propositions are found in the first volume of this work, where I treat of the moral powers of man. I therefore here confine myself to the consideration of personal interest as the cause of morality.

Man, say the partizans of selfishness, acts by interest; he does that which gives him the greatest pleasure, or seems the most advantageous. Egotism, continue they, is not confined to the search after the pleasures of the body or of sense, but extends over all internal sensations, and all moral and intellectual enjoyments. To act, in order to experience pleasure in the moment of action, or to obtain reward either in this life or in that which is to come, is still to act from self-interest.

I grant that man is eminently selfish, and that selfishness in union with pride make him believe what he likes. We may admit with Benjamin Franklin that he who for giving a draught of water to a thirsty person should expect to be paid with a good plantation, would be modest in his demands, compared with those who think they deserve heaven for the little good they do on earth. The basis of morality founded on selfishness, indeed, is unworthy, ignoble, and uncertain at the same time. Wherever it prevails man will be unhappy; and agreement, in regard to that which is morally good, impossible. Individual inclinations of legislators will determine the laws; and their self-satisfaction be the principal motive of their regulations. This is the law of the strongest, assisted by intelligence. It advises governments to treat subjects with benevolence and justice, because in this they

find their own advantage; to keep the community in ignorance, as it is easier to persuade and arbitrarily to guide ignorant people than to convince those with cultivated understandings; and to foster superstition, since it is an excellent means of effecting whatever seems convenient.

The insufficiency of this morality has been felt, and therefore it has been deemed necessary to add, that every one has a title to satisfy his selfish desires, provided he does not trench on the rights of others. This is the doctrine which moralists of modern times endeavor to establish. It is certainly far superior to the vile system founded on the right of the strongest, which, for so many centuries, has desolated the world. Self-love, which undoubtedly exists in man, is here combined with love of others,—also an inherent principle in human nature.

This doctrine, if followed, will put an end to many abuses, and prevent numerous disorders; in many respects it will also promote general happiness. Whoever loves humanity must therefore desire to see it propagated. Nevertheless, the doctrine is founded on the inferior motive of personal interest; and it is neither what Nature nor Christianity teaches.

Other philosophers, still considering self-interest and intelligence together as the cause of morality, say that the strong govern the weak; and that if the weak occasionally become the strong, they throw off the yoke, and impose their own will in turn. Thus it is always the strong who govern. In these circumstances one fears another, and then both agree upon what shall be considered as law. This system, therefore, is founded on convention or agreement between the governors and the governed, for their common advantage.

Let it be understood that no sentiment results from any other, nor from intelligence. Fear then cannot produce the moral sense. Animals are sensible to fear, and yet are ruled by the right of the strongest. Fear, it is true, may become a motive to act and to make laws; but it neither conceives the necessity nor the justice of making laws.

Positive facts and reasoning prove, that the basis of morality is inherent in human nature; but those who treat of justice and virtue and admit this innateness do not always attach the same meaning to these expressions, and their nature and essence are not yet determined. Both terms are taken at one time for faculties, at another for actions. Farther, in considering virtues as good actions and in maintaining that every good action which has required an inward struggle is virtuous, the meaning of the word virtue is still very variable. The same thing happens with the terms *vice*, *immoral* or *unjust*, and *sin*, in the language of religion.

The ancient philosophers spoke of *cardinal* virtues, but these are only the just employment of certain fundamental powers. *Temperance*, for instance, is the right use of the pleasures of sense; *prudence*, of circumspection and intelligence; *force*, of courage and firmness; *justice*, of conscientiousness, benevolence, and self-love, together.

The virtues styled *theological* result from three fundamental faculties: *hope* and *charity* belong to primitive sentiments, *faith* or religious belief depends on hope and marvellousness.

Hitherto religious and civil governments have decided on what they desired should be called virtue or vice. The same action has, according to circumstances, been declared on one occasion a virtue, and on another a vice. Courage is virtuous in conquerors as well as in those who defend themselves against aggressors. The church of Rome commands celibacy as a virtue, while other governments reward those who bring up a family. It is remarkable, that all codes, revealed or profane, with one exception, have declared the *amor patriæ*, or love of country, a principal virtue. The Christian doctrine alone acknowledges no exclusionary patriotism; it alone commands universal love.

As in every religious system and civil code the determination of right and wrong varies, the perplexity of the lover of truth must be great; and as long as virtue is defined according to circumstances, or depends on the good will of civil and religious legis-

lators, it will be contradictory and cannot become absolute. Absolute virtue, however, is to be proved; in other words, morality is to become a science. This cannot happen as long as philosophy and religion are not united, and as long as the fundamental powers of the mind, their origin, their modes of action, the effects of their mutual influence, the conditions of their manifestations, the laws of their improvement and the moral and religious nature of man are not perfectly understood.

Whatever may be said against the plurality of the faculties and their peculiar organs, they must be admitted. Both vegetative and animal life is, in fact, more or less complicated in the different orders of animals. The vegetative is exceedingly simple in the lowest tribes of all. Nutrition is limited to mere intussusception, absorption, and assimilation. It becomes complicated by degrees, and in the mammalia includes mastication, deglutition, digestion, chylicification, sanguification, respiration, circulation, assimilation, and a great number of secondary and auxiliary functions, as the secretion of bile, of pancreatic juice, of urine, &c. Even the particular functions which aid in reproducing the organization, as intussusception, digestion, respiration, circulation, &c., are performed by a greater or less quantity of apparatus. Yet in the most complex, as in the most simple animals, the end is the same, viz, the preservation of the individual.

Animal life is also very simple in the most inferior classes of living beings. It begins with the sense of feeling, is complicated by the addition of taste, smell, hearing, and seeing; by various instincts or propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties; and, finally, attains its utmost complexity in man. He alone unites all the faculties which are dispersed among different animals; and, farther, is endowed with several in peculiar. The faculties of man, then, are multiplied. Let us now examine whether there be any subordination among them or not;—let us see if they be all equally important.

Neither in vegetative nor in animal life is every function of like excellence. Mastication, and the mixture of saliva with the

food, are less important than digestion, circulation, and assimilation. The secretion of certain glands is less necessary than respiration, &c. The same law holds in animal life. Of the external senses, every one would rather lose the sense of smell than of sight. Who would not rather give up some talent, as drawing, music, painting, than the faculty of reflection and reason? Every one is offended if we call him stupid; not if we say that he wants such or such a talent. If we farther examine the influence of different faculties of animal life upon the happiness and preservation of mankind, we shall be convinced that several are much more important than others. The love of approbation is of far less consequence than benevolence; the Christian religion, indeed, ranks charity above all the other virtues. It must, therefore, be granted that the faculties of animal life are important in different degrees. A great line of distinction between them may at once be drawn by separating such as are common to animals and man, from such as are proper to man. A double nature of man was long ago remarked, and has been designated by different expressions; as the flesh and the spirit; the animal and the man, or the carnal and spiritual part of man.

Now, are the faculties common to animals and man, or those proper to humanity, to have the superiority? The answer is obvious. The general law of nature is, that inferior are subordinate to superior faculties. Physical are subject to chemical laws; gravity, for instance, is modified by chemical affinity: the particles of a salt attract each other in opposition to their gravity, and form crystals. Again, physical and chemical laws, though existing in organic beings, are modified by those of organization. Plants do not increase by juxtaposition; nor do they assimilate mere homogeneous substances. In the muscular and circulatory systems, the physical laws of motion and hydraulics are preserved, but they are influenced by the laws of life. Chemical laws remain in digestion, but swayed by organic laws. Physical, chemical, and vegetative laws exist in living creatures, but modified by those of phrenic life. Animals take food, so do plants;

but animals choose it, guided by the sense of taste. Plants propagate their species automatically; animals feel a propensity to do so. The propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties of animals, consequently modify the properties of their organization extremely.

The same principle must be applied in regard to the distinguishing part of human nature: all inferior laws, physical, chemical, organic, and animal, are subordinate to those of the peculiarly human faculties. These, therefore, compose the moral character of man. Thus, as the faculties are not equally important, and as some must be subordinate to others, I divide them, in relation to actions, into three orders: one excites man and animals to determinate actions, as hunger, physical love, the propensity to fight, to build, to gather provision, &c.; I style these *faculties of action*; another, because they assist and modify those of the first kind, I call *auxiliary*; and another, which ought to direct, I term *directing faculties*.

The faculties proper to man are obviously superior to those common to him and animals, since, by means of his peculiar nature he is master of all that breathes, and, therefore, ought to be master of his own animal nature also. I, consequently, lay down the following principle:—The faculties proper to man constitute his moral nature and his absolute conscience, that is, all actions conformable to them are absolutely good. And now liberty assumes the character of morality, if the will produce actions flowing from motives which are proper to man. Man, then, has not only the largest share of liberty, from his superior will and great number of motives, but he alone possesses *moral* liberty. The feeling of conscientiousness is to morality, that which will or the perceptive and reflective faculties are to liberty. As long as actions spring from motives common to man and animals, they are not primitively moral, though they may be conformable to morality. Inferior motives, however, must still be employed in guiding mankind, and must frequently supply the place of such as are moral. We even see that purely moral motives have but little influence in the world.

Extent of Morality.

In regard to morality, an important question concerns its extent. Is man the only aim of the terrestrial creation, that is, is all the rest made for him? An affirmative answer can only be the result of too much self-esteem;—the contrary seems evident, since nature produces poisons for man as well as for other animals. Geology also proves that many beings existed before man. It is however a natural law that superior employ inferior beings to their advantage, and in consequence of his superiority; man, as he is their master, may make use of all the other creatures upon earth. Still this does not prove that every thing exists merely for the sake of man. The human kind may govern all animals, but it has also certain duties towards them, and I cannot believe that man has any right to torment animals for his gratification or amusement.

Benevolence and reverence are essential qualities of human nature, and man's duties towards his like form the principal object of morality. It is commonly stated that he is created to be happy. This proposition, however, is vague, and individual happiness is too often confounded with the general weal: the former results from the satisfaction of the faculties each person is more particularly endowed with, but it varies, since individual gifts differ widely; hence it can never become the universal standard of moral actions: actions which are evidently bad may be accompanied with pleasure. Mere pleasure, therefore is not the aim of man's existence any more than individual happiness; these, indeed, are synonymous expressions.

I am of opinion, that the Creator viewed general happiness as superior to that of individuals, and that he intended to produce the second by the first. All nature seems to prove this idea.

In considering the immense system of the celestial bodies, it is probable that the earth might rather perish than the universe be destroyed. Geology teaches that our globe has continued to

exist while many kinds of animals have disappeared from its surface. Species are preserved while individuals die. The totality of living bodies exists, but particular parts perish. Again, nature has established a law of violent death, and of the sacrifice of individuals, for the sake of general preservation. All animate beings exist at the expense of each other, and all are thereby preserved.

Man makes no exception from this general arrangement, and it is, therefore, quite certain that the happiness of all mankind is preferable to that of nations; this to that of families, and this again to that of individuals. Personal interests, it is allowed, must be neglected sooner than those of our country, or than family affections. But the same reasons that lead to this conclusion, prove also that the species is more worthy of our love than our native country.

The superiority of general happiness is also confirmed by the essential difference of the two natures of man. The greater number of animals find their enjoyments in selfishness; some, however, live in society, are attached to each other, and feel a kind of love for the country of their birth; but man alone is susceptible of exercising good-will towards the whole of his own species, and every other being of creation. I am confirmed in my opinion, that general happiness is the aim of man's existence, since I see the truth of what afflicts many amiable minds, that the just perishes in his righteousness, while the unjust prospers in his wickedness. This happens under the government of the animal nature, which feels no pleasure in general happiness, nor pain in the commission of injustice. It shows the predominance of the animal nature, but is it not probable that the Creator intended the satisfaction of those faculties which are proper to man as well as of those he holds in common with the brutes? There can be no doubt he did. I think that both natures are to be gratified, that no faculty is made in vain, and that all that stamps superiority upon man is not merely bestowed to make him unhappy. Now, as the more noble powers are not satisfied in the

actual state of things, religious people hope that they will be ministered to in another life, and this is considered as a conclusive argument in favor of the immortality of the soul. As the peculiarly human nature, however, is preferable to the animal, it must follow that even in this life, its satisfaction is superior to that of the other. I entertain this opinion the rather because the animal part may be satisfied under the dominion of the human, which leads to the recognition of duty universally; while the brute nature has no feelings of obligation, and looks for mere selfish enjoyments. Wieland, in his *Agathon*, expresses this idea almost in phrenological terms, yet it must be understood that he considered the mind as free and in conflict with the senses. He calls the mind the spiritual part and the senses the animal part of man. In order to render man that which nature intended him to be, says he, the harmony of these two natures must be preserved. 'If this harmony,' continues he, 'is possible, it can be effected only by the subjection of the animal part to the spiritual, the intelligent and the free. This subjection is the more reasonable, for the animal part incurs no danger from the sway of the spiritual, and has no reason to dread any denial of its legitimate enjoyments, since the former knows too well what is necessary for the common good of the whole man to refuse to the animal portion what is necessary to its existence and its welfare. But the animal part knows nothing of the wants of the spiritual, cares not about its own restless struggles against every attempt at control, and the instant that reason slumbers or slips its bridle, it assumes an arbitrary supremacy of which the destruction of the whole internal economy of our nature is the inevitable consequence.'

Thus, I do not believe that in the eye of God, the unjust who thrives is worth the just who perishes; I rank the unjust among animals; like them he is pleased with what flatters himself alone; he is even more dangerous than they, on account of his superior understanding.

The proposition (it is one which troubles many minds)—mor-

al errors are unavoidably punished in this life—finds its solution also, in the superiority of general happiness. The strong and able-bodied man may not seem to suffer from excesses and sensuality; but his descendants have often to pay the penalty. The love of domination is ministered to by the ignorance and servility of nations; these, however, must bear its blighting influence. He who begins by subjecting his countrymen to his will, and finishes by aiming at the empire of the world, must injure, and make thousands and millions wretched. The few who amass riches do so at the expense of the many who remain poor, and so on. Thus the evil which results from any infraction of the natural laws, is not always felt by him who is its first cause; it is, however, certainly experienced sooner or later.

Finally, as I perceive that, in the kingdom of justice, and of general happiness, the individual is never forgotten, whilst individuals enjoying happiness so easily forget their neighbors, and the general weal, I most anxiously wish the kingdom of individual happiness at an end.

Thus, general happiness appears to me the principal aim of phrenic life, as the preservation of the species is the chief end of vegetative life. General happiness is the touch-stone for all natural morality, for all social institutions, and for all the actions of man. Every deed which favors the general weal is good, and the more this is opposed the worse is the act.

Here we may ask, whether there are certain races of men in civilized society, or certain classes, who deserve the lot of mere animals? These, on account of their inferiority, are employed by man for his pleasures and purposes; are the highly gifted among the human kind also permitted to use for their advantage those who are less favored by nature? Or, are there individuals who may arrogate privileges, and claim immunities?

To reply in the affirmative would be against natural morality. This declares God to be the impartial parent of all, and permits man only to do good to his fellow man; it does not exclude the agency of self-love, but makes it, along with all other faculties

common to man and animals, subordinate to those proper to man. Indeed, I know of nothing more important than it is to prove the existence of natural morality, and to specify its laws. For, as mankind must be governed, a true legislation is extremely desirable.

Both religious and civil regiments have done immense injury to mankind, and this in proportion as the inferior faculties, such as self-love, love of approbation, courage, destructiveness, and even attachment and circumspection, have dictated their positive laws. The animal is the enemy of man, it justifies absolute power, the right of the strongest, the spirit of party and of sect, national pride and hatred, and every kind of personal design. It looks only for convenience. Religion itself is employed as a tool in its purposes. The misery of man will certainly endure so long as the faculties common to him and animals determine that which is to be done or omitted.

Attempts have been made, with more or less success, to improve legislation, but all the means have been derived from inferior faculties. Evils, therefore, may have been mitigated, but they could not be entirely abolished. Final success depends altogether on the sacrifice of personal interest, or of individual to general happiness.

The universality and constancy of the natural laws deserve a particular attention. Their basis is the same, at all times and in all countries; they are independent of personal and of local circumstances. Were it not presumptuous, even absurd, in naturalists to endeavor to create physical and chemical laws, and in gardeners to change the laws of vegetation? Those who breed and rear animals must treat them according to their nature; they will never feed parrots with bitter almonds or parsley. The organization of man is also allowed to be subject to natural laws, though several are unknown or neglected in social life.

That the five senses, in their healthy state, propagate external impressions according to determinate laws, is farther admitted. No one can see as great that which is small; taste as sweet

that which is sour; nor see as blue that which is scarlet. Without perfect regularity in the functions of the senses, it were altogether impossible to acquire any positive knowledge of the physical qualities of external objects.

Now, why should not the same determinateness pervade the affective and intellectual faculties? It is, indeed, commonly admitted in as far as the intellectual operations are concerned. The principles of the arts and sciences are always pointed out. Who doubts of the mechanical laws? They are the same now as they were in ancient times. The mechanician never attempts to warp or change them in constructing machines; in inventing, he only makes new applications of laws that are invariable. Mathematical laws, also, have not changed with ages; every mathematician, whether aware of them or not, applies them in his calculations. A great musical genius produces harmonious tones, and a great painter agreement of colors, according to natural principles, and without previous study. The laws of all arts exist in nature, and are only discovered, not created. A deep thinker needs no logical precepts to enable him to perceive sound from false reasoning. Thus the intellectual operations of the mind are governed by natural laws which can neither be changed by revelation nor by human enactments, neither by praying, by fasting, nor by offerings. They who are born gifted with great talents discover the laws of their faculties, make these known to the less favored in capacities, who then learn and apply them in their mental operations.

In the same way, they whose peculiarly human faculties hold such as are common to man and animals in subordination, act in a moral way without precept, and even with pleasure; nay, if constrained to do evil, they would feel positive pain, precisely as does the great musician from bad music. Moral precepts are necessary to those only who do not possess them in their interior. Now, as the Creator has provided for physical and moral laws, when will man cease to invent laws, and begin to study those the Creator has traced for his guidance? And when will he be wise enough to submit to them.

Existence of Evil.

The natural law of the subordination of the faculties leads us immediately to consider moral evil. The first step is to inquire whether evil exists or not. Having settled this point, I shall then examine its origin.

Two kinds of evil are commonly spoken of; the one physical, the other moral. There is an evident opposition throughout all nature. Earth, water, and air, present a perpetual scene of destruction and reproduction, of pain and pleasure. And even as temporal good is often distributed unequally and without personal desert, so physical evil is frequently inflicted without any fault on the part of the sufferer, and this both among animals and the human kind. Why should domestic animals so often be ill fed and harshly treated in reward for their services? Why should all suffer by contagious diseases? Wherefore must the children begotten in debauchery, expiate the sins of their parents? Why, when the hail-storm ravages the wide-spread harvest of the indolent and rich man, does it not spare the little garden of the laborious poor? Such melancholy queries have been put at all times. The Preacher says, 'There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that longeth his life in his wickedness.*' 'All things,' says he, 'come alike to all: there is one event to the righteous and to the wicked; to the good, and to the clean, and to the unclean; to him that sacrificeth, and to him that sacrificeth not: as is the good, so is the sinner; and he that sweareth, as he that feareth an oath. This is an evil among all things that are done under the sun, that there is one event unto all: yea, also the heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead.†' In another passage he continues: 'I returned, and saw under the sun, that the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of understanding, nor yet fa-

* Eccles. vii. 15.

† Ib. ix. 2, 3.

vor to men of skill: but time and chance happeneth to them all.* Physical evil, indeed, does not merely exist, it even invades all according to the established laws of creation.

Moral, no less than physical evil, occurs in the world. Even in thinking himself abased by his wickedness and imperfection, man must acknowledge its existence. Moses said, 'God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually.† David thought, that 'there is none that doeth good, no not one.‡ The psalmist said, 'the wicked man delights in blood.' Christ taught; that 'out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witnessing, blasphemies||.' St Paul speaks of men being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness, envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; and of whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boastful, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them. Moral, as well as physical evil, then, has always existed, and the time when it will be rooted out seems yet to be far off.

Origin of Evil.

The origin of evil has been a fertile subject of discussion. Evil seemed incompatible with a perfect Creator. The notion of a malevolent principle, therefore, came to be entertained. This still prevails among those who, personifying evil, speak of a devil. To explain the existence of evil, however, is a simple and easy task. It is only necessary to know that all natural phenomena depend on certain conditions or circumstances; that things are in relation to each other, and that these relations generally

*Eccles. ix. 11, 12.

†Gen. vi. 5.

‡Psalm xiv. 3.

|| Matt. xv. 19.

Before I enter into details upon the organs of the mind, I shall answer a question which may be put in regard to every organ, viz: *why do you admit a particular organ of this, and not of another function?* When actions alone are spoken of, it is certainly difficult to conceive the necessity of particular organs; yet the answer is decisive when we can say: experience demonstrates it.—Moreover as I look for fundamental powers and not merely for their organs, the necessity of every one may be proved even by reasoning, that is, by the general proofs which confirm the plurality of the powers and organs. In considering these proofs, in relation to every faculty, we may be sure in our proceeding. Every faculty is fundamental and a particular organ must be pointed out for it:

1. Which exists in one kind of animal and not in another;
2. Which varies in the sexes of the same species;
3. Which is not proportionate to the other faculties of the same individual,
4. Which does not manifest itself simultaneously with the other faculties, that is, which appears or disappears earlier or later than they;
5. Which may act or repose singly;
6. Which individually is propagated in a distinct manner from parents to children; and
7. Which singly may preserve its proper state of health, or be affected by disease.

Gall did not determine any of the organs in conformity with these views. He followed an empirical method only, looking for organs according to the actions of man. But I have no hesitation to maintain that in pointing out the special or fundamental powers of the mind, my proceeding is philosophical, founded on principles, and adequate to refute the following objections made against the object of our investigations.

Some adversaries say that too many, others that too few organs are acknowledged, and that they might be multiplied

infinitely. The former should know, however, that each is admitted by the same proofs which demonstrate their plurality generally, and that it is verified by experience. The independent existence of one organ is neither more nor less certain than that of any other ; and if similar proofs be admitted confirmatory of one, they must be agreed to in regard to every other. On the other hand the opponents who think that enough organs are not admitted, should consider, that every faculty may be applied to an infinite number of objects. Seeing is always seeing, but to what an infinity of objects may the power be directed ! Hearing is always hearing, but how various the impressions perceived by this sense ! It is the same with the internal faculties. Constructing is always constructing, but how infinite in number and variety the objects that may be produced ! Moreover, it is to be observed, that a great number of actions result from combinations of different powers ; and, therefore, it is not surprising to see so many effects produced by a small number of primitive faculties. Are not twenty-four letters of the alphabet sufficient to compose all imaginable words ? The muscles of the face are not very numerous, yet almost every individual of the human kind has a different physiognomy. There are few primitive sounds ; few primitive colors ; only ten primitive signs of numbers ; but what an infinity of combinations do not each of these furnish ? Let us suppose from thirty to forty primitive faculties of the mind, and then consider all possible combinations, with their modifications ; and we shall not feel surprised that we observe such a number of modified functions. I repeat that the organs are not multiplied unnecessarily, but that determinate principles are followed in establishing each of them, such only as nature presents being recognized.

Some opponents have a peculiar turn of mind. They rely on their saying that phrenology is not complete, as if this imperfect state could refute that which is discovered and confirmed. The

physical analysis of matter is not yet complete ; shall therefore all discoveries of modern chymists be denied : such a conclusion should be evidently erroneous. In the same way this incomplete state of phrenology does not refute that which is certain in it.

Some metaphysical speculators imagine that several powers, which in phrenology are considered as special, might be ranged as constituents of other powers ; for instance, that combativeness and destructiveness might be reduced to one and the same power, in the same way secretiveness and cautiousness ;—self-esteem and love of approbation.

We prove our assertions by reasoning and facts, nor shall our constant observations deserve less confidence than mere *à priori* reasoning, particularly since we find in practical life that nature is not so simple in her means as many metaphysicians fancy. Why different nerves for different sensations, and again others for voluntary motion ? why so many different glands for the individual secretions : &c.

Other metaphysicians indulge in their fancy and speak of discrepancies of phrenology, supposing that there are special faculties of the mind for which they find no organs in the map of the phrenological bust.

Let me admit, for the sake of argument, such powers to exist, why do those who find them necessary not look for the respective organs ? why should we do all ? or shall the organs which we have discovered, not be true, because we do not know those organs which some metaphysicians suppose to exist. Some, for instance, think it necessary to admit an organ of the love of parents, since there is one for the love of children. Let those who want an organ of the love of parents, find it out and prove it, as we do in regard to the organ of philoprogenitiveness, or shall the organ of philoprogenitiveness not exist because that of the love of parents is unknown ? I for my part, do not think it necessary to look for an organ of that kind, since I do not think that the love of parents is a special faculty. Nature has distributed powers for necessary

phenomena. The preservation of the species depends on the care which parents take of their offspring, and it is obtained by a special power. Parents are supposed to be independent of their children, and if in old age they should want their assistance, other feelings, as attachment, consciousness, reverence and benevolence are sufficient to explain gratitude and any other help they give to their parents. Others want an organ of self-love. I might reply, look for it, and prove it ! I see necessity for doing so. Self or self-love seems to me attached to the whole myself and an attribute of every faculty which when active wishes to be satisfied.

Many consider it as a discrepancy of phrenology that I admit an organ of coloring, and another of tune, and none of taste, and none of smell. There is, however, a great difference between these mental phenomena. In treating of the external senses, I shall speak of their immediate and mediate functions. The immediate functions are independent of cerebral organs, only as far as they are referred to special objects, they are the result of internal mental operations. The sense of smell, perceives odors ; that of taste, savors ; that of hearing, sounds ; and that of sight, different shades of light. When these different perceptions or sensations are referred to external objects, individuality and eventuality are active. This is common to all the external senses ; but the mind operates on sounds and the shades and modified impressions of light in a peculiar manner, in which it does not operate on odors and savors. It transforms sounds into tones, melody and harmony, and the impressions of light into coloring, and for these peculiar operations of the mind, there are special organs in the brain.

I shall now begin to treat of the special faculties, which I admit in phrenology, and in the order which seems to me in the mean time as the most philosophical. An invariable order cannot be adopted till phrenology is complete. In discussing the fundamental powers of the mind, I shall always follow the same procedure : I shall first consider the individual actions which invite

to think of a special faculty ; then give the history of the discovery of the organ ; I shall add my remarks where Gall, myself, or other phrenologists happen to differ in opinion ; and afterwards describe the seat of each organ, and name it according to its essential nature ; finally I shall examine its influence on the other faculties and the effects of its inactivity. It is my intention rather to make known the philosophical spirit of these inquiries and the manner in which I conceive they ought to be conducted, confirmed or amended, than to quote the numerous facts observed in support of our opinions. Gall was fond of quoting individual facts : these, however, be they ever so numerous, can never produce conviction. I have neither the wish nor the intention to persuade, but invite every one to convince himself by personal examination, since there can be no self-conviction without self-observation. I think, however that by our unabated inquiries during so many years, we have acquired the right to demand that no conclusion be formed until our observations have been repeated. Is it not painful then to see that this is not done in phrenology as it is in all other new discoveries ? I cannot but regret that physiologists and philosophers do not examine with sufficient zeal and care the doctrine of phrenology, which undoubtedly one day will become the basis of all philosophical, moral, and political sciences.

SECTION VIII.

ORDER I.—FEELINGS, OR AFFECTIVE FACULTIES.

THE affective faculties have their origin from within, and are not acquired by any external circumstances.—They cannot be taught and must be felt to be understood ;—in themselves they

are blind and act without understanding ;—finally they are partly common to man and animals, partly proper to man.

GENUS I.—*Propensities.*

There are several species of propensities ; each species has a particular nature, and they all exist in animals and man.

Organ of the Desire to Live.

It is highly probable that there is a peculiar instinct to live, or love of life, and I look for its organ at the basis of the brain, between the posterior and middle lobes, inwardly of combativeness.

Organ of the Propensity to Feed.

Alimentiveness.

The common opinion of physiologists is, that hunger, or the desire to take food, depends on the nerves of the stomach alone. Gall and myself, placing all other instincts into the brain, thought it probable that the instinct to feed, depends on a cerebral portion, though we did not know its situation in the head.

Mr. Crook, lecturer on Mnemonics, seems to have been the first who observed the development of a peculiar part of the brain, in relation to the instinct in question, though the view he took is probably too limited. He observed several individuals who were exceedingly fond of good living, and he found their heads anterior to the organ of destructiveness very large. He thought that this organ produces a fine exquisite taste, and called it the organ of *gustativeness*.

Dr. Hoppe, of Copenhagen, as stated in two communications published in the Phrenol. Journal, No. V. and VII., looked for an organ of the appetite for food, at the same spot of the head, where Mr. Crook admits the organ of gustativeness, viz., before that of

destructiveness : ' we observe,' says he, ' that the chicken is no sooner out of the egg, than it picks the grain that lies on the ground, and the new-born babe sucks the nipple. Is this to be explained without the supposition of an organ analogous to that which makes the duckling immediately plunge into the water. Neither am I able otherwise to conceive how the new-born animal can discriminate what is useful for its nutrition ; that, for instance, the chicken, never mistakes gravel for grain, and that the wild beasts always avoid poisonous plants without ever tasting them.'

I agree with the idea that the propensity or instinct to feed, is fundamental, and attached to a portion of the brain situated before the organ of destructiveness, and under that of acquisitiveness, embracing the anterior circonvolutions of the middle lobes in man, and the corresponding cerebral parts in animals. But I do neither think with Dr. Hoppe, that this propensity discriminates what is useful for nutrition, nor with Mr. Crook, that it produces the delicacy, and nicety of taste ; I confine this power to the mere desire to feed, in the same way as the cerebellum to physical love, or amateness, considering these two like all other propensities, as blind and deprived of intellect. In this way the comparison between nutrition and propagation is complete, each class of these functions, comprising three sorts of nervous activity, partly vegetative, partly instinctive, and partly sensitive.

Now all concurs to prove that the above mentioned portion of the brain, is the organ of the instinctive part of nutrition, or of the desire to feed. It exists not only in carnivorous, but also in herbivorous animals. The goose, turkey, ostrich, kangaroo, beaver, horse, &c. &c. have a middle lobe as well as the duck, eagle, pelican, tiger, lion, dog, &c. The desire to feed, is common to all animals, and the carnivorous animals want the organ of destructiveness in addition to that of the instinct to feed.

The functions of the anterior circonvolutions of the middle lobes in man, were unknown before the observations of Mr. Crook and

Dr. Hoppe. It is, however, remarkable that they are developed from the earliest age, sooner than many other parts, and proportionably larger in children and young, than in adult persons and animals. This instinct, acts in conformity, from the first appearance of young beings in this world, and is generally the most active in early life. In treating of destructiveness, I shall mention the reasons which induce me to think that it does not determine the food of carnivorous animals, or the taste for animal food, this being the result of the sense of taste, or of the *gustatory* nerve. This latter sense too, in my opinion, explains that which Mr. Crook calls gustativeness, and ascribes to the organ in question, which I confine to the instinct to feed.

This propensity is particularly assisted by the smell, and the olfactory nerve is in all animals, in the most intimate communication with the middle lobes, so much so, that in the ox, sheep, horse, dog, fox, hare, rabbit, &c., the internal part of the middle lobes, seems to be almost a mere continuation of the olfactory nerve. In man also, the external and greater root of the olfactory nerve, is in connexion with the anterior convolutions of the middle lobes.

Farther, the middle lobes are in particular communication with the nervous bundles, which constitute the anterior lobes, and the anterior external portion of the crura, in other words, the organs of the intellectual faculties; and the propensity to feed, puts into action many of the perceptive powers, and the voluntary motion of many parts, before the food is transmitted to the stomach for digestion.

This organ, though indicated by reason and comparative anatomy, is merely probable, and can be confirmed, or rejected like every other, according to direct observations alone, in comparing cerebral development, in relation to the special propensity. I possess many facts in confirmation.

Thus, the first great commandment of Christianity is perfectly agreeable to the experience of all times, and is the basis of all positive regulations; it embraces all natural laws and even includes the second commandment of Christianity. This, however, on account of its importance, has been announced separately; it is: *Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*

This precept is very simple; but, like the first, has not escaped manifold abuses. It has always been, and is still eluded by various interpretations. A great number flatter themselves that they are Christians, without ever expending a thought on the happiness of their neighbors; some are not ashamed to bear the name of Christians though they think all the inhabitants of a country and the country itself made for them. The first absolute king who pretended to be a Christian was a curse to Christianity. On the other hand, in combining the second precept with several passages of the Gospel, some have discussed the question whether Christianity abolishes private property and establishes community of goods or not? The early Christians made a trial of a true commonwealth; several religious orders or monasteries did the same; but experience has shown that mankind is not yet in a condition to live in such a state of purity. Nevertheless, it is certain, that if the second commandment were fulfilled, there would be no peculiar property.

To this may be started the objection of there being a fundamental feeling in which inheres the desire to acquire, a feeling very active in animals and in man. Now, Christianity opposes no natural disposition; on the contrary, it commands acknowledgment of the natural order, and, indeed, is declared to be destined to re-establish things as they were from the beginning of the creation. The propensity to acquire certainly exists in man as well as in animals; man is also influenced by attachment to his family and country, and both of these feelings are powerful motives to action; yet they also give rise to many disorders, and occasion a great deal of mischief. They are not interdicted by the second precept of Christianity, but they are placed under the

dominion of a superior sentiment, which desires general happiness, and places the well-being of others on a level with our own, our family's, and our country's.

Christianity consequently commands, 'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.'* As well as nature, Christianity proclaims original differences among men. It allows that some are more, others less, talented; but it makes each answerable only for the gifts he has received; commanding that those who have received much, give much; that is, contribute largely to the general happiness. Thus, true Christians form a separate society; they receive among them none who are profligate, selfish, ambitious, or who are governed by inferior faculties; but only those who find pleasure in the satisfaction of their peculiarly human powers. They scout idleness with its attendant vices from among them. They have many members in one body, and all members have not the same office;† there are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit; and the manifestation of the spirit is given to every one to profit withal.‡ In short, they consider as brothers and sisters those only who do the will of God; who love each other as themselves.

The accomplishment of this precept is extremely difficult, but it is essential to see that it is indispensable to the constitution of a Christian. To maintain that it is not, is to be deceived, or to be a hypocrite. Jesus constantly admonished his disciples to love one another||. 'By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye have love one for another.'§

Many flatter themselves with being Christians, when they say that they believe in the divinity of Jesus, in his mission and miraculous actions; and all the while neglect the moral principles he inculcated. Jesus, however, has loudly declared, that practice of his commandments is indispensable, in order to enter into the

* Matt. vii. 12.

|| John xv. 12.

† Rom. xii. 4.

‡ 1 Cor. xii. 7.

§ John xiii. 35.

kingdom of God. St Paul says,* ‘The kingdom of God is not in word, but in power.’ And St James† is very clear in writing: ‘What does it profit my brethren, though a man say he hath faith and have not works? Can faith save him:—as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.’

It is, indeed, scarcely possible to find a true Christian; but the unbeliever who deems Christian morality merely fanciful, is more excusable than those who call themselves its disciples, but suit Christianity to their own tastes. Such conduct has done incalculable injury to mankind, and by spreading abroad false conceptions of its nature, has greatly lowered the Christian system of morality in general estimation.

The second precept of Christianity is, therefore, also conformable to natural morality, or to the faculties proper to man. For these look for general happiness, and are satisfied with neighborly love, without any regard to personal distinctions.

The third precept of Christian morality concerns its propagation. Jesus commands his disciples to preach his doctrine as preferable to all other systems of morality; to be indulgent and forbearing; to give freely, as they have freely received;‡ and to pardon faults and errors, provided they be corrected. He who does not act according to the law is to be excluded from their society; excommunication, therefore, is the severest punishment it admits.

How lamentable it is that these sublime principles of morality have been so dreadfully disfigured, as now not to be recognisable in social intercourse! Understanding has, from time to time, endeavored to oppose arbitrary interpretations, and hence divisions arose. Unfortunately, and in direct contradiction to the mild spirit of Christianity, unbelievers in its doctrines have been persecuted. This was the most certain means of confirming dissensions, and is the more to be regretted, as these have always been based upon secondary things, which in themselves never had and never will have any influence on mankind. By degrees the

* 1 Cor. iv. 20.

† ii. 14. 26.

‡ Matt. x. 8.

essential was distinguished from the indifferent portion, and in several countries men are now permitted to do whatever they think agreeable to God, provided it do not trouble the order of society. Civil governments are at present superior to the priesthood in wisdom. They allow people to believe that God is fond of perfumes, of music, and of various ceremonies, and they tolerate those who show their love of God by fulfilling their social duties, by esteeming every day alike, and saying with St Paul,* 'the kingdom of God is not meat and drink.' Let us hope that religious toleration will become general, and that the aim may be no longer confounded with the means: the aim must be the same every where and at all times; the means must vary according to the natural dispositions of individuals, to the education they have received, and to the circumstances in which they are placed, but still be dictated by the faculties proper to man. Let us hope that the maxim, that no man ought to suffer in his person, property or reputation for his opinion in matters of mere supernatural doctrines, will be established in every enlightened nation.

It is indispensable to obey the will of God, but it is by no means likely that he is pleased with the errors of his creatures, or that he leads them into temptation by trifling and insignificant commandments. It is evident that they are not arrived at refined notions of a Supreme Intelligence who lay the greatest possible stress upon the necessity of a belief in Mahomet's pretended mission; who consider all other virtues as useless if this single point of the prophet's divine appointment be not instantly present to the mind of the aspirant to eternal life. This doctrine, however, prevails throughout the Coran. Farther, Mahomet establishes a scale of meritorious actions in which idle, ridiculous, useless and sometimes mischievous observances occupy the chief place, while many useful and virtuous actions are passed over as unimportant.—May a similar reproach not be made to various creeds among Christians?

Is it not rather probable that God has given to man, and identi-

*Rom. xiv. 17.

fied with his being, such laws as are necessary to his happiness? Surely it is. They, therefore, who call themselves the ministers of God, ought to make it a principal business to study his will, especially the laws of nature, and to consider it an imperious duty to teach these, and by submission to them, to give an example of belief in their truth and excellence.

On the other hand those who understand the natural morality of man, will approve of several propositions of Christianity, which are sometimes declared to be unnatural and absurd. These they will consider as inherent in man, noble in their application beneficial in their effects, and conformable to the law of nature. They will allow that all the faculties common to man and animals are to be subjected to those proper to man. There are three kinds of positive legislation which I shall call to mind in the order of their imperfection or excellence. In the first, there are only absolute masters, who arbitrarily determine what is to be done or omitted, whose pleasure, in fine, is the only reason of their regulations. This administration is the morality of the strongest; it prevails among barbarous nations, and may, in the 19th century, come to an end among the civilized nations of Europe. The second, which prevails among civilized nations, rejects the right of the strongest, and all sorts of privileges. The animal faculties, however, are permitted full scope for their activity, but without having power to constrain other persons to minister to their desires. This morality abolishes slavery, the rights of feudality, respects property and allows every one to exert his faculties for his own advantage, under the sole restriction, not to take aught that belongs to others. It commands us not to do to others what we would *not* that they do to us. Thus, the inferior animal faculties still dictate the law, though they are limited by those which are proper to man. Many are susceptible of living under the reign of this degree of moral perfection, civil and religious liberty. Their selfishness opposes the grant of monopoly and privileges to others, and their moral feelings reject them as unjust. The desire to acquire, and at-

tachment, that is, commerce and exclusionary patriotism, here exert a very great influence. Nations, therefore, thus far advanced, are united and powerful, and defend their situation vigorously. They use every effort to advantage their community; but, besides, every one lives for himself, brings up his children for his private ends, and uses all his energies to increase his wealth.

The third, and most perfect legislation, results from the supremacy of the peculiarly human nature. The faculties proper to man guide the aim of every action; all are therefore directed towards the universal good. The animal nature becomes a mere auxiliary to this end. Commercial liberty is introduced, national pride and prejudices cease, and nations are allied. Natural morality even here differs in nothing from that of Christianity. Universal charity and love of truth prevail. He who does the will of the Creator, prospers. There is no distinction of person. Every one does to others what he wishes to be done by them. In this way we understand Jesus when he desires his disciples to abandon their wives and children rather than the doctrine he teaches; he only places man above animals. He does not command abandonment of wives and children, if they love each other as themselves, but of those only who do not the will of God. Animals love their offspring, but parental love is certainly inferior to the love of mankind. Jesus therefore acknowledges as mother, brother, or sister, those only who love their neighbours as themselves.* He wished man to be and to act according to the faculties proper to human nature. If this were so, all would work with pleasure for the common happiness; those who engaged with great talents, would require the same recompense as those who were industrious with slender endowments; private property would be at an end, and general peace would reign on earth.

Jesus felt that his doctrine was too difficult for man as he is, but he supported his superiority by its salutary effects and by experience, which shows that it is perfect. Nations may pre-

*Mark iii. 35.

pare themselves for such a kingdom of love; but Jesus himself did not rely on this motive alone; he attended also to the motives of reward and punishment. Moreover he was prepared for the disputes his teaching occasioned. Whoever proposes a new doctrine brings forth an object of difference. Now the moral principles of Jesus being especially opposed to riches and worldly distinctions, to that, therefore, which man desires most eagerly, necessarily excited adversaries and caused persecutions. He came not on purpose to excite dissensions between brothers, relations, or man and man; but he knew that dissensions were unavoidable in the natural order of things. Now let every one judge for himself, whether it were better to live quietly in error and in injustice, than to suffer and struggle for truth and general happiness.

Thus, my conviction is, that the moral precepts of Christianity are those of the Creator. I cannot, however, believe that such a pure system of morality will be easily, or soon adopted. But this can take nothing away from its perfection. It will ever remain the object all regulations ought to have in view, for its reception is the indispensable condition to universal peace. In my work on Education, I speak of what will avail in procuring the conditions under which man can receive this moral doctrine. Meanwhile, it is certain that they only usurp the name of Christians, who by their enactments prove that their sole aim is individual happiness; or, who strive after riches and worldly distinctions, and other advancement of their merely private estates; or, who live at the expense of others; or, finally, who are apt enough to laud, but ever ready to act in contradiction to the precepts of Christianity. It is, indeed, blasphemous to bear the title of Christian without acting up to the sacred duties it requires. Let us, therefore, in acknowledging the purity of Christian morality, put it in practice, before we dare to arrogate the noble name of Christians.

Natural goodness of man.

There is, undoubtedly, a great deal of moral evil in the world. Man, it is also certain, is commonly inclined to evil, that is, to follow the activity of the animal faculties, which are, for the most part, very energetic, and submit with difficulty to the guidance of the powers proper to man. I am, nevertheless, astonished to observe so much goodness in the world. Its abundance evidently proves that man is naturally good, and by no means in consequence of his social institutions; these, indeed, are for the most part, calculated to pervert him. The poor are surrounded with temptation and exposed to corruption on all hands, and the lives led by the rich, especially their idleness and luxury, invite them to immorality. All ranks have their superstitions, and all believe in error, as well as in truth; all pay for temporal and also for eternal happiness, and all subscribe to the first dogma proclaimed necessary to secure the good things here, or to purchase the joys of immortality hereafter,—an entire abnegation of reason.

A true picture of society would, indeed, be frightful. Happily, man has received from the Creator so large an infusion of goodness, that it is not to be annihilated. It is lamentable, then, that certain persons attach themselves more to the letter than to the spirit of some symbolic propositions of the gospel, and that mystical, contradictory, and noxious interpretations are rather believed in than simple, reasonable, and salutary views.

There are some naturally good, some who instinctively, so to say, do the things which Christian morality commands. But, have we not all heard religious people say, that this natural disposition to do well profits those who exert it in no wise? Some may wish to excuse their sins in degrading the nature of man, not aware that in degrading man they degrade his Maker, since they tell us at the same time that man is made according to the image of God. Let us examine into the origin of faith and of charity, discuss their comparative excellence, and determine the merit which belongs to natural benevolence.

In regard to the origin of religious belief and charity, I refer to the first volume of this work. I shall only repeat that they spring not from the same fundamental faculty, that they may exist separately or conjoined, and that they may be active in very different degrees. These propositions are as important as those according to which charity and the disposition to faith are inherent in the nature of man. We may, therefore, proceed to ask which of the two is the more important?

Pious people commonly decide on this question according to their individual feelings. But this manner of judging frequently leads into error, and is apt to deceive. Let us, therefore, make abstraction of ourselves, and consider the subject generally.

We are very ready to believe that which we like; this, however, is not always truth. Religious systems, and the various sects of each are all founded on belief. Jews, Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Calvinists, Inquisitors, Quakers, &c., all fancy they possess the true interpretation of the revealed will of God. Hence, simple belief does not indicate abstract truth. Religious belief is the result of feelings, and all feelings without exception, are blind; religious belief consequently, may be deceived; and I think it causes error whenever the faculty on which it depends ceases to act in harmony with the other powers proper to man. It has, unquestionably, done a great deal of harm in the world. Some standard, by which its manifestations may be regulated, is therefore extremely desirable.

What shall we say of those who maintain that Christianity does not require good works? Simply: that they wish to make their task very easy; not reflecting on the very nature of a covenant, which cannot be made without conditions; and not knowing the gospel of Jesus Christ who desired that his disciples might be known by their works, and the excellence of his doctrine by its effects. Such a basis alone is unobjectionable, since it includes its validity in itself, and soon changes faith into conviction. Now as pure charity is the aim of the doctrine, and was the practice of the life of Jesus, charity is evidently the chief of his precepts.

Farther, the tendency of charity is solely to do good; but religious belief may do evil too; it easily finds an excuse for self-love, personal views, and abuses of many complexions. Priestcraft when asked what is right, commonly answers, expediency or our decision. History proves this accusation of religious governors.

We may add, with the Apostles St James and St Paul, that faith without works is dead. Every hypocrite may say, *I believe*. Faith should be considered only as an additional motive to exercise charity; and in its inferiority it alone should never be the basis of any religious doctrine. Priestcraft of all denominations, contending for their supremacy, wish to lead the people blind-folded.

‘Beware of false prophets,’ says Christ,* ‘which come to you in sheep’s clothing, but inwardly they are ravening wolves. Ye will know them by their fruits.’

Finally, even those who have no religious faith, or belief, still admit charity and its good effects. Thus, I do not hesitate to place, with St Paul,† charity above faith.

In regard to the merit of natural benevolence, I think, that the moral laws are as positive and inherent in our nature as are those of vision, and of the harmony of colors and tones; I also conceive that Christ has commanded certain works because they are good in themselves and according to the will of the Creator, but not that these works are good by their being commanded; and, farther, that the truth of religious interpretations is proclaimed by their compatibility with general happiness. If man can do nothing of himself, that is, by the powers which he has received from his Creator, what can be the benefit of the priesthood? How could Jesus Christ speak of gifts or talents? How can man be made answerable? Those who say that natural human benevolence is worthless, might also say that the goodness of God is without value.

Persons, it is true, who are naturally good, deserve less credit

* Matt. vii. 15.

† 1 Cor. xiii.

for their beneficent actions than those who do good principally because it is commanded. The former are charitable because they find pleasure in charity, while the others of charity make an act of virtue. In reference to energy and effect, however, natural benevolence is superior to that which results from faith. The faculties which act from internal vigor are rewarded by their indulgence; they persevere with pleasure and constantly tend to action, while those which must be excited by other motives become inactive as soon as these cease to operate. The naturally good do more acts of beneficence without faith than those who, little endowed with primitive charity, take mere faith as their guide and rule of conduct. Those, however, who unite natural charity and faith are the most assiduous in doing good; but, to reject natural benevolence is equivalent to saying that pure and natural gold is not worth such as is extracted from very heterogeneous minerals, and that a swift and willing horse is inferior to one which must be spurred to go quickly.

I finish this section by asking, what individual can determine moral evil and moral good, that is, dictate the moral laws? I think that it is with moral as with all other principles; a blind man cannot establish the principles of coloring, nor one born deaf those of music; the great painter gives the rules of his art, and the great genius for music indicates the laws of harmony. In the same way, he who possesses the faculties proper to man in the highest perfection, and in whose actions they predominate, he who can challenge the world *to convict him of sin*, has a right to determine moral principles, and to fix rules of moral conduct. Those, therefore, who would make exception and say, Follow my words and not my deeds, have no title to give rules of action to the community, or to superintend their practice. How noble was the saying of Christ in reference to this point,* *‘If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not.’*

* John, x. 37.

SECTION VI.

Practical Considerations.

In every science the theoretical must be distinguished from the practical part. The former considers principles, the latter applies them. Both, however, must be in harmony with each other. Saying that experience contradicts a theory, only means that the theory was inexact, and not founded on sufficient experience. But it does not indicate that no theory or principle should be established. Farther, I think with Socrates, that knowing and acting ought to be inseparable, and that useful knowledge is alone worth attending to; no philosophy, therefore, which cannot be applied in social life deserves to have a student. The knowledge of the human mind is interesting to physicians in reference to insanity, and to teachers and legislators in determining the means of perfecting mankind. I have treated these subjects in separate volumes; I shall here add some considerations which concern us in our social intercourse, and which may contribute to further general happiness. This I shall do in four chapters. The first will treat of the modifications of the affective and intellectual functions in individuals; the second, of the difficulty of judging the actions of others; the third, of sympathy and antipathy; and the fourth, of the happiness of man.

CHAPTER I.

On the Modifications of the Affective and Intellectual Functions.

In philosophy it is commonly admitted, that the world is different to every species of animals, and even to every individual of the same species. This is easily understood, when we consider that all the beings of nature are in relation one to another, and that these, endowed with consciousness, recognise this, in other terms, perceive various impressions made on them by other beings. Now, it is evident that each must perceive impressions in proportion to the number and energy of its sentient faculties. Hence it results that the world differs to different species of animals; that it is essentially the same, but modified to individuals of the same kinds; and that man, who unites all the faculties distributed among the other living tribes, and possesses some peculiarly and alone, has, so to speak, the most extended world, though this be still modified to individuals, as it is among animals of the same species.

I shall now investigate the modifications of the faculties more in detail. First then, the manifestations of every faculty are greatly modified in different kinds of beings. This appears from the functions of those faculties, both of vegetative and animal life, which are common to man and animals. The liver secretes bile, the kidneys secrete urine, the salivary glands saliva, &c; yet these secretions vary in different kinds of animals; and are even modified in individuals of the same species. The power of motion is modified in different kinds of animals, and the consistence, texture, and taste of its organs, the muscles, also vary. The external senses offer modifications according to species and individuals. Now, are the faculties attached to the brain also modified in different animals?

If we examine their applications, there can remain no doubt of it. The function of the cerebellum must be modified in every species, because the individuals of each prefer others of their own kind. Sometimes also it is quite inordinate. Modifications of philoprogenitiveness are not less certain. Animals love the young of their own more than those of other kinds. Inhabitiveness must be modified in animals which live in the water, on dry land, in the air, and at greater or less elevations. Adhesiveness presents many modifications in solitary and in social animals. Destructiveness and constructiveness are much modified; all animals do not kill in one way, and the nests of all birds are not built in the same manner. The song of birds, and the instinct to migrate, are modified universally. Similar observations might readily be made in regard to the whole of the propensities, sentiments, and intellectual faculties. Thus it is certain that all are modified both in species and in individuals. Nay, it seems to me that there are idiosyncrasies of all the mental functions, as well as of digestion and the external senses. Certain stomachs do not digest some particular substances; some individuals cannot bear certain odors, savors, colors, and sounds; and some cannot endure certain modes of feeling or thinking, certain successions of tones, of ideas, and so on. The same thing is approved or disapproved of by different people according to the manner in which it is proposed.

Another cause of the modified manifestations of the faculties is their mutual influence. I only consider the human kind at present. It is indubitable that if two or more persons do the same thing, it will be done in a modified way by every one. Inasmuch as the faculties are essentially the same, the same actions are observed in all mankind: nay, in as far as nations have similar predominating faculties, there prevails a certain analogy in their actions and manners, because these are effects of the special faculties and their combinations; it is only their modifications and different combinations that produce varieties in action. Every faculty may act combined with one, or two, or more.

The number of binary, ternary, and more multiplied combinations is, therefore, immense, especially if it be remembered that each may be modified in itself, and may be more or less energetic. As this subject, however, is of the highest importance in anthropology, and indispensable to the elucidation of my ideas, I shall treat it somewhat in detail, and choose examples easily understood, and interesting to every one.

Physical love alone, combined with adhesiveness, philoprogenitiveness, benevolence and veneration, or with the propensities to fight and to destroy, acts very differently. Two affectionate mothers, of whom the one has philoprogenitiveness combined with much self-esteem, much firmness, a great propensity to fight, and little benevolence, and the second philoprogenitiveness combined with adhesiveness, benevolence, veneration, and very little self-esteem and propensity to fight, will love their children in very different manners. Determinate or individual justice varies extremely. Justice gives laws universally, but these are modified according to the particular and combined faculties of legislators. What a difference in the characters of Lycurgus and Solon; but what a difference in their precepts also!

Man universally believes in one or several Gods; but what a difference between the Gods of different nations, and even of different men! The Gods seem to be every where represented with faculties conformable to those of the nations by whom they are adored, or of the religious legislators who have commanded in their name. The sages of the Orient thought God the centre of light and the source of all wisdom: but the Scythes took him for a valiant hero, constantly armed and occupied with battles. The ancient Egyptians supposed their Supreme Divinity to have little eyes, brown skin and dark hair, whilst the natives in the North fancied him to be of exceedingly white complexion with blue eyes and fair long hairs. The Caffres imagined him to be black with a broad flat forehead. The God of the Jews, particularly of Joshua, and the Deity of the true Christian, are extreme-

ly modified. If different individuals, even of the same religion, be asked their opinion about God, we observe great diversities. St Peter and St John speak, the former with fear, the latter with meekness and love, of the same Christian Deity. The holy spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the peculiarities of their minds. If we examine the opinions of the reformers, Luther, Calvin, Zwingle, and others, do we not always observe the faculties of the individuals? Who, for instance, finds not in the principles of Melancthon, the mildness and moderation of his character? A person endowed with veneration, combined with charity, attachment, and understanding, without pride, destructiveness, and amateness, will establish a system of religious observance quite different from his who is endowed with veneration combined with covetiveness, pride, amateness, and destructiveness, without charity and understanding.—Every one who dares to think for himself, interprets the Bible according to his own feelings. The ambitious contrives to find in it doctrines which favor his love of dominion; the timid discovers a gloomy system; and the mystical and fanatical finds a visionary theology.

The Evil spirit or Devil too, was represented with forms quite opposite to those of God. The Romans, Celtic nations and Germans saw him black, whilst the ancient Egyptians painted their Typhon with a red beard and similar hair, almost as the Germans formed their good principle.

Music is different in every nation. We easily distinguish that of the Italians, Germans, French, Scots, &c. Even the music of each composer offers something particular, and connoisseurs distinguish that of Gluck, Mozart, Haydn, and others. It is the same with painting. All painters are colorists, but there is a difference in their modes of coloring; and every one as regularly prefers certain colors as subjects. Hence the difference in the pictures of Titian, Rembrandt, Paul Veronese, Albano, and others. The canvas of Titian shows reflexion and combination; that of Paul Veronese his fondness for architecture; Albano again

betrays his amorous inclination; and so of the rest. The same object, represented by various masters of painting, will always show the peculiarities of every artist's mind. How different, for instance, the *Virgins* of Raphael, Correggio, Guido, Titian, Murillo, Carlo Dolce, Caravaggio, Rubens &c.

The languages of different nations present fine examples of modifications produced by the mutual influence of the faculties. I even admit as a principle, that the spirit of its language proclaims the predominating faculties of a nation. I have spoken of a faculty which learns and knows the signs invented by the superior intellectual faculties to express the feelings and ideas. It is evident, therefore, that a nation with many feelings or ideas must have many signs, and that the number of any one kind of these indicates the energy of the faculty they represent. Thus, the Greek and French languages have a greater number of tenses than the German and English. The French, on the contrary, is poor in expressions of reflection and of sentiment; moreover, it has few that are figurative; while the German is rich in all of these, and has also many more signs of disjunction. Frenchmen have the organs of individuality and eventuality very much developed, and are therefore fond of facts; but their faculties of comparison and causality are commonly smaller. In consequence of this, the French Institute does not admit analogies as proofs; these consist according to it only in facts. The Germans, on the other hand, are fond of analogies, perhaps too much so, for they compare and wish to explain every thing. French expressions are individual, without any comparison; therefore, similar sounds denote many different objects. From this it appears that the discriminating faculties are not very active in Frenchmen. The same deficiency is evident in the very different names they give to very similar objects. The German and English tongues are more systematic than the French. The common language of Germany is even conformable to the system of Linnæus. Whilst the French say, *bouvreuil*, *chardonneret*, *pincon*, &c, the Germans and English preserve the generic name *fink*, or

finch, and join to it a sign of distinction. In the same way, while the French say, *rasoir*, *couteau*, *canif*, *serpette*, &c; in German and English the generic name *messer* or *knife* is retained, and a sign of particular destination affixed, as *feder-messer*, or *pen-knife*; *tafel-messer*, or *table-knife*; &c. For this reason also, the number of roots of the French language is much more considerable, though that of its words be much smaller than those of the German. Another proof that the French language is very unsystematic, lies in the fact of its very often having a substantive without its derivative adjective, or the contrary, to designate the same idea. These illustrations show the evident influence of the faculties generally, in establishing languages. Thus the number and nature of signs is in relation to the special powers of the mind which invent them. The faculties of individuality and eventuality being the first active in children, we may understand why nouns and verbs are soonest employed, and constitute almost the whole artificial language of infancy; and why all words may be reduced etymologically to these signs. By degrees, as other faculties become active, other significations of signs are discovered, even though their roots remain the same.

The construction of languages proves also the modified manners of thinking of different nations. The French like facts, and direct their attention to them, without first considering causes. It is natural, indeed, to begin with the subject, then to join the action of the subject, and after this to express other circumstances. This the French do regularly. If cause and effect be considered, they always begin with the effect, and relate the cause afterwards. The Germans proceed in a very different manner, and their tongue in this respect requires much more attention than the French. It also ordinarily begins with the subject; then follow expressions of the relation between subject and object, both of which are mentioned; and lastly, the action of the subject upon the object is considered. If an effect and its cause, again, are spoken of, the cause is commonly denoted first

and the effect after it. Certain languages are known to admit of a great number of inversions, others of very few. The former appear to me the more logical; for it seems natural that attention should be given first to the most important object. The French language begins almost always with the fact: hence French understandings consider the fact as the most important.

From these observations upon language, we may conceive that the spirit of no *one* language can become general. I am of opinion that the spirit of the French will never please Germans; and that Frenchmen, on the other hand, will always dislike that of the German; because the manner of thinking, and the enchainment of ideas, are quite dissimilar in the two nations.

I am farther convinced that different philosophical systems have resulted from various combinations of faculties in their authors. He who has much of the faculty of eventuality will never neglect facts. He who possesses less of it, and a great deal of the faculties of comparison and causality, will begin to philosophize with causes, and construct the world, instead of observing its existence. He, on the contrary, in whom the faculty of causality is less active, will reject this mode of consideration, and may think it unphilosophical to admit a primitive cause. Another who has individuality very small may doubt of external existence. The philosopher in whom the superior sentiments are very energetic, directs his mind principally to moral principles, and then we have various systems of virtue and morality, according to the predominance of one or other of these. One makes virtue consist in prudence, another in benevolence. One considers all actions as done from love of praise or from vanity; another from self-esteem, from love of self-preservation, self-interest and so on. Philosophers as well as other men think differently, and each is also apt to consider his own manner of thinking and feeling as the best; his consciousness tells him it is so; but every one errs who assumes himself as a measure of the absolute nature of man. In examining human nature, we ought to make abstraction of ourselves entirely; we ought never to ad-

mit in man a feeling as the strongest, and a manner of thinking as the best, solely because they are conformable to our own; nor ought we ever to deny in others what we ourselves do not possess. We should observe mental phenomena in the conviction that all the essential kinds or particular faculties inhere in human nature; and we should observe how and under what circumstances each faculty can and does act. In this way I think it possible to determine the absolute nature of man, and to become acquainted with the infinity of modifications occurring in individuals.

It would be easy to quote examples in the case of every faculty, to prove the mutual influence of the whole; but I shall only dwell on this principle, in reference to abuses of the faculties, for the sake of showing how peculiarities may be explained which seem inconceivable to those who know nothing of Phrenology.

Suppose, for instance, we are told that of two inveterate thieves presented to us, one has never scrupled to rob churches whilst the other has, the robber of the church may be distinguished from the other: he who has the smallest organ of veneration is the thief of the holy articles. Suppose we see two women in confinement, and are told that one has stolen, and that the other has concealed the stolen things; the former will have the organ of acquisitiveness larger, and that of the propensity to conceal less, while the second will have the organ of secretiveness much developed. If we would detect the chief of a robber band, we examine the organs of self-esteem and determinateness. We may distinguish an habitual vagabond thief from a coiner of false money by his having, besides the organ of acquisitiveness, the organ of locality larger, and smaller organs of cautiousness and of constructiveness. We may also distinguish dangerous and incorrigible criminals from the less desperate and more easily amended. They who have the organs of the sentiments proper to man and of intellect very small, but those of the propensities to fight, to destroy, to conceal, and to acquire, very much developed,

will be corrected with far more difficulty than such as have the organ of acquisitiveness very much developed, but at the same time the organs of the human faculties and of intellect large, who, in short, are susceptible of moral *will*.

CHAPTER II.

On the difficulty of judging others.

Having examined the modified manifestations of the faculties of the mind, natural order leads me to consider the difficulty of judging, and of determining the motives and actions of others. From the preceding views it follows, first, that the judgment of every one as well as all his other functions must be modified. If we but attend to the judgments of different individuals upon the same object, if we note their reflections, and consider what each praises or blames, we may speedily be convinced by experience of the truth of this. It may, indeed, be admitted as a principle, that every one judges according to the natural modifications and the mutual influence of his faculties;—that all judge others by their own nature, or take themselves as the measure of good and evil. Therefore it is that God has at all times been anthropomorphosed; every one has modified the Divinity, and conceived a Creator conformable to his own manner of judging and feeling. And when philosophers, moralists, and the virtuous, regard conscience as the severest judge of malefactors generally, they suppose in these degenerate beings the sentiment they feel themselves;—they judge themselves in the actions of others. In the same way, whatever is conformable to our manner of feeling and thinking is apt to be approved, and the contrary to be disapproved of. To judge well, therefore, we must first distinguish the common nature of man from the modifi-

cations of every individual; and then we must know our own nature and the modifications of our faculties to avoid censuring or lauding others according to our own favorite sentiments or ideas. We must, in fact, judge others and ourselves by one and the same standard—absolute good and evil.

It is also difficult to judge of the actions of others, and to determine their real motives, because the motives of the same action may be quite different. Appearances are proverbially deceitful. I shall quote but a few examples in illustration; a very superficial glance, however, will, at all times, show us many motives for the same act done by different individuals. One gives to the poor from ostentation, another from duty, a third from the hope of gaining heaven, and others again from real charity. One wishes to know the history and situation of the unfortunate,—if he be of his sect or party, &c, before he does good; another relieves as soon as he sees misery, every one is his neighbor, his left-hand knows not what his right-hand does. One goes to church because it is usual; another to see or to be seen; another to obtain the good opinion of the pious; and another from feelings of sincere veneration. One is neat and clean only when he goes into society, while another is so at all times, even in solitude. One cultivates an art or science from vanity; another because he is charmed with it; and a third because he finds it advantageous, &c.

It is the same with the abstaining from abuses. One, for instance, from charity does not steal; another steals every where except in the house where he lives; another robs churches, but not the poor; another does not steal, for fear of being punished, for fear of injuring his reputation, or from a sense of duty and justice, &c. In short, every one knows that the same action he did, or abstained from, has not always followed from the same motive. Thus, if an action or omission is to be judged, it is necessary to consider whether it resulted from the natural energy or inactivity of the respective faculty, or whether other faculties exerted a determinative influence. In judging others, we

must remember that every faculty may be active by its own energy or by the excitement of other powers, and, again, may be inactive by its own insufficient energy, or by the influence of other faculties. Hence it follows, that, on one hand, every function does not suppose large development of the respective organ; and, on the other, that organs may be greatly developed without producing abuses. The organ of acquisitiveness may be very large without causing theft; the organ of amateness much developed without occasioning libertinism; and so of the rest. The functions of very large organs may be suppressed, though certainly not without difficulty. The activity of every organ only produces a particular inclination; the faculties mutually influence each other, and regulate their subordination. Thus we cannot judge of other persons from our own sentiments and intellectual endowments, nor by one or several, but by the whole of their faculties together; and then only censure or praise their actions as they disagree or harmonize with the absolute moral nature of man.

The principle that every faculty may be active by its internal energy, answers the question so often proposed in books: What is the origin of the arts and sciences? In examining their source, writers commonly begin from remote antiquity, and endeavor to show how external circumstances have produced and improved them. Without denying the importance of external circumstances as exciting causes, I still think that the most important, the primary cause, indeed, is overlooked, that, namely, which exists in the conate organization; the same, in fact, as that of the instinctive labors of animals. Man invents and cultivates arts and sciences in the same way and for the same reason that the beaver builds its hut, and the nightingale sings. Every sentiment and every intellectual faculty may act by its internal activity without external excitement; and this is the primitive source of the arts and sciences. Scarcely could Handel speak, before he articulated musical sounds, and his father, grieved at the child's propensity to music, banished all musical instruments from

his house; but this sublime genius was not to be extinguished by the caprice of a mistaken parent; for the boy contrived to get a little clavichord into a garret, and applying himself to this after the family retired to rest, he soon learnt to produce both melody and harmony.

Nature, then, invented arts and sciences, and revealed them to man by means of his organization. Arts and sciences are also gradually perfected only in proportion as they who cultivate them are possessed of energetic organs.

Inferences.

The consideration of the two sources of activity of the faculties leads me to the following question: What actions in reference to morality deserve the greatest confidence, those which result from the goodness of nature, or those which are the effect of virtue? Though I think that good is always good in itself, and must ever be approved of, I still allow that there is greater merit in virtue than in natural goodness. I agree with the definition of virtue which all the great ancient and modern philosophers have given, as Aristotle, Plato, Cicero, Seneca, Kant, and others. I admit that those who have vanquished temptations deserve particularly to be rewarded, and that by the possibility of being either virtuous or vicious, our actions have the greatest merit or demerit.* Nevertheless, I confess that for my own

* Non virtus est, non posse peccare, cum renunciatur improbitati, statim adiscitur virtus. *St Ambrosius*.—Nulla sine labore virtus est. Non est gloriosa victoria nisi ubi fuerint gloriosa certamina. *Idem in Ps. 118, et De Off.*—Posse peccare datum est primo homini, non ut proinde peccaret, sed ut gloriosior appareat, si non peccaret, dum peccare posset. *St Bernardus de Lib. Arb.*—Vita nostra in hac peregrinatione non potest esse sine peccato, sine tentatione, quia profectus noster per tentationem nostram fit, nec sibi quisquam innotescit, nisi tentatus; nec potest coronari, nisi vicerit; nec potest vincere, nisi certaverit; nec potest certare, nisi inimicum et tentationes habuerit. *St Augustinus super Ps. 60.*—Quidam in juventute luxuriose viventes, in senectute continentis fieri delectantur, et tunc eligunt servire castitati, quando libido eos servos habere contemp-

part and guidance in society, I trust more to natural goodness than to virtue. I love goodness and esteem virtue. Guided by early experience, which shows that the greatest number of persons act more from the dictates of their propensities and sentiments than of their understanding and moral will, I never choose for my intimate friends individuals in whom the inferior organs are very large, and the superior very small. In the same way I think, that if the intellectual faculties act by their internal energy, they effect much more than if they be excited by sentiments or motives emanating from any other source.

From the modifications of our faculties results still another very important practical rule—indulgence. It is impossible that others should feel and think on every point as we do. Precisely as it is generally admitted, that the functions of the external senses cannot be altogether the same, and without any modification—and as it is proverbially said, *De gustibus non est disputandum*, so also are the internal faculties modified, and no one has a right to desire another to feel and think with him. A certain indulgence is indispensable in society. I do not maintain that every manner of feeling and thinking, and every action, are to be tolerated. There is a common touchstone for all mankind. Feelings, thoughts, and actions, must be conformable to the absolute conscience of man; but all other modifications ought to be permitted. This principle may be applied to both sexes, and to all conditions, and to all ages; no friendship can be permanent without indulgence upon many modifications in the manner of feeling and thinking. It is the

sit. Nequaquam in senectute continentes vocandi sunt qui in juventute luxuriose vixerunt; tales non haberint præmium, quia laboris certamen non habuerunt, eos enim spectat gloria, in quibus fuerunt gloriosa certamina. *Isidor. de Summo Bono, Lib. i c. 31.*—For there are some eunuchs which were so born from their mother's womb, and there are some eunuchs which were made eunuchs of men, and there be eunuchs which have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven's sake. *Matt. xix. 12.*—Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons which need no repentance. *Luke xv. 7.*

same in regard to religious and other opinions. St Paul said to the Romans, 'One believeth that he may eat all things; another, who is weak, eateth herbs; let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not judge him that eateth. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind. We then that are strong ought to bear the infirmities of the weak, and not to please ourselves. The kingdom of God is not meat nor drink, but righteousness and peace.'

CHAPTER III.

On Sympathy and Antipathy.

THE principle of the universally-modified manifestations of the faculties leads me also to the consideration of sympathy and antipathy. Throughout all nature, beings have relations with each other. As we have seen that there are relations between the faculties of the same individual, so there exist relations between the faculties of different individuals. Indeed it is generally observed, that certain beings cannot exist together in society, while others dwell in harmony and peace. Attraction and repulsion in physics, and affinities in chemistry, are remarkable and well known; and even among vegetables, some species perish in the neighborhood of certain others, while many species increase and prosper very well together. Among animals, the same law obtains, not only as different species, but also as different individuals of the same kind are concerned. Certain individuals of the same species manifest a particular attachment, while others cannot bear with each

other. In a herd of cows, the bull is commonly more attached to one than to any of the rest; birds, too, pair by choice, &c.

It is the same with mankind. Be it, however, remembered, that I do not speak of sympathy and antipathy in the same sense as many authors do when they discuss the sympathies and antipathies of the stomach and the five senses. They then describe what is called idiosyncrasy. Certain persons, for instance, cannot digest a particular kind of food, cannot endure certain odors, are disgusted with particular savors, and cannot look at certain figures, or touch certain bodies. I have already said that I admit idiosyncrasies in the internal faculties; but I here speak of the natural relations between the faculties of different individuals. Some are, as it were, born for each other, while others mutually feel an invincible aversion. This may be explained in the following manner: First, certain faculties of man are eminently social, as attachment and charity; others are quite the contrary, for instance, selfishness and pride. Again, according to a general rule, every faculty desires to be satisfied. Hence every one is pleased with whatever is conformable to his manner of feeling and thinking: every one wishes to enjoy; therefore every one likes those who procure or permit him enjoyments. It is consequently evident, that there is no single and invariable combination on which sympathy depends. These vary in the same degree as the faculties of different individuals are modified. Before we can decide whether two individuals will sympathize or not, we must consider all their faculties; and then we can see as certain that understanding must like understanding, and every intellectual faculty manifestations of a similar power in others. The musician is pleased with music: a mathematician with mathematics; a philosopher with philosophical ideas; a philologist with languages, &c. In the same way, the sentiments proper to man look for and sympathize with similar sentiments. A charitable man likes mild and benevolent people; the religious choose the society

of the devout, and so on. Thus, the faculties of the understanding and the sentiments proper to man favor sociality.

It is not precisely thus with the faculties common to man and animal. Some of them, however, are social, as attachment, and, in a certain degree, amateness and philoprogenitiveness; but the greatest number are eminently antisocial. The interested, for instance, do not like the interested, except in as far as their own selfishness is satisfied. Proud persons cannot suffer others endowed with the same feeling. The haughty and interested not only dislike one another, but are also disliked by those who are possessed of the superior sentiments. This is the case, too, with the propensities to fight and to destroy. Thus every one will sympathize with those in whose society his faculties are satisfied; and antipathy will be proportionate to the obstacles in the way of this, that is, to the prevention of enjoyment.

It is the animal nature which causes so many unhappy and ill-assorted marriages. Amateness or adhesiveness brings husband and wife together; perhaps they have thought of money, beauty, sometimes of health and intelligence, but they have forgotten the other dispositions, which are independent of physical love and of attachment, which cannot be bought, and which no intelligence can give, but which, nevertheless, contribute greatly to the happiness of those who bind themselves by indissoluble ties. All the other numerous faculties which are not satisfied soon change the original sympathy of the couple into indifference or even into antipathy, and then follow disorder and misery.

CHAPTER IV.

On Happiness and Unhappiness.

In speaking of happiness or unhappiness it is difficult to understand each other. Both ancient and modern philosophers take different views of happiness and modify accordingly their ethical doctrines. Thales placed it in the health of body, in a competent fortune and in a cultivated mind;—Socrates in the love of truth, useful knowledge and virtue;—Plato in the contemplation and knowledge of the first Good, God; and in endeavoring to make man as like to it as the conditions of human nature will permit;—Aristippus in agreeable impressions on the senses;—Anniceris in pleasant sensations and moral feelings;—Hegiasias a disciple of Aristippus in voluptuousness;—Epicurus in mental tranquillity, bodily ease and freedom from labor and pain;—Diogenes in an absolute independence from circumstances;—Zeno in the freedom from all sense of pleasure, and pain, from hope and fear, from all feeling and emotions in every situation, in self-denial and self-command. Marcus Aurelius said that the true contentment of heart is not found in the study of arts, in eloquence, riches, glory, sensual pleasures, in short no where but in the practice of actions which the human nature demands. Paley denied that happiness consists in the pleasures of sense, as in the animal gratification of eating and drinking, or by which the species is preserved; neither in the refined pleasures of music, painting, architecture, gardening, theatric exhibitions, splendid show; nor in the pleasure of active sports as of hunting, shooting, fishing; neither in greatness, rank, honors, nor in the exemption from pain, care, labor, business, molestation; but he placed it, 1st, in the exercise of social affections, as husband, wife, children, kindred, and friends; 2d, in doing good to others; 3d, in the pur-

suit of great engagements and important occupations, and 4th, in health.

Yet it cannot be denied that some find their happiness in the cultivation of arts,—in fishing or hunting; whilst another delights in examining metaphysical questions; or mathematical problems, and another in religious proselytism. Servile minds despair of supporting existence in a state of civil liberty, whilst the truly free man considers civil and religious liberty as the greatest good upon earth and indispensable to his happiness.

Phrenology easily explains these and many other views of happiness. Human nature is composed of numerous special dispositions and every special disposition may be active in different degrees. Now every faculty being active and satisfied is happy or pleased, and every active faculty which is not satisfied is displeased or unhappy. Every one, then, who gives a definition of happiness, expresses the state of his own mind, or the powers active in him; he takes his individual happiness as the standard of happiness in general. No one, however, can measure the happiness or unhappiness of others by his own, hence he finds his happiness in the gratification of his active powers, in the same way as the sheep whilst feeding on grass and the tiger whilst devouring its prey, are happy each in its own manner. To speak with precision it is necessary to divide and subdivide happiness, and unhappiness. Both concern individuals—families—associations—nations or mankind at large. Farther, human nature being vegetative, affective, intellectual, animal and human; it follows that individuals, families, associations, nations, or mankind may be happy or unhappy according to the special powers. In individuals the sum of happiness is made up by the sum of gratification of the active faculties, and in every society the sum of happiness consists in the number of happy individuals. Farther, happiness and unhappiness may be subdivided into temporal or eternal. The latter lies beyond the reach of my inquiries. I am satisfied with stating that in my opinion both these sorts of happiness are not incompatible with each other; I do not be-

lieve that we must be miserable here on earth in order to be happy in the life to come.

In speaking of happiness, an important remark is to be kept in view, viz. that the satisfaction of the active powers, not the special gratification, is the foundation of happiness. The satisfaction of hunger, not the enjoyment of dainties alone, makes happy. Running and moving about makes children happy, the individual game is not the essence;—the satisfaction of all special powers varies according to age and social circumstances, and they are mistaken who think that individual and particular gratification constitute the happiness. In this respect there is more compensation in the world than many imagine, in taking themselves as the standard of others.

I shall first treat of individual happiness, and then of that of societies. The first condition of happiness certainly is health. Is it then not astonishing that this condition is so much neglected, whilst the laws of hereditary descent and the dialectic rules ought to be put into practice? Without health we are unfit to receive education and to fulfil our duty in social relations. Without health we are a burden to ourselves and to others.

The next condition of happiness is mental activity. This however is very different according to the special dispositions of the mind. It is a matter of fact that, (and phrenology explains why,) by far the greater number of individuals look for their happiness in the satisfaction of the faculties common to man and animals, such as in the sensual pleasures, in the love of offspring, in the love of approbation, in the love of acquiring, and so on. In certain countries inferior pleasures alone are permitted; means of subsistence are provided for; the people have plenty to eat and to drink, but all intellectual pleasures, and those beyond the range of mere animality, are interdicted. Very few persons cultivate arts and science for the pleasure they procure in themselves. They do it to furnish means necessary to the satisfaction of some animal desires. Finally, those who are happy in the exercise of the faculties proper to man are exceedingly rare.

They are those who, as St Paul says, have the law written in their heart; those who find their happiness in the abnegation of selfish desires and in actions of general happiness; those finally who in the eyes of common people are called dreamers or fools.

It is a common saying, that man to be happy ought to have few wants. The expression *want* is here synonymous with desire,—the effect of every faculty's activity, and is as various in kind as the fundamental faculties, each want individually being proportionate to the activity of the power from which it results. Wants or desires then, or in other words the activity of the faculties are not the immediate cause of happiness or unhappiness. The whole of the mental powers acting with energy may be sources either of bliss or of misery. This follows on the possibility or impossibility of gratifying their impulses. He who has many faculties active which he can satisfy is more happy than the man who has no desire whatever: but it is better to be without desire than to possess very active faculties with no means of ministering to their cravings. Even those who are eminently endowed with the superior sentiments and who would like to see every one happy find a kind of misery in the injustice of mankind. The unfortunate of this kind, however, are by no means the most numerous.

The human as well as animal faculties produce wants or desires. To be just is a want for the righteous, as to take nourishment is for him who is hungry. As however the animal faculties are the most generally active in men, if wants are spoken of, we commonly think of inferior powers, as of self-esteem, vanity, personal interest, sensual pleasures, and so on. Now as happiness depends on the gratification of active faculties and unhappiness on their non-satisfaction, it is obvious why those who are fond of ostentation, luxury, riches, distinctions &c., are commonly unhappy: it is impossible to appease their wants or desires.

It is also necessary to distinguish in the doctrine of wants in reference to morality between the faculties themselves and the satisfaction of their desires. The satisfaction may vary and produce good and evil.

Religious sentiments are inherent in human nature, they frequently act with great energy and have done an immensity of mischief to mankind. Yet religion itself should never be ridiculed; well directed, it may increase our own and our neighbor's happiness, though certain notions and certain actions, called religious, are fit butts for mockery. Religious belief may admit reasonable things as well as absurdities, just as we may take wholesome or unwholesome food.

I shall now consider the happiness of societies. It depends, 1st, on the same principles of individual happiness; and 2nd, on some new principles which modify those of individual happiness. Here I take for granted, what I have stated in the section on the moral constitution of man, viz. that general happiness seems to be the aim of the terrestrial creation, and that it is impossible without the powers proper to man; or that general happiness falls together with true morality.

Though reason compels us to think that the Lord of the universe in his goodness and perfection, destined man to be happy, it is certain that to whatever side we turn our eyes, we perceive individuals who are unhappy and who lament their lot. 'I have travelled over the world,' says Volney, (Ruins ch. iv.) 'I have visited villages and towns, and perceiving misery and desolation over all, my soul has been deeply afflicted by the ills which weigh heavily upon mankind. With a sigh I have said: and is man then born only to suffer misery and pain? I shall ask the ashes of legislators how empires rise and fall? In what reside the causes of prosperity or decay of nations? On what principles the peace of society and the happiness of mankind must be based?'

It is not necessary to insist on the existence of human misery, but let us ask for its causes. Various marvellous conceptions of Divines are articles of faith and do not fall within the reach of my province confined to observation. The natural causes of human misery may be reduced to two: ignorance and immorality. Both are great. From the cradle man is imbibed with

prejudices; he is taught to fear his Maker who is terrible. Man is the object of his anger; he was told to be tried by visitations and to be destined to lament, to give up the use of his reason and to rely with unbounded confidence in his civil and religious leaders. The most noble part of human nature, his moral and religious sentiments, have been turned to his oppression, and he had not sense enough to distinguish truth from falsehood. Man can never be happy, till he knows his fundamental powers, the conditions on which their manifestations depend, and till he submits himself completely to the will of his Creator, or in other terms, to the natural laws.

The ancient speculators in philosophy and religion by their doctrine that the mind operates independently of the body, or is rather impeded by it in its operations, have done great harm to mankind. On that account the body has been and is still neglected with the progress of civilization, it degenerates, and becomes effeminate; diseases multiply and misery is inevitable. The neglect of the body is even cause that no family and no nation is lasting.

Our ignorance of human nature and of the influence of the body on the mental phenomena extends over the laws of hereditary descent. The neglect of these laws, however, is of incalculable consequences and prepares innumerable sufferings of body and mind. Bodily strength, infirmity or disease as well as mental energy, weakness or derangement, are hereditary. Phrenology teaches why. The study of the natural laws then ought to be the *Vade mecum* of every philanthropist.

The other great cause of human misery is immorality. Philosophers are right in recommending the cultivation of intellect, and by doing so, many disorders will be removed, but the aim will not be attained without attending with the same care to the moral nature of man.

In the section on the moral constitution of man I have shown the innateness, nature and necessity of morality. It will last as long as the human kind, and is indispensable to its happiness.

Phrenology explains this part of human nature better than it has been done by any philosophical doctrine. It shows why religiousness may be combined with selfishness, cunning and deceit, why in the midst of wickedness some persons are naturally virtuous; and why selfishness, stupidity, base passions and want of justice are so common.

The great activity of the animal nature is evidently a fertile cause of human misery, for two reasons. Many are unhappy by not satisfying their excessively energetic feelings, without any moral consideration. It is therefore extremely interesting to examine why the brute nature of man is so active, and why the multitude place happiness in the satisfaction of inferior feelings and carry in themselves the cause of their own and other's misery.

Farther, human misery depends on the relation between the two natures of man, on the different degrees of their activity and on the resistance of the inferior to the superior. For as the moral laws exist, and as few feel naturally disposed to submit to them, the greater number have to combat their animal propensities. Now, as pain is felt each time any inclination is opposed, or any law is obeyed, which would willingly be eluded, or whose necessity is not understood, it is obvious that in the actual state of things the virtuously good must spend a life of suffering.

These ideas are admirably developed in the doctrine of Christianity. Morality is there declared the aim which must be obtained, whether with ease or with difficulty, with pleasure or with pain, through love or through fear. The great difficulty of vanquishing the brute nature is acknowledged, but the necessity of fulfilling the law or will of the Creator is still insisted on. For this, therefore, reward is also in proportion to the pains of success; eternal life is promised to those who gain the victory, and the 'joy in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth shall be more than over ninety and nine just persons which need not repentance.'^{*}

^{*}Luke xv. 7.

Without pretending to know what the cerebral organization was at the beginning, or whether it has suffered any change in the lapse of time, but in the conviction that the manifestation of the mind depends on the brain, I dare to say, that the wickedness of mankind, the disobedience to the peculiarly human nature, will continue so long as the brain remains such as it is. I dare answer in the most positive manner the following passage of Volney: (Ruins ch. xiv.) ‘Man who despairest of mankind, hast thou scrutinized the organization of sensibility, in order to determine with precision, whether the motives which dispose man to happiness are essentially weaker than those which remove him from it?’ But I still say with him, ‘If at one time, and in one place, certain individuals become better, why should not the whole mass improve? If partial societies become more perfect, why should it not happen with society at large?’ Phrenology explains why so few find pleasure in cultivating their intellectual faculties, and why almost all seek enjoyment in gratifying some one or other of the sentiments;—why the animal nature is so active, and the powers proper to man proportionately so weak. The cerebral mass devoted to the intellectual operations is to that of the affective functions scarcely as one finger to the whole hand, and the organs of the animal feelings together are much larger than the organs of the human sentiments. These observations are founded on the invariable laws of nature, and it is impossible to insist too much on the error of philosophers; to consider understanding as the chief and fundamental cause of our actions, and to overlook the influence of the brain in the mental phenomena.

What must be done to better the lot of Mankind?

The friends of man have at all times been interested in this matter. They have proposed many and various means, natural and supernatural, according to the ideas they had conceived of the cause of human misery. Hitherto, however, there has been

little or nothing effected. From this I infer that the measures employed were insufficient.

Bishop Butler speaks of the moral government, of the superiority and advantages of virtue, of the natural tendency to be virtuous and of the hindrances to be so, but he adds: 'that these hindrances are so far from being necessary that we ourselves can easily conceive how they may be removed in future states and full scope be granted to virtue.' To this end he supposes 'a kingdom or society of men perfectly virtuous, for a succession of many ages, to which, if you please, may be given a situation advantageous for an universal monarchy. In such a state there would be no such thing as faction, but men of the greatest capacity would of course all along have the chief direction of affairs willingly yielded to them, and they would share it among themselves without envy. Each of these would have the part assigned him, to which his genius was particularly adapted, and others who had not any distinguished genius would be safe and think themselves very happy by being under the protection and guidance of those who had. Public determinations would really be the result of the united wisdom of the community, and they would faithfully be executed by the united strength of it. Some would in a higher way contribute, but all would in some way contribute to the public prosperity, and in it each would enjoy the fruits of his own virtue. And as injustice, whether by fraud or force, would be unknown among themselves, so they would be sufficiently secured from it in their neighbors. For cunning and false self-interest, confederacies in injustice, accompanied with faction, and intestine treachery, would be found mere childish folly and weakness, when set in opposition against wisdom, public spirit, union inviolable, and fidelity, allowing both a sufficient length of years to try their force. Add the general influence which such a kingdom would have over the face of the earth by way of example particularly and the reverence which would be paid it. It would plainly be superior to all others, and the world must gradually come under its empire, not by means of lawless

violence, but partly what must be allowed to be just conquest, and partly by other kingdoms submitting themselves voluntarily to it, throughout a course of ages, and claiming its protection one after another in successive exigencies. The head of it would be an universal monarch in another sense than any mortal has yet been; and the Eastern style would be literally applicable to him, that all people, nations and languages should serve him. And though indeed our knowledge of human nature, and the whole history of mankind, show the impossibility without some miraculous interposition, that a number of men, here on earth, should unite in one society of government, in the fear of God and the universal practice of virtue and that such a government should continue so united for a succession of ages, yet admitting or supposing this, the effect would be as now drawn out, and thus, for instance, the wonderful prosperity promised to the Jewish nation in the scripture, would be in a great measure the consequence of what is predicted to them, that the people should be all righteous and inherit the land for ever. (Is. i. 21).—The prediction of this kind, continues Bishop Butler, cannot come to pass in the present known course of nature.'

Phrenology affords a clearer insight into human nature, and in my work on Education I consider all that I deem requisite to improve the species and to establish God's moral government, which as Bishop Butler says is not fictitious but natural. Here I confine myself to a few general indications which are commonly neglected by those who exercise some influence on society.

The causes of human misery being ascertained, it is evident, that whatever impedes human happiness, must be removed or at least diminished. The study of human nature forms the foundation. This being done, moralists will see, that human happiness requires more than to preach moral principles, to give alms, to found charity-institutions, to follow religious ceremonies, and to cultivate the arts and sciences; they will apprehend that the evil is to be attacked by the root, that is, that natural means must be employed to improve dispositions. The body, the temple of the

soul—will be more attended to; the laws of vegetative functions and of hereditary descent will be appreciated and put into practice. The maxim : make the tree good and it will bring forth good fruit, will be constantly present to philanthropists and legislators. In short, ignorance and immorality will be attacked by all possible means. All that can augment or excite the animal nature is to be avoided, and every condition that may develop the faculties proper to man is to be encouraged. Governments cannot be serious in their desire for morality so long as they encourage lotteries, countenance games of hazard, and keep mercenary soldiers in pay. The importance of the faculties proper to man or his moral constitution in regard to general happiness, is a point which cannot be too strongly nor too often recommended. The superior powers are satisfied by their own functions. The just, the benevolent, the religious and the disinterested need not foreign aid to satisfy their noble feelings. Inferior inclinations on the contrary, almost always depend on the caprices of others for their gratification. The egotist, for instance, is opposed in his undertakings by those who, like him, think chiefly of themselves. The ambitious man is unhappy if he be not approved of, or honored to the extent he thinks he has deserved. He who, prompted by charity, does good, finds his reward in the deed itself; but he who does good to gain approbation, or gratitude, is liable to be deceived, and, in the very act, often prepares himself a source of sorrow. In proportion, therefore, as the animal nature shall lose in energy, and the peculiarly human faculties gain in strength, the sum of human happiness will increase.

As man, in the actual state of things, cannot be left to himself, as his actions must be directed by social institutions, it is much to be wished that these were conformable to the invariable laws of natural morality. I fear, that notwithstanding the sincerest love of truth and the purest intentions, some means which are useless, and even noxious, will be resorted to, on account of human nature not being sufficiently known.

Whatever may be done, however, the progress will necessarily

be slow. Governments must as a first step begin by nourishing pure intentions, by giving up all selfish and exclusionary views and in all their particular regulations, by favoring general happiness.

Let those whose duty it is to direct society, reflect on the two natures of man; on the superiority of the one over the other; and, farther, on the faculties which compose each; let them be convinced that every fundamental power exists of itself; that charity is not the result of faith, nor faith of charity; and that all the faculties, though existing independently, may be combined, and mutually aid and excite each other.

Though the animal faculties being the principal cause of human misery, must, by all means, be diminished, yet it is to be remembered that no fundamental power can be annihilated, but the actions of all must be directed. I have explained my ideas sufficiently, not to be suspected of speaking in favor of any arbitrary regulation; yet I shall always insist on the necessity of restraining the animal faculties by those proper to man. In my opinion, consequently, personal, as well as moral liberty is limited. I have already treated of moral liberty; I shall here add my views of that which is personal in connexion with general happiness.

CHAPTER V.

Of Personal Liberty.

Man, it is said, is born free. This proposition has been used by some authors in a very extensive signification. Every one, they have said, may do whatever he pleases. This interpretation, however, is incompatible with the constitution of the human mind. Let us observe the order of nature, that we may understand the will of the Creator.

Personal liberty we see is first limited by the laws of nature. Conception, birth, growth, health, and every function of vitality, as subjected to positive circumstances, force us at once to look on man as very dependent. Farther, man depends entirely upon others during his long infancy. And, again, as a social being, he has duties to fulfil, and rights to reclaim; now, the idea of mutual obligation is incompatible with unbounded, or that liberty which admits every kind of individual gratification. We must live and permit others to live; we must do our duty as child, as parent, and as citizen. The elucidation of these points belongs to the study of the law of nature, or of the rights and duties of man.

The personal liberty of man is also limited by the reality of his two natures, and by the superiority of the one. The animal faculties must be subordinate to the powers proper to man, and the true christian is still the slave of justice. This principle, the touch-stone of the excellence or imperfection of civil laws, bounds at the same time those who govern and those who are governed, and it proves clearly that by the will of the Creator the personal liberty of man is limited. It has, indeed, been said repeatedly, that without morality no society can exist, and that liberty is not licentiousness. This is strictly true. The laws, however, must be just in favoring the common welfare.

Finally, the faculties proper to man may deviate from their natural destination, and this they do each time they act separately. Benevolence without justice and reflection, may do much evil, and justice without benevolence may be too severe. Thus even the most noble parts of man's nature are limited, and kept in check by each other; all must act in harmony to elicit good.

The truth, that personal liberty is very much circumscribed, is never neglected without great disorders following. We must, however, add that no one has any natural right arbitrarily and from selfish motives to limit the personal liberty of others. Volney says, 'Wheresoever I cast my eye, whatever the period of

which I think, I find the same principles of increase, or of destruction, of elevation and of decline. If ever a nation be powerful, or an empire prosper, its conventional laws are conformable to those of nature. If, on the contrary, a state sink in ruin or be dissolved, the laws are imperfect or vicious, or the government is corrupt and violates the laws.' Civil restrictions ought to be the mere application of those of nature; they ought to be the same for every member of the community, and the aim of their imposition—the general happiness. Nature applies its laws constantly and indiscriminately; nature is incorruptible, and makes no exceptions. Human regulations alone are liable to this reproach. Governors and the governed are subjected to the same laws of propagation, of nutrition, of health, disease and death. Who can deny that nature is equally constant in the application of its moral laws? Happy period when every one will be obliged to conform his conduct to them!

In order to elucidate my ideas on the necessity of submitting the individual desires to the natural laws of morality, I shall quote physical love, attachment, self-love or covetiveness, and the love of approbation, and whatever I say of them will apply to the other feelings common to man and animals. The subordination of the animal nature to proper humanity seems to me as necessary to the happiness of mankind as is attention to matters used as food to individual preservation. A poisonous substance can never become wholesome aliment, and any action inimical to the happiness of mankind will never lose its essential and immoral character.

Is it permitted to limit physical love in society? The faculties proper to man decide the question. For as these are destined to general happiness, physical love being an animal feeling, must be restrained whenever it acts in opposition to their dictates. Now, there can be no doubt that the number of inhabitants in a country influences their state of being. Too crowded a population unavoidably causes misery and degeneration of the species. Both natural and Christian morality forbid us to ex-

terminate or to forsake such unhappy beings as exist; society is even bound to take care of them, but their farther multiplication, as well as every other cause that militates against general happiness, may be lawfully opposed.

The most enlightened economists, admit that population increases in the ratio of the means of subsistence, in the same way as all living beings multiply or perish, according as they are well or ill supplied with nourishment. Vegetation prospers if the soil be well manured. Birds that live on insects are more or less numerous in districts, according to the quantity of food they afford. Herbivorous animals abound in lands which are rich in forage, and countries are peopled in proportion as they furnish the means of living. It is true that a greater number of sober and temperate than of gluttonous and luxurious persons may live in a given district, but nourishment is still the principal condition influencing population. The equilibrium between aliment and consumers is always preserved; sometimes, however, at the expense of a vast quantity of individual suffering. Were it not more meritorious, therefore, in governments, and more beneficial to the community at large, entirely to prevent the evil which becomes necessary to diminish the number of inhabitants? Since beggars, and those with hereditary dispositions to diseases, only propagate to the detriment of society and entail misery on their progeny, were it not better to prevent them from marriage altogether?

Let those who think differently reflect on the destination of mankind, and on all that is done, or rather neglected in society as relates to marriage, and they will not, without distinction, defend personal liberty in regard to propagation.

Both civil and religious regulations have, in some instances, restrained the desire, or even abstracted the power of propagation. Libertinism is interdicted in all countries, and adultery is punished as a crime. Soldiers and sailors are prohibited from marrying; they, however, are the stoutest and best made men; for bodily weakness and disease exempt and exclude from the

military and naval service. Now, if society can prevent the choice of its youth from propagating, nay, if it think proper to make them expose their lives for the common welfare, as it is said, why should it not also have the right to interdict the marriages of those who propagate to the common calamity?

Let us farther reflect on the celibacy of priests of the Romish Church, and even on the example of Christ's apostles, who were advised against marriage. Now, if the prohibition of marriage be just and necessary as soldiers, sailors, and priests are concerned, and if polygamy in general be inadmissible, why should the propagation of infirmities and vices be endured? I think that marriages ought to be regulated by the rule of natural morality, and that this is an essential condition to general happiness. More details on this subject are given in my work on Education.

Another point conformable to the civil laws of all countries, but contrary to the morality of nature and Christianity, concerns exclusive love of every kind. Love of our family and of our country are natural it is true, but both are common to man and animals, hence they must be subordinate to universal charity. Farther, attachment to those around us is laudable, but justice and truth are to precede every other consideration. The man must always triumph over the animal; hence we must prefer truth and general happiness before our country; we must give up national pride and the innumerable prejudices and evils that result from it, for the sake of entire humanity. Let us appreciate things in themselves and independently of occasions or causes. The Samaritan who has compassion on an unfortunate Israelite, dresses his wounds, and takes care of him, is truly his neighbor, and not the Jew or the Levite who looks at him and passes on. On the score of universal love, man, indeed, generally, and pretended Christians particularly, are very far behind. There is no nation which practises this noble precept of Christianity, and nothing but a perfect knowledge of human nature will ever incline men to follow it, or induce them to change the erroneous and pernicious opinions they entertain on this subject.

I arrive at the third point, which is equally delicate and contested, but indispensable to general happiness; I mean the restriction of selfishness. This feeling is the most formidable of all the enemies of mankind. It particularly induces neglect of the natural laws of morality, and divides society; it excites one individual against another, family against family, and nation against nation; it saps the foundations of empires, for it sells places, justice, and even puts up Heaven and immortality at a price; it concentrates all power in an individual, and establishes absolute governments, &c. We may therefore ask whether society has the right of restraining the desire to acquire, and how far it may enforce it?

The answer is similar to that given to the questions implicating the other animal faculties. The desire to acquire is a fundamental power, and cannot be annihilated by any enactment; it is a strong motive exciting the other aptitudes and dispositions, and may be most usefully employed; however, to what extent its activity is admissible is a point not yet determined. As an animal feeling, it must necessarily be subordinate to the moral nature; indeed, as all countries have laws against its abuses, the propriety of limiting its desires is evident.

We are, now-a-days, permitted openly to maintain the injustice and the violation of natural morality and of true Christian principles, committed when individuals are secured in the possession of peculiar privileges and immunities. We may now also dare to say that personal merit is preferable to the pride of ancestry; that it is more just to reward talents than incapacity; and that every one should be obliged to exercise his natural powers to add to the common stock of industry, and ought only to reap the fruits of his own exertions.

This, the effect of civilization, is a great step towards natural morality—the only basis of general happiness; but I dare maintain that it is not yet sufficient to render it paramount. The obstacle lies in the inequality of natural talents, and in the weakness of the moral sentiments, in by far the greater number of

individuals. So long as every one shall work merely for his own interest, fortunes will necessarily be unequal. A few will succeed each other in opulence, and many will dwell in poverty and misery. This inconveniency is mentioned in the Christian system; a difference of natural gifts is recognised; but all are commanded to employ their endowments to the common advantage.

In this, as in every discussion having the actions of man for its object, I start from the principle that natural morality ought to govern mankind, and that general happiness is preferable to that of individuals. He then who uses his faculties to the furtherance of the common weal, ought to enjoy full liberty, and to meet encouragement in his noble purposes; while all who think only of their private interest are to be superintended, lest the commonwealth suffer by their undertakings.

Great manufactories, for instance, which are so apt to ruin the body and the mind of those engaged in them, must be over-looked; no one has the right to make others vicious and unhappy, that he may procure enjoyments or amass riches; and if personal morality suffice not to prevent the doing evil, society has a prime right to interfere, and, guided by general morality, to supply all that is defective.

Hence, universal happiness, as it is the aim of legislation in general, must be the basis of all enactments relative to property. So long as individuals shall be suffered to collect riches without limits, the causes of misery and of slavery will endure. The poor will sell themselves to the rich, and the rich will find easy means of imposing their arbitrary will as law upon society.

This, however, is a subject surrounded by innumerable difficulties. Much has been written upon it, but all has not yet rendered it clear in every one of its points. Property must be respected, otherwise civil wars and the dissolution of society would be unavoidable; but, again, if in the regulations concerning property, general happiness be neglected, the order of things established cannot be permanent. Fortunes get more

and more concentrated, the equilibrium is disturbed, and in the end the rich to maintain possession are obliged to repel by force the attacks of the poor, who think themselves strong in their numbers. The division of property is, therefore, a necessary condition to general happiness; hence, primogeniture is inadmissible, and opposed to natural morality, which recognises reward as well-bestowed for personal merit alone. I have already said, that if it be unjust to punish children for the faults of parents, it cannot be just to reward them for the merits of sires; I add—

That to me it seems necessary for the nations which would secure a permanent existence, to fix the maximum of the property that may be acquired, as well as the conditions, viz., natural morality, in conformity with which it may be amassed; or else, as it seems fair that every one should enjoy the fruits of his labor, parents might, under certain conditions, be permitted to acquire to the extent they pleased, but still have the power of transmitting a certain sum only to their children when arrived at the age of maturity, while the rest of their gains should revert to the commonwealth, and be employed in purposes of public usefulness. This would be the best way of doing justice to the community, and of preventing idleness, that foster-parent of vice.

History proves that nations attain the highest prosperity when every one is permitted to work for his peculiar advantage; but history also proves that this prosperity is not permanent; its very causes involve the elements of decline; for luxury, indolence, moral corruption, degeneracy of body, and feebleness of mind, are consequences of its temporary endurance, and these are the sure precursors to the death of empires. I leave this discussion to those who are occupied with politics. I am particularly interested in calling the attention of all thinking people to the necessity of founding society on the broad basis of natural morality, itself the sole, sure, and unalterable foundation of universal welfare. This ground is more stable than that which

sensual pleasures or the arts and sciences can supply. The indulgence of inferior appetites degrades, morality ennobles human nature, and is indispensable, whilst the arts and sciences are mere embellishments of existence. Jesus taught his disciples to be satisfied with their daily bread and with what is necessary to their existence. He condemned riches in the most severe terms.

To impress still more deeply the importance of subordinating the animal feelings to the faculties proper to man, I shall speak summarily of the love of approbation. This sentiment exists in animals and in man, and exercises a powerful influence over all our actions in society. Still to permit it, unbounded activity is a very great error. Nations in whom it prevails are scarcely fit for a free government, servility, so to speak, is their natural bent. Blinded by external appearances they overlook the common welfare. Titles, decorations, encomiums are effectual instruments in the hands of their governors to enslave them.

Two prime errors are to be guarded against; in the first place, distinction is never to be conferred on account of actions resulting from the animal nature, undirected by the superior faculties; and again, distinction ought never to be the aim of human actions.

From all I have said then, it follows that I consider the submission to the natural laws and the practice of natural morality as indispensable to the welfare of mankind at large, and that all social institutions ought to be founded on this natural morality, which has been, is, and will ever be, invariable. Individually I call those happy who enjoy good health and without difficulty subject their animal nature to the faculties proper to man; who, for instance, are satisfied with such things as are merely necessary—with their daily bread; who desire not superfluities, luxuries, riches, or distinctions; who taste of all pleasures in moderation, enjoying every thing, but abusing nothing; who cultivate art or science for the delights it affords; who in every situation do their duty, and who stand not in need of others or foreign

aid, to satisfy their active faculties. Unhappy, on the other hand, are almost all who look for their personal well-being in things which are opposed to natural morality; who have many and active faculties, the satisfaction of which depends on others; whose inferior faculties, in short, are the most energetic, especially if they injure the health, and if their indulgence be expensive.

SECTION VII.

Explanation of different Philosophical Expressions.

Nothing is more vague than the language of philosophy. Many expressions have several significations, and almost every term in use has been invented to designate actions, and not the faculties which produce them. To make this difference felt I shall collect several of the most common words, and in one column give their usual signification, in another their explanation according to the fundamental faculties, referring the reader to the passages either in the physiological or in the philosophical part of this work, in which the terms as they occur are more particularly explained.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Absolute.

Unconditional; not relative.

Nothing but God is absolute.

In man every thing is relative and conditional.

Admiration.

A tribute paid by individuals to whatever appears to them good and excellent.

It is an affection of the sense of marvellousness.

Adoration.

The external homage paid to the Divinity.

The effect of the sense of veneration.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Affectation.

A singular manner of speaking; the making an external appearance in order to attract the attention of others.

It results from the love of approbation when not combined with understanding; it increases in combination with secretiveness and ideality.

Affections.

Certain states of the mind.

They are the modes of being affected of the fundamental faculties. Vid. p. 43 of this volume.

Ambition.

Great desire of preferment and distinction.

An effect of great activity of the love of approbation applied to things of importance. Vid. p. 216 Vol. I.

Anger.

Uneasiness upon a receipt of any disagreeable sensation.

A violent emotion with an inclination to revenge.

Apathy.

The quality of not feeling; exemption from passion; freedom from mental excitation.

Inactivity of every fundamental faculty; it is partial, or more or less general.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Ardor.

Heat, or eagerness in action. Great activity of every fundamental power.

Art.

A word used in opposition to nature; something effected by skill and dexterity. The result of individual powers of the mind.

Attention.

Application of the mind to any subject. The result of the individual intellectual faculties. Vid. p. 27 of this volume.

Attrition.

Grief of sin arising from the fear of punishment. A disagreeable affection of the sense of conscientiousness caused by that of veneration, assisted by benevolence and circumspection.

Beautiful.

Each agreeable sensation by means of hearing and seeing. It designs the harmonious relations between external impressions and the intellectual faculties of the mind, principally the senses of extension, configuration, coloring, tone, and order.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Belief.

Credit given to something which we know not of ourselves.	Hope disposes to belief; hope and marvellousness produce religious belief.
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Benevolence.

Disposition to do good.	A fundamental faculty. Vid. p. 222 Vol. I.
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Charming.

Pleasing in the highest degree.	Springs from a high degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
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Compassion.

Painful sympathy.	A disagreeable affection, or mode of action of benevolence.
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Confusion.

Distraction of mind and indistinct combination of ideas.	Defect of order in general, discord among the functions.
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Conscience.

The faculty by which we judge of good and evil.	A mode of action of conscientiousness.
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Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Constancy.

Unalterable continuance.

The effect of firmness assisted by the activity of the individual faculties.

Consternation.

Astonishment accompanied with terror.

An affection of marvellousness and circumspection without hope and courage.

Contempt.

The act of despising.

A disagreeable affection of self-esteem, produced by various causes.

Contentment.

Acquiescence without plenary satisfaction.

A degree of satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

Contrition.

Sorrow for sin.

A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness, caused by benevolence, veneration, and marvellousness.

Courage.

Active fortitude.

A fundamental power. Vid. .p. 185 Vol. I.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Cruelty.

Delight taken in the pain of others.	It results from the satisfaction of destructiveness without benevolence.
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Cupidity.

Unlawful longing.	Great activity of acquisitiveness.
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Desire.

Wish to enjoy.	A result of every faculty in action. Vid. p. 40 of this vol.
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Desolation.

A sort of mixture of melancholy and despair.	A disagreeable affection of attachment, and of benevolence, or of circumspection without courage, hope, and firmness.
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Despair.

Hopelessness.	A disagreeable affection of circumspection without hope.
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Despise.

An act of contempt.	A disagreeable affection of self-esteem.
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Diffidence.

Want of confidence.	The effect of circumspection, combined with secretiveness and intellect.
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Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Disdain.

A sort of contempt.

A disagreeable affection of self-esteem.

Disorder.

Irregularity, neglect of rule.

Want of order and time; often also want of justice and benevolence.

Doubt.

Uncertainty of mind.

The effect of circumspection, combined with intellect.

Duty.

That to which a man is by any natural or legal obligation bound.

The effect of conscientiousness.

Envy.

Pain felt at the sight of excellence or happiness in another.

The effect of selfishness, combined with various inferior powers, and without benevolence.

Ecstasy.

Rapture and excessive elevation of the mind.

The faculties of marvellousness, ideality, mirthfulness, and hope, dispose to this state of mind.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Faith.

Belief in the revealed truths of religion.	The effect of marvellousness and hope.
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Friendship.

The state of minds united by mutual benevolence.	A fundamental feeling. Vid. Vol. I. p. 159.
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Fright.

A strong and sudden fear.	A strong and sudden affection of circumspection.
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Fury.

A violent fit of anger.	An affection and strong irritation of courage and destructiveness.
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Genius.

A man endowed with mental powers in a high degree.	The highest degree of activity of the individual faculties.
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Grief.

Sorrow for something past.	A state of dissatisfaction of every fundamental faculty.
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Hatred.

Ill-will.	A compound affection, it results from opposition to our selfish views, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive.
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Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Happiness.

State of satisfaction.

The effect of the satisfaction of every fundamental faculty.

Haughtiness.

Pride, arrogance.

The effect of self-esteem, sometimes combined with firmness and justice.

Honor.

Reputation, dignity.

Its basis is the love of approbation. It is often modified by self-love and veneration.

Hope.

Expectation of something which we desire.

A fundamental power. Vid. Vol. I.

Horror.

Terror, mixed with detestation.

A disagreeable, more or less compound, affection of benevolence, veneration, justice, circumspection, approbation, and configuration.

Idea.

Thought, mental image.

The effect of each intellectual faculty.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Imagination.

The power of forming ideas, and of representing ideas of absent things.	The spontaneous and great ac- tivity of every faculty; activi- ty of ideality. Vid. this Vol. p. 31.
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Impatience.

Inability to suffer delay.	Great activity of every funda- mental faculty.
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Impetuosity.

Great vivacity in action.	Great and quick activity of the fundamental faculties, princi- pally of ideality, self-love, courage, of the love of appro- bation and of mirthfulness, without circumspection.
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Inattention.

Want of attention.	Inactivity of every intellectual faculty. Vid. p. 28 of this vol.
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Indifference.

Unconcernedness.	Little activity of every funda- mental faculty.
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Indignation.

Anger, mingled with contempt or disgust.	A compound affection of self- esteem, justice, courage, and the love of approbation.
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Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Indolence.

Laziness, carelessness.

Little activity of the fundamental faculties.

Insolence.

Pride, displayed in contemptuous treatment of others.

The effect of great self-esteem, courage, and other inferior feelings, combined with little justice.

Instinct.

An impulse to act in the mind not determined by deliberation.

The effect of spontaneous activity of every faculty. Vid. this volume, p. 21.

Jealousy.

Suspicious caution, or rivalry.

A compound affection of selfishness, and various fundamental powers.

Joy.

A lively and agreeable emotion of the mind.

An agreeable affection of every fundamental faculty, particularly of the feelings.

Judgment.

The power of judging; the determination come to.

A mode of action of the intellectual faculties. Vid. p. 33. of this Vol.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Knowledge

Cognizance, clear perception. The effect of the activity of every intellectual faculty.

Love (physical.)

The passion between the sexes. A fundamental power. Vid. vol. I. p. 145.

Lukewarm.

Indifferent, not ardent. Little activity of the fundamental faculties.

Melancholy.

A gloomy temper. A disagreeable affection of the feelings, particularly of circumspection.

Memory.

The power of recollecting things past. An internal repetition of its function by every intellectual faculty. Vid. this vol. p. 29.

Moderation.

Forbearance; not going to extremities. A moderate activity of every faculty.

Modesty.

Decency, purity of manners. Little activity of self esteem with benevolence, circumspection, and justice.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Morality.

Practice of the duties of life. The effect of the faculties proper to man, particularly of conscientiousness.

Negligence.

The habit of omitting, or of acting carelessly. Little activity of the individual faculties, particularly of order, of the desire to acquire, &c.

Nobility.

Persons of high rank. True nobility results from activity of the superior sentiments.

Pain.

A disagreeable sensation. A disagreeable affection of every fundamental faculty.

Passion.

Violent emotion of the mind. The highest degree of activity of every faculty. Vid. p. 45 of this vol.

Patience.

The power of expecting long, or of suffering without discontent. Moderate activity of the faculties, supported by circumspection, firmness, and sometimes by benevolence; also, the activity of individual faculties, assisted by firmness.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Perplexity.

Distraction and irresolution of mind.	A compound affection of circumspection, combined with the love of approbation and justice, increased by little courage.
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Pleasure.

Gratification of the mind.	An agreeable affection of every faculty.
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Pretension.

Claim, true or false.	Great activity of self-esteem, increased by the love of approbation.
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Rage.

Violent anger.	Great activity of courage and destructiveness.
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Ravishment.

Violent but pleasing excitement of the mind.	A high degree of pleasure produced by the satisfaction of every faculty very active.
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Regret.

Vexation for something past.	A disagreeable affection of every faculty combined with the remembrance of some enjoyment lost.
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Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Reminiscence.

Recollection.

The peculiar memory of the power of knowing facts (*Eventuality*). Vid. p. 31 of this vol.

Remorse; or, Repentance.

Pain of guilt.

A disagreeable affection of conscientiousness.

Science.

Knowledge built on principles.

It is the effect of the reflective applied to the perceptive faculties.

Self-esteem.

A fundamental power. Vid. vol. I. p. 218.

Sensation.

Perception by means of the senses.

The knowledge of every impression either external or internal. Vid. p. 24 of this vol.

Shame.

The passion felt when reputation is supposed to be lost, or when a bad action is detected.

A disagreeable affection of the love of approbation, combined with justice and circumspection.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Sorrowful.

Mournful; grieving.

A disagreeable affection of every faculty.

Spite.

Malice, rancor.

A disagreeable affection of self-esteem and courage.

Stupor.

Great diminution, or suspension of sensibility.

A great degree of inactivity of the faculties.

Sublime.

Exalted, high in excellence.

The effect of ideality, combined with the superior sentiments, and intellectual faculties.

Temperance.

Moderation and sedateness.

A moderate activity of the inferior feelings.

Temptation.

The act of tempting, and the state of being tempted.

The effect of every active faculty which incites to action.

Tranquil.

Quiet.

The effect of little activity.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Uneasiness.

State of disquiet.

The effect of great activity of every faculty.

Unhappiness.

Distress.

The state of dissatisfaction of every active faculty.

Unreasonable.

Want of reason.

Inactivity of the reflecting faculties.

Vengeance.

The desire and act of rendering evil for evil.

Self-esteem being offended, combined with courage, destructiveness, and other inferior sentiments, whilst benevolence and justice are inactive, incites to revenge.

Virtue.

Moral goodness, that which gives excellence.

Every action conformable to natural morality; the result of the contest between the two natures of man.

Want.

The state of not having; desire.

Want, in the sense of desire, is the effect of every active faculty.

Common Significations.

Explanation according to the Faculties.

Will.

A faculty of the mind, and the determination which results from it.

Decision according to motives which are proper to man, and enlightened by the reflecting faculties.—Vid. p. 40 of this vol.

Wisdom.

The power of judging rightly.

The regulation of every action, by the rule of natural morality.

Recapitulation and Conclusion.

In this volume I flatter myself with having proved that idealogists and moralists have confined themselves to general notions of the mind, and have taken mere modes of action for fundamental faculties. I have proposed a new classification of the faculties of the mind, capable of being ascertained by observation and applicable in social life. Moreover, I have examined into the origin of the fundamental faculties, and shown that neither outward circumstances, nor education, nor the external senses, nor the will, explains their existence; but that each is innate, and depends on the cerebral organization for its exhibition.

I have particularly insisted on the moral nature of man, and am convinced that the lovers of truth will not now accuse Phrenology of teaching either materialism or fatalism, in the sense that the faculties being innate, act irresistibly. I have considered the conditions necessary to liberty, the nature of moral liberty, and the origin of evil. I have compared Christianity with the natural mo-

rality of man, and am of opinion, that true Christianity will gain by the knowledge of human nature. I have decided in favor of natural goodness, because it may rather be depended on than the goodness which is prompted by virtue. I have entered into some considerations relative to the practical part of Phrenology, and spoken of the modifications observable in the manifestations of each faculty; of the difficulty of judging of others; of the necessity of mutual indulgence; of natural sympathy and antipathy; and of the happiness of mankind. At the end I have given an explanation of several expressions according to the fundamental faculties of the mind, and their modes of action.

Conclusion.

The object of anthropology in its extensive signification is immense, extremely difficult, but important and interesting in the same proportion. It will still require much exertion to be rendered perfect. I shall be happy if I succeed in calling the attention of others to the study of man, and particularly to the consideration of his moral nature, which is essential to general happiness, and which, I think, has been too much neglected in modern times. I conclude in hopes that the things prescribed by Providence, and the victorious forces of truth will finally prevail.

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